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EDITORIAL

"MAN is born free, and everywhere he is in chains," said Rousseau. This, however, puts the cart before the horse. It is truer to say that man was born in chains, and everywhere he is struggling to be free. Notwithstanding his long history, man has not yet got rid of his chains. Indeed it would seem that sometimes nations, after having enjoyed for a period a large measure of freedom, return to their fetters when confronted with a crisis. Faith in a generous toleration and in the light of Reason is temporarily lost, and primitive forces once more rise to the surface and dominate the lives of men. Thus the tortures of Prometheus are renewed. But Reason, though exiled, cannot be slain. So long as there is life at a high conscious level, Reason cannot indefinitely be denied her proper function of guide and friend to the human soul, for without the wisdom which is her gift man cannot survive as a civilized being.

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Freedom of adventure in the realms of thought and practice would seem to be a necessity for civilized human life. There can be no lasting satisfaction with any static order of affairs, however excellent. Life's insistent demand is for scope to advance to novel forms of achievement and expression. Its denial engenders restlessness in the soul and a deep discontent. Moreover, since living consciousness is essentially creative it cannot be imprisoned in any permanent and unchanging form without ultimately falling sick of tedium and entering upon the path of decay. For vigorous health a vision of fresh ideals and far horizons is essential.

But alas, in our time the soul of humanity, whose essence is freedom, is sorely sick. And this impairment of health is for the most part due to the antagonisms of man with man, fed by fear, envy, and the unholy love of power. But the massive habits of physical nature

also contribute their quota to the frustration of human purposes. Heat and cold, birth and death, disease and famine, earthquake and storm, constitute the background to the human drama which is being played throughout the ages.

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The essence of human freedom is the power to accomplish practical purposes, to achieve ends which satisfy deep-rooted human needs. But it is just this freedom of action which is so often denied. Consequently frustration, loss, tragedy, are written across the pages of human history. Economic forces have played no insignificant part in this tragedy, and hence to-day the primary demand made in the name of freedom is the outlawing of the predatory instincts of man, and a reasonable degree of social and economic security, without which no advance in the realm of spirit can be made. But since man cannot live by bread alone, freedom also demands an environment in which certain ideal ends bearing intrinsic values can be pursued. It is this blending of ideals and economic policies which constitutes the web of human history.

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Since in every modern state there are many types of individuals and groups, each having its own character and its own worth, freedom for all is impossible without mutual toleration. Intolerance is the besetting sin of every society, against which its members must always be vigilant. Times without number it has defeated the pursuit of freedom and brought disaster and ruin. In the modern world, there cannot be freedom without a generous toleration of diversity. What is to be aimed at is not the destruction of different groups with their specific character, in the interests of a false ideal of homogeneity, but rather a balanced co-ordination of diverse groups, each contributing its own excellence to the complex pattern of human life. This form of freedom should be the ideal of all great statesmen.

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But beyond the ideal of social freedom, Plato teaches us that there is a deeper freedom which the individual soul needs for its peace. This freedom lies beyond all temporal circumstances good or bad, being based on an intuition of the eternal order of things, and upon the conviction that human life is grounded in a realm of values changeless in the midst of change. This deeper freedom can be enjoyed by all who, through understanding, come to learn that as individuals they are partners in the supreme adventure of the universe as a whole, an adventure which is concerned with the realiza-

tion of all possible value. The possession of such an intuition is, in Whitehead's words, "the reconciliation of freedom and the compulsion of the truth."

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Finally, in every human society, there has been some liberty and some restraint, and the values of human life have been won in an environment constituted by the fusion of both in some relevant proportion. Has this fact any wider significance? Does it point to freedom and restraint as operative factors in the more extensive realm of Nature? The answer appears to be an affirmative, and for this reason. In our day we are being taught to think of Nature as a vast community of events actualizing, in the temporal process of the world, values belonging to the eternal realm of possibility. Every new event coming into being in and through the creative process is said to have a dual nature. On the one hand, the event is composed of energies from the past, continuing their existence in the rôle of efficient causation, and on the other of a teleological factor contributed by the transcendent creative activity itself, which controls and directs the concrescent process. The last word is with the self-creative unity of the universe, which puts the decisive stamp of creative emphasis upon the efficient determinations of the past, as a poet decides the stresses to be laid upon words and syllables in the making of his poem, to express the weight of his thought and the clearness of his meaning. If this view be true, the events of Nature, even in the inorganic realm, are not completely determined by the past, but, in a degree appropriate to that domain, are self-creative. Above this level freedom grows from more to more.

Accordingly in nature there would appear to be the same realization of the two elements of compulsion and liberty that characterize human affairs, and thus our deep-rooted belief in freedom is not a mere idle play of the emotions, irrelevant to the physical facts of the world. But, if freedom is pervasive throughout the whole, the view of the universe which lays exclusive emphasis on efficient causation and is blind to the other equally important rôle of teleological self-creation, is clearly a one-sided account of the nature of things.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE WOLF STATE

The Very Rev. W. R. INGE, K.C.V.O., D.D., D.Litt., LL.D., F.B.A.

"Wind time! Wolf time! There will come a year when no man on earth his brother man will spare."—*Norse Edda.*

Among all the sorrows and anxieties of the present crisis in human affairs, none has caused so much consternation to thoughtful people as the open and scornful repudiation, by two of the most civilized nations of Europe, of all the moral principles, all the decent conventions, which for two thousand years have enabled human societies to live together in some degree of contentment and security. Almost all things which once seemed sacred and immutable have now become unsettled—truth and humanity, justice and reason. An apprehension of impending doom, of the break up of a great civilization, has become general.

We have seen through the pathetic falsehood of the lay religion of the nineteenth century, the last western heresy as the Catholics call it, the belief in an ineluctable law of progress, the faith in human perfectibility. This was a secularization of the Christian hope of a blissful future life. It was the natural result of an age of unexampled advance in material comfort, which, as Disraeli said, we mistook for civilization. The century of hope achieved great things, partly because Providence, as Aeschylus says, had planted blind hopes in men's minds. But to throw our ideals into the future is the death of sane idealism, as to leave our debts for the future to pay is the death of sane finance. The future is a convenient place to store our dreams and our obligations, but the future will honour neither of them.

But to surrender the law of progress is one thing; to deny the fact of progress is quite another. Are we not, in some ways, at least, better than our ancestors? We no longer eat our enemies or enslave their children; we do not examine witnesses on the rack, or burn those who attend a different church. Cruelty, which no pagan or Christian moralist included among the deadly sins, is for us the most detestable and unpardonable of crimes. Even a man who rejects the retributive theory of punishment would be wholesomely vindictive if he found a man torturing a child or even an animal. We may or may not be more chaste and more unselfish than our forefathers, but at least, we thought, we are more humane, and also less treacherous. For the sacredness of signed agreements was part of industrial civilization.

And now we have seen in Germany and Italy the justification, almost the glorification of the character which Livy unfairly attri-

butes to Hannibal—*inhumana crudelitas, perfidia plus quam Punica.* What is the meaning of it? "The coming of Antichrist" is no explanation. Is it possible that the atrocities have been exaggerated for propaganda purposes? We should like to think so, but it is impossible. In 1915 I asked Lord Bryce, who was chairman of a commission to report on the alleged cruelties in Belgium, whether they were really true. He replied gravely: "The Germans are doing things which have not been done in civilized warfare for centuries." In this war they have been ten times worse. The cold-blooded massacres of tens of thousands of avowedly innocent persons recall the worst exploits of Attila, Genghiz Khan, and Timur. The extermination of the Jews has not even the pitiful excuse of religious bigotry.

It is a phenomenon which we must try to understand. In the first place it is a local malady, which has not shown itself outside Germany and Italy, except in Russia and Spain, racked with revolution and civil war. There has been no revival of cruelty in the rest of Europe, or in America.

Next, we may confine our attention to Germany, and ask whether ruthless brutality is an ingrained vice of the German character. On the whole, national character is a myth; we can hardly be too sceptical of this explanation. We have known Germans; we have visited their country; we have read their books. The average German, as we have known him, is a rather good-natured fellow, fond of eating and drinking and making a noise; very unpolitical, regarding politics as a dirty trade which does not interest him; very industrious and efficient; fond of working in a team, giving and receiving orders, and therefore unused to liberty, for the cause of freedom is obstructed more by those who love to obey than by those who wish to rule. Many of their most esteemed writers loathe war, militarism, and tyranny; from Kant and Goethe to Eucken, Troeltsch, Harnack and Natorp their testimony is clear and strong. According to trustworthy evidence they went jubilantly into the war of 1914, but reluctantly into the war of 1939. Neville Chamberlain told me himself that the demonstration in favour of peace which greeted him at Munich exceeded all expectations. There is certainly a problem here. Has a German a dual personality, a Jekyll and a Hyde?

Germany is Nazism, and Nazism is Hitler. So the Germans tell the world. And what kind of man is Hitler? I think we must accept the very unfavourable portrait drawn by Germans like Haffner. "The Nazification of Germany signifies for Hitler a social career—the means by which a life that had gravitated from the petty bourgeoisie to the rabble suddenly ranked as an equal with the King of England." As a young man "he had sunk to the lowest position—a petty, despised police spy, poorly paid for the job." "Behold the man with-

out family or friend or calling, the adult spiteful child whom no one loves or respects, but who still clings to the life of a hero out of opera. One day he will pay them all out—the organized workers and the Jews, the artists and the Austrian State." To Papen he said: "I am over forty; I must now rule." To the British Ambassador in August, 1939: "I would rather have the war now than when I am five or ten years older." He does not really care for the Nordic race, or for *Lebensraum*, or for Germany, but only for himself, for power, and revenge.

And this man is worshipped as a demigod by his subjects. Is this incredible? It is not. When a nation boils over, the mud always rises to the top. Robespierre, Barras, Rewbell, and the rest were not much better than the group of corrupt gangsters, seven of whom have smuggled out of Germany (a capital offence!) seven million pounds of stolen public money, besides vast sums which they keep in Germany for their enjoyment. They are efficient rascals, like their model, the supremely competent Corsican brigand who plagued the world for nearly twenty years. There is nothing unexampled in the adoration of Hitler. Martial speaks of an *edictum domini deique nostri*. His lord and god was Domitian, whose reputation is no better than Hitler's. Popes before now have been equated with the Deity. "It is a little strong," said one of them, "but rather pleasant." Neville Chamberlain, on the other hand, said to H. A. L. Fisher: "Hitler is the blackest devil I have ever met," and this opinion is shared by Germans who are not intoxicated by collective mania.

How far are the German people really behind him? It is quite impossible to say. We may recall the words of Ugo Foscolo about Europe under Napoleon. "Napoleon's domination was like a July day in Egypt—all clear, brilliant and blazing; but all silent—not a voice heard, the stillness of the grave." The end came when Bonaparte, disguised as "Colonel Campbell," fled through Provence to escape being lynched. But while the terror lasts, the opposition is dumb. "Wise men," says Selden not very heroically, "say nothing in dangerous times."

Nevertheless, just as the French Revolution began in an atmosphere of idealism which appealed to many generous hearts, so Nazism rests on a philosophy, a theory of the State which did not begin with Hitler and will unfortunately survive him. The object of this paper is to consider this philosophy. No other approach to the crisis which now convulses the world would be appropriate as a contribution to this Journal. The question may be raised whether the repudiation of parliamentary government and of all the ideas which collectively constituted what Fisher calls the Liberal experiment is necessarily connected with aggressive imperialism and blatant immoralism. The answer seems to be that the theory of the State

which we have to examine demands that a nation shall be permanently on a war footing, and that this type of State is almost incompatible with democracy, liberty, and decent behaviour. We are discovering with regret that in order to combat Fascism we are obliged to a large extent to fascise ourselves. Power politics and liberty can hardly exist together.

Thucydides in his third book gives a very brilliant description of the complete dissolution of all public and private morality during the Peloponnesian war. Such a moral chaos, he says, will always recur while human nature remains the same, if the same conditions are repeated in the course of history. These conditions were the existence of a number of small cantons always quarrelling among themselves, and internally split into two political factions. The same conditions were repeated in medieval Italy, and the same results followed. Machiavelli describes them with a cool cynicism which has made his name a byword. The world finds a difference between the restraint of Thucydides and the panegyric on Caesar Borgia. The combination of parochial nationalism and class warfare was fatal to Greece, and almost fatal to Italy. On a much larger scale Europe seems bent on the same method of suicide. The outcome, as some good judges think, may be a knock-out blow by some strong Power which has succeeded in suppressing class warfare and has substituted world-conquest for parochial nationalism. This is what the philosophy of Nazism or Fascism claims, in principle, to have achieved. It offers the world peace—the peace of serfdom or of death, except for the ruling race, a *pax Germanica* like the *pax Romana* in the first two centuries of our era. It is one possible outcome of an intolerable situation, but, as will be argued in these pages, a quite intolerable and a very short-lived solution.

The deification of the State is one attempt to escape from the eternal antinomy of what is and what ought to be. It is to idealize the actual, or what the actual may become. This was not Plato's philosophy. Plato, a Christian before Christ, taught that our citizenship—our *politeuma* as St. Paul calls it—is in the city "whose type is laid up in heaven," and only very conditionally in our earthly city. He was a Hildebrandian before Hildebrand, but not a Hegelian before Hegel. The Stoics contributed two doctrines of the greatest value—the supremacy of the individual conscience as against the State, and the law of nature which is the law of God. Conscience may err, and the limitations of natural rights are open to discussion; but the words of Antigone to Creon are the charter of freedom in its inviolable citadel. "I did not think that your decrees were of such force that a mortal could override the unwritten and unfailing statutes of God. For their life is not of to-day or yesterday, but from all time, and no man knows when they were first put forth." Ultimate

judgments of value admit of no compromise. If we are true to ourselves we must be true to them.

And yet the Stoa, and the Christian Church afterwards, were obliged to compromise. They were driven to admit that there is a relative as well as an absolute law of nature; mankind "in a state of sin" must tolerate acquisitiveness, criminal laws, even war. These accommodations were energetically repudiated by what Troeltsch calls the sect-type; but the Great Church had to come to terms with an imperfect world. Ethics became dualistic; the Church offered a pass degree, as well as an honours school for those who wished to be "perfect." Augustine envisaged "two cities," the city of God and the earthly State, the Roman empire, whose victories without justice were only great acts of brigandage. He did not mean to identify the city of God with the institutional Church; but papal ambition soon made the identification under his authority; and when the Vatican had won its triumph over the Hohenstauffens the Church became itself a *civitas terrena* of a very noxious type. It must not be forgotten that Germany and Italy were the chief sufferers from the Holy Roman Empire and the Holy Roman Church.

But there was another dualistic solution, the most ruinous of all. Christian ethics, it was held, are purely personal; the State is free from all moral obligations. This is the Fascist creed; but it is much older than Mussolini and Hitler.

The clash was bound to come as soon as the Church won its victory over the Empire. What has the Church to say about war? It is not necessary to collect the proofs that Harnack was fully justified when he said, "The Gospel excludes all violence, and has nothing in common with war, nor will permit it." "Christian ethics rule out war absolutely." To argue that the teaching of Jesus was dependent on the limitations of his historical outlook is to deprive it of all permanent value. "The influence of eschatology on the ethics of the Gospel, especially on the Sermon on the Mount," says Windisch very honestly, "is not so great as I formerly supposed." The suggestion that "love your enemies" applies only to private quarrels is unscholarly. *Echthros* is used both in the Septuagint and in the New Testament for national enemies; *polemios* is not used in the New Testament at all. As late as 295, Maximilianus, executed as a conscientious objector, was canonized by the Church.

We need not discuss the very difficult problem here raised as to whether a Christian ought to be unconditionally a pacifist. It was plain to all that States do not act on Christian principles. Bacon thought that "we are much beholden to Machiavelli and others that write "what men do, and not what they ought to do." This may be doubted. The good man tries to practise what he preaches; to preach what we or others practise is shamelessness rather than candour.

Diderot thought that part of *The Prince* ought to be headed, "The circumstances in which a prince ought to be a scoundrel." "If we had done for ourselves what we have done for Italy," said Cavour, "what scoundrels we should be." But the influence of Machiavelli is very perceptible in Bacon and in Hobbes; nor should we forget the glorification of conquest in Marvel's famous Ode, when Britain was for a few years the first military Power in Europe.

Luther makes it his boast that "the temporal sword and the secular authorities have never been so highly extolled as by me." He needed the protection of the German princes, and he made this shameful and disastrous accommodation, which has poisoned German Protestantism from that day to this. The entire outward life of the Christian is in submission to the State; inwardly he obeys the Sermon on the Mount. "The hand that bears the sword of government is no longer man's hand but God's. Not man it is, but God, who hangs, breaks on the wheel, beheads, strangles, and wages war." This is a radical dualism, transferred to the motives of action in every individual, an utterly impossible cleavage. "If thine eye be single, thy whole body shall be full of light. But if the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is that darkness." The double heart makes the double head, as one of the Cambridge Platonists says. Calvin believed in the possibility of a "Christian State," and his followers have been less submissive to authority than the Lutherans. But his ethics were distorted by frequent appeals to the Old Testament, and he offered no real protest against State-worship. Appeals to Christian principles were also compromised by the obvious fact that "reasons of Church" had sanctioned as many enormities as "reasons of State."

Frederick the Great was an apt disciple of Machiavelli, never more so than when he thought of writing a treatise against *The Prince.* Voltaire saw through him at once. "Sir," he said, "the first advice that Machiavelli would have given to a disciple would have been that he should begin by writing a refutation of his book." Carlyle, unfortunately, was less acute; a transcendentalist is never quite secure against immoralism. Machiavelli's disciples have in point of fact been more logical and shameless than the satanic Florentine himself. Even Alexander I in one of his moods said to Talleyrand, who must have smiled inwardly, "you talk to me of public law, which means nothing to me. What do you suppose that your parchments and treaties signify to me?" The terrible Manicheism of human history has come into full light. It is a strife in which Ahriman is usually the conqueror. "Machiavelli," says Acton, "is not a vanishing type, but a constant influence."

That Lutheranism is still infected is shown by the influential moralist and preacher Naumann, who found "this dualism in our

consciousness—not one God but two—a riddle and a grief," but accepted it without reservation.

Hegel and Fichte, who, it must be remembered, lived at a time when their country was suffering deep humiliation at the hands of the bandit whom the Nazis regard as a hero and a model, are often regarded as the chief philosophical villains. Hegel's achievement was to insert Machiavellianism into the context of an idealist philosophy which included all the values of ethics. This was to legitimize a bastard. Reasons of State now received a quasi-religious benediction. "What is real is rational." He did not mean that might is always right, but that right is might. So did Carlyle; but it is not true. The mills of God grind too slowly for this assumption to have any practical value. Even the Jews learned this lesson at last.

Fichte's frenzied patriotism may be summed up in the American Stephen Decatur's aphorism, "My country, right or wrong," a saying often ascribed to some Englishman. The morality of the Sermon on the Mount, he says, must inspire the patriot with "deep repugnance." Yet Fichte never thought of stigmatizing freedom as a "bourgeois superstition." He is only convinced that civilization stands or falls with Germany, and that Napoleon is a devil. And somehow or other he can still say that "the honourable man has no country upon earth, but seeks his citizenship in heaven." A philosopher is sometimes at his best when he contradicts himself, and unless he is a mystic he dates himself, as Fichte certainly did.

But it is the worst side of the German idealists which has lived. "In opposition to all utopians," said a German writer in 1915, "we may, with Fichte, Hegel, and Moltke, praise war as the awakener of moral strength." "Might," says Bernhardi, "is the highest right, and the question of right is settled by the dynamometor war, which always decides biologically with justice." There is no more idealism here. In spite of Socrates, Thrasymachus remains unrefuted. It has at last become transparently clear that *Realpolitik* and Christianity are fundamentally antagonistic, and the latest apostles of State-worship have spued Christianity out of their mouths. The issue is thus clarified.

Our own thinkers have not been immune to the German virus. Not to speak again of Carlyle, moralists like McDougall and metaphysicians like Bosanquet have either accepted the Lutheran dualism, or have idealized the State in the manner of Hegel. "The State," says Bosanquet, "is the guardian of our whole moral world. It is hard to see how the State can commit theft or murder in the sense in which these are moral offences." After reading some of their utterances, we can sympathize with the indignation which led McTaggart to make the following perhaps indefensible protest: "Compared with worship of the State, zoolatry is rational and

dignified. A bull or a crocodile may not have great intrinsic value, but it has some, for it is a conscious being. The State has none."

The genesis of Fascism has been briefly traced. It is now, as has been said, a philosophy. As such, what appeal does it make to our generation?

The biological doctrine of the survival of the fittest may be interpreted to mean that power is the true aim of human endeavour. "We dined as a rule on each other. What matter? the toughest survived." The fact that Nature has exterminated the huge diplodocus and the stately mastodon, while preserving the bug and the louse, is not very promising for the great blond beast; but the will to power may make use of technical intelligence. Fascism, says Mussolini, rejects the materialistic conception of happiness, which belongs to utilitarianism and economism, bourgeois, or as they now say, philistine notions. Like the mystagogue in Lucian, the Fascists cry, "Get out, Epicureans; get out, Christians!" The "absurd doctrines" of political equality and majority rule are rejected with contempt. The General Will (Rousseau's phrase) is to be ascertained not be counting heads, but by consulting those in power. "Justice and Hitler's will are the same thing." The prevalent anti-intellectualism is accepted with alacrity. We should not think; we should will and act. The individual has no value or meaning in himself, and therefore he should have no liberty, least of all any liberty of conscience. Christianity, as Nietzsche taught, is an organized conspiracy of the weak against the strong. It would prevent superior races, such as the German, Italian, and Japanese from realizing their destiny to conquer the world. "The expansion of the nation," says Mussolini, "is an essential manifestation of vitality." The primary duty of women is to produce soldiers, and any man who has not taken part in this duty must give a valid excuse if he wishes to be employed by the State. No independent organized groups can be tolerated. Trade unions must go; and ultimately a war with the Catholic Church cannot be avoided. Even aesthetics must be enslaved. "So long as there remains in Germany any non-political art," said Goebbels, "our task is not ended." Fascist education follows the method favoured by Newman, "Pour truth into the child's mind and then seal it up in perpetuity."

This system might be described as barbarized Platonism or as barbarized Jesuitism, but to do so would be a great injustice to both. It is rather an organized worship of Moloch, based on a perverted romanticism, which when it is corrupted always becomes obscene and sadistic.

That the theory of State absolutism, carrying with it the promise of the abolition of class warfare and of individual acquisitiveness, makes a strong appeal to many generous minds among the young,

has been proved by results. Even the fantastic racialist theory, ridiculed by all competent ethnologists, has been swallowed readily and made the excuse for unexampled cruelties. It may also for a short time have a most formidable survival value, comparable to the irresistible force of the mounted Altaic nomads in the Dark and Middle Ages, which wrecked civilization over a great part of the old world. But it suffers from internal contradictions, some of which go down to the roots of human nature, which make its early break-up inevitable.

In the first place, there is no reason why the State should be chosen as the sole object of loyalty. We all belong to several different groups, some narrower, some broader than the State. Such are the family, the locality, the trade or profession, the Church, the whole comity of civilized nations, humanity itself. Each of these has a limited but definite claim upon our loyalty. St. Peter's words, "Honour all men; love the brotherhood; fear God; honour the king," embody a much truer philosophy than State absolutism.

The State is neither a person nor an organism; it is only an organization. The General Will is a figment, a stick for the backs of minorities; there is no will apart from the wills of individual citizens.

When the ethics of violence become the publicly acknowledged philosophy of the whole society, it is inevitable that other groups, which have as good a right to recognition as the State, will adapt the theory to their own ends. If moral considerations do not apply to group action, any rebellion may justify itself. The disintegrating effects of the dissolution of ethical principles and traditions were proved in ancient Greece and medieval Italy. They will certainly be proved again.

Another obvious objection is that if one State is exalted above right and wrong, so that no falsehood, no cruelty, no tyranny, can involve it in guilt, the same privilege belongs to all other States. Practically, the totalitarian State holds that no faith need be kept with foreigners, as the Catholic Church has been known to argue that no faith need be kept with heretics. But where there is no obligation of honour, there can be no trust or confidence. *Regna regnis lupi.* Fascists maintain that such obligations hold only between equals, and that other nations are only fit to be hewers of wood and drawers of water for the master race. Apart from the fact that such claims are purely ridiculous, State absolutism could only subsist when there was but one master race. We may leave Italy out of account, since the romantic dream of restoring the Mediterranean empire of Rome is altogether out of relation to the facts. The modern Italians are not a conquering race. But the utterances of Japanese militarists are as extravagant as anything that could be quoted from

German chauvinists. There is not room on one planet for two nations impelled by biological necessity to unlimited expansion.

There never was a time when the love of independence was so strong as it is to-day. The tendency during the last hundred years has not been towards the coalescence of small nations into great empires, but towards a fissiparous breaking up of composite nations into their component parts. The exceptions have been in Germany and Italy, where there had already been a racial unity prevented by peculiar circumstances. The analogy between modern conditions and Napoleon's empire here breaks down, though even the French attempt failed because it aroused dormant antagonisms to foreign interference. The French Revolution offered, and for a time and in places gave, better conditions—more "liberty, equality and fraternity"—to the peoples of the Continent than they had previously enjoyed. Germany has nothing of the kind to give, and the hatred aroused by her aggressions probably exceeds any felt before against any nation. It does not seem possible that a settlement of Europe can be reached by a universal empire established by force.

Bishop Henson in his Gifford Lectures thinks that no other nation hates war as we do, and that therefore our pacifism will meet with no response. It is no doubt true that France and England had good reasons, apart from moral repugnance, for hating war and seeking peace as long as it was possible. Both had everything to lose and nothing to gain. But I question whether the majority in any country, even in Germany, regard war as anything but a curse. The masses everywhere are quite unmoved by a policy of aggressive imperialism. The romance and chivalry of war have almost disappeared; only the horrors remain. Wars end with *vae victoribus* as much as with *vae victis*. It is hardly credible that any nation will long favour a policy of wanton aggression, at the cost of remaining armed to the teeth, and being the object of universal detestation.

The fetishes of the nineteenth century, our special contribution to civilization, are no doubt discredited, though Liberalism would revive if the danger of war were removed. But the repudiation of the absolute values, Love or Goodness, Truth, and Beauty, is a very different thing. These intrinsic values, in which, as theists believe, the nature and mind of God are revealed to us, stand in their own right, and cannot be treated as means to anything else. Men who will not be martyrs for their interests will face death for their convictions. A tyranny which invades and dethrones personality in its citadel, the soul and conscience, can no more stifle resistance than the persecutions could destroy nascent Christianity.

The claims which the totalitarian State makes upon the individual are monstrous, and quite intolerable, except as a war-measure. It follows that when Germany is no longer on a war footing, as the

result either of victory or defeat, the pressure will be relaxed, and freedom will again lift up her head. And freedom, when the common people are allowed to speak, will not favour brutal aggression.

Lastly, the question may be raised whether the nation State is likely to be the final form of human organization. The determination of national frontiers has been something of a historical accident. A European war is as much a civil war as the wars between Athens and Sparta, or between Florence and Milan. There have been times when the upper classes in the different nations fraternized naturally, as English and Hungarian nobles still do. It was thought till comparatively lately that the community of interest between the labouring classes all over Europe might prevent the outbreak of war. It is mainly fear that keeps the nations apart, though none of them would willingly surrender its complete internal independence.

No solution is yet in sight of a problem which threatens the very existence of civilization. The present international anarchy is quite intolerable. An effective League of Nations to prevent war is not out of the question; but as long as some nations think that the balance of power is changing in their favour, they will resist any attempt to stabilize present conditions. The subjection of Europe by a wolf State would be very short-lived, and the hatreds which it would arouse would sooner or later have dreadful consequences. The words of Christ that those who take the sword shall perish by the sword have on the whole been confirmed by history. Over all the efficient brutalities of the Fascist Powers hover the fetid fumes of a state romanticism. As a political philosophy, Fascism claims to be the herald of a new order; but its methods are purely destructive, and its aims absolutely vague.

CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS IN DESCARTES[1]

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1. Descartes's general rule that "whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived is true" has traditionally been criticized on two closely related grounds. As Leibniz, for example, puts it, clearness and distinctness are of no value as criteria of truth unless we have criteria of clearness and distinctness; but Descartes gives none. And consequently, the standards of judgment which the rule in fact evokes are purely subjective and psychological. There must hence be set up analytic, logical "marks" by means of which it can infallibly and without arbitrariness be recognized whether any ideas or propositions are or are not clear and distinct.[2]

In a general sense, these criticisms had been laid before Descartes himself. In the *Fifth Objections* Gassendi writes: "Why are there so many and so varied opinions among men? Each one thinks that he perceives clearly and distinctly the opinion which he defends. And lest you say that many are either being partisan or pretending, I want you to notice that there are those who even face death for the sake of the opinions which they hold, even though they see others facing it for the sake of the opposite opinions." Hence, Gassendi concludes, Descartes's main concern should have been to "propound a method which should direct us and teach us when we are deceived and when not deceived in thinking that we clearly and distinctly perceive something."[3] In the face of this objection, Descartes's reply is significant. The instance of men who face death on behalf of their opinions, he writes, "proves nothing . . . because it can never be *proved* that they clearly and distinctly perceive that which they pertinaciously affirm. And as for what you then add, that the concern must be not so much with the truth of the rule as with a method to discern whether or not we are deceived when we think that we clearly perceive something, I do not deny this; but I contend that

[1] This is the third in a series of articles on some basic problems in the philosophy of Descartes. The first two were "Experience and the Non-Mathematical in the Cartesian Method," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, II, 2 (April 1941), p. 183 ff., and "The Cartesian Circle," *The Philosophical Review*, l., 4 (July 1941), p. 368 ff.

[2] Cf. L. Couturat, *La Logique de Leibniz* (Paris, 1901), pp. 196, 202–3, with texts there cited. For a more recent version of this criticism, cf. C. S. Peirce, *Collected Papers*, 5. 391.

[3] *Vae Obj.*, VII, 278–9. Cf. *ibid.*, 318. References are to the volume and page of *Œuvres de Descartes*, ed. Adam-Tannery.

this very thing has been accurately set forth by me in its place, where first I discarded all prejudices, and then enumerated all the principal ideas and distinguished those which were clear from the obscure or confused."[1]

Descartes is here referring, of course, to the procedure followed in the first three *Meditations*. But before examining the relevant details of that procedure, it should be noted what he considers to be the general character of the "proof" of clearness and distinctness such as he mentioned to Gassendi. Whereas Leibniz demands that the criterion be "palpable," "mechanical," and lacking in "even the least difficulty," and declares that "there is no need for prolix discussions concerning our prejudices,"[2] Descartes states already in the *Discourse* that "there is some difficulty in noting well what are the things which we conceive distinctly,"[3] and tells Gassendi that "I do not believe that those who are so little concerned with the uprooting of prejudices that they complain that I have not spoken of them 'simply and in few words,' will readily perceive the method whereby we can distinguish that which is really perceived clearly from that which is only thought to be clearly perceived."[4] The setting forth of criteria of clearness and distinctness, then, will for Descartes necessarily involve a psychological discipline. Among his basic comments concerning formal logic and the "synthetic" method of demonstration, both of which he opposed to his own method, were that the former permits the mind to "go on a holiday from the evident and attentive consideration of the inference itself,"[5] and the latter "wrests assent from the reader, no matter how unwilling and pertinacious he may be."[6] Both of these methods, in their formal character, thus realize Leibniz's ideal, but only, Descartes holds, at the expense of losing all heuristic value. His own method, on the other hand, is dedicated not to exhibiting the formal interrelations of ideas and propositions but to research into subject-matters the truth concerning which is not yet known to the mind, so that the necessity which it achieves cannot be a merely formal one but must derive from the impact of the subject-matter itself upon the mind. Hence, even when the results of the method are set down in writing, but

[1] *Vae Resp.*, VII, 361–2. (Italics here and in all other quotations are mine.) An anonymous exponent of Gassendi took up the debate at this point, "denying" that Descartes had set forth a method for distinguishing the really from the apparently clear and distinct (*X*** to Descartes*, July 1641; III, 402). Unfortunately, however, his examples of men firmly convinced of the clearness and distinctness of their perceptions, and nevertheless in contradiction to one another, were all taken from theological controversy, so that Descartes was able to say in rebuttal merely that "reply to them would be very easy for one who distinguishes the light of faith from the natural light, and sets the former before the latter" (*to X****, Aug. 1641; III, 426).

[2] Couturat, *op. cit.*, p. 100, nn. 2 and 3; p. 203, n. 2. [3] *Disc. IV*, VI, 33.

[4] *Vae Resp.*, VII, 379. [5] *Reg. X*, X, 405–6. [6] *IIae Resp.*, VII, 156.

exhibiting the same procedures as were followed in the original investigation, the method "has nothing whereby it may impel an inattentive or unwilling reader to believe: for if the least bit of what it propounds be not attended to, the necessity of its conclusions is not apparent."[1] When this consideration is put within the framework of a theory of representative perception, where only ideas can be directly perceived by the mind, the reason for the psychological orientation of Descartes's method becomes evident.

Yet if Descartes's criteria of clearness and distinctness will not be logical in the formal, "mechanical" sense demanded by Leibniz, neither will they be so radically psychological as to be divorced from all logical considerations. At least there is a difference, Descartes insists, between the evidentness of clear and distinct perception and the "precipitation," "pertinacity," and "persuasion" of minds which cannot prove what they assert, or whose assertions vary according to arbitrary whim.[2] And the accomplishment of the difference comes through a certain prudence acquired by habituation: "only the prudent correctly distinguish between that which is clearly and distinctly perceived, and that which only seems or appears so";[3] for "there are few who are accustomed to clear and distinct perceptions."[4] This difference is accentuated from the side of the subject-matter itself; for if Descartes insists upon the ease and infallibility of the deduction prescribed by his method,[5] he also warns that the deduction must first be "prepared for" and "discovered," and the order of the deduction "excogitated,"[6] so that the clearness and distinctness exhibited by the process will have had to meet the tests presented by these preliminary operations upon the specific problem in hand.

2. But let us now examine the basis and development of these considerations, following the Cartesian order from the simple to the complex. The direct object of the mind's act of perception is for Descartes always an idea.[7] Ideas, however, have a double status: on the one hand, they are themselves existents, "formal essences," modes of thought; on the other hand, they are significances, "objective essences," representative of things other than themselves.[8] In

[1] *IIae Resp.*, VII, 155–6.

[2] Cf. *Disc. II*, VI, 18. *IIIae, IIae Resp.*, VII, 146, 192. *Reg. II*, X, 363. *To Regius*, 24 May, 1640; III, 65. *To X****, Aug. 1641; III, 430–1. *Princ. I*, 50, 68. *Notae in Prog.*, VIII (2), 352.

[3] *VIIae Resp.*, VII, 461–2.

[4] *Ibid.*, 511.

[5] *Reg. II, III, IV, XII*, X, 365, 369, 372, 429.

[6] *Reg. IV, XII, XIV*, X, 372, 428, 439–40, 451.

[7] ". . . ostendo me nomen ideae sumere pro omni eo quod immediate a mente percipitur." *IIIae Resp.*, VII, 181.

[8] *Med. III*, VII, 40 ff. Cf. *ibid.*, 37: "Quaedam ex his (cogitationibus) tanquam rerum imagines sunt, quibus solis proprie convenit ideae nomen."

order that ideas be susceptible of truth, they must be viewed not in the first way, or "materially," but in the second way, or "formally."[1] The total cognitive situation for Descartes thus contains three factors: perceptive act, idea (the direct object or content perceived), and thing purportedly represented by the idea. From this characterization, it is at once apparent that the clearness and distinctness of an idea cannot directly consist in the relation of "correspondence" or "conformity" between the idea and the thing. For since "we can have no knowledge of things otherwise than through the ideas which we conceive of them,"[2] it follows that if clearness and distinctness were qualities consisting in some direct relation between the idea and the thing it purports to represent, the mind, not knowing the thing without the idea, could never know whether it had attained these qualities, so that the first precept of Descartes's method, to accept as true only what is clearly and distinctly perceived, could lead only to obscurity and indecision. Clearness and distinctness, then, cannot in their essential nature be the same as truth; it remains that they are qualities internal to ideas and perceptive acts.

And yet the significatory character of ideas plays an important part in their being clear and distinct. It is precisely from the relation between these two aspects of ideas, the internal and the representative, that the difficulties which have traditionally been found in Descartes's doctrine arise. To understand the nature of those difficulties, we must first consider Descartes's general description of clearness and distinctness:

> A clear perception I call that which is present and open to the attending mind; just as we say that those things are clearly seen by us which, being present to the regarding eye, move it sufficiently strongly and openly. But that perception is distinct which is not only clear but is so precise and separated from all others that it plainly contains in itself nothing other than what is clear.[3]

It will be noted that the word which Descartes here uses is "perception," not "idea." But that he means by it the perceived rather than the perceiver, the object rather than the act, is apparent from the analogy which he draws with sight: "perception" is given the same relative status as "things seen by us." Since, however, idea and perceptive act are correlative, the requirements indicated for either will to a certain extent belong to the other as well.

In order to be clear, then, an idea must be (1) "present" to the mind, (2) "open" to the mind, and (3) the mind in turn must be "attending" to the idea. Some of the problems of Descartes's doctrine are already apparent in this formulation. It might seem that the first and third requirements are really the same, that an idea cannot be "present" to the mind at all unless the mind is "attending" to it, for "there can be no thought in us of which we are not

[1] *IVae Resp.*, VII 232. [2] *To Gibieuf*, 19 Jan. 1642; III, 476. [3] *Princ. I*, 45.

conscious at that same moment at which it is in us."[1] Moreover, it might be held that there cannot even *be* an idea unless these two requirements are fulfilled, since an idea is "all that which is immediately perceived by the mind." In these respects, difficulty might be found with Descartes's analogy of vision. For an object can be locally "present" to the eye without the eye's "regarding" the object; moreover, the objects of vision can presumably exist even while they are not being seen; but an idea is constituted both as to its very existence by the mind's act of perception, and as to its significance or representative character by precisely that about which the mind is thinking. The case is the same with Descartes's other requirement, that the idea be "open" to the mind. The analogous phrase on the side of vision is that things "move the eye sufficiently strongly and openly." The "sufficiency" to which Descartes is here referring obviously is the ability of the mind to recognize the object which is seen. But here again, does not the mind recognize *any* idea, since an idea is precisely that, and all that, of which the mind is at any moment thinking? At least, such would seem to be the tenor of definitions like these: "I call generally, by the name 'idea,' all that which is in our mind when we conceive a thing, in whatever manner we conceive it";[2] and "by the name 'idea' I understand that form of any thought, through the immediate perception of which I am conscious of that same thought."[3] In the *Nouveaux Essais,* Leibniz protests against just this definition of an idea when, to Philalethes' question, "Is it not true that the idea is the object of thought?" he has Theophilus reply, "I grant it, provided you add that it is an immediate internal object, and that this object is an expression of the nature or qualities of things. *If the idea were the form of thought, it would arise or cease with the actual thoughts which correspond to it; but since it is their object, it can be anterior or posterior to the thoughts.*"[4]

Now for Descartes it is also correct to say that ideas, at least those which are clear and distinct, represent the essences of things. But apart from the difference in the interpretation of this statement owing to fundamental metaphysical dissimilarities from Leibniz, the statement itself cannot be used by Descartes in a methodological context; i.e. he cannot consult the essences of things in order to specify the clearness of an idea, because things themselves cannot be directly perceived. It is only after the nature of clearness and distinctness has been determined, and the veracity of God demonstrated, that Descartes is able to assert that clear and distinct ideas are true. And this difference in the initial interpretation of the status of ideas also prevents a solution of our general problem along the lines given

[1] *IVae Resp.*, VII, 246.
[2] *To Mersenne*, July 1641; III, 392–3.
[3] *IIae Resp., Def. II*, VII, 160.
[4] *Nouv. Ess.*, II, i, 1.

by Leibniz. The problem to which the above considerations have pointed is, of course, how can any idea whatsoever fail to be clear and distinct, i.e. how can clearness and distinctness in any way constitute a normative requirement for ideas when, on Descartes's formulation, every idea seems *ipso facto* clear and distinct? For if what has been said about ideas makes all ideas clear, then it also makes them distinct, since the mind perceives only that which it is in fact perceiving, and nothing "other" than that. In the later discussion of the same problem by Locke and Leibniz,[1] the solution of the former, based upon the relation of ideas to their names, was amended by the latter to rest upon the relation of the idea to the thing it purports to represent: an idea is not clear if it does not permit recognition of its object. But in the Cartesian context whereby things in any case can be perceived only through ideas, this solution cannot be accepted, at least without serious qualification.

3. The difficulties which we have been canvassing arise out of the need to find in Descartes's doctrine distinctions, analogous to Locke's between idea and name, and Leibniz's between idea and thing, which will explain how clearness and distinctness can be normative qualities and yet capable of ascertainment in a methodological context, within the sphere of ideas and perceptive acts. The Cartesian distinctions are forthcoming when it is seen that the idea and the perceptive act are less simple than our above interpretations have indicated. Let us examine some instances where Descartes calls ideas obscure and confused; for the considerations on which he bases this characterization should help to reveal the nature of the opposite qualities as well. Sense perceptions are the best-known class of Descartes's obscure and confused ideas. Yet this is not the only characterization which he applies to them. They are called clear and distinct in two different contexts: (1) "when they are viewed only as sensations or thoughts,"[2] and (2) when they are used as "signifying to the mind what is helpful or harmful to the composite of which it is a part."[3] They are called obscure and confused, however, when viewed as representing the essence of material things outside the mind.[4]

From this example we may infer that the clearness and distinctness, or obscurity and confusion, of an idea are neither intrinsic to the idea nor explicable in terms of a simple relation between idea and perceptive act; for the same ideas of sensation may be both clear and obscure, distinct and confused. It seems hardly possible to say

[1] *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, II, xxix, 5–6. *Nouv. Ess., ad loc.* For Kant's echo of the same difficulty, cf. *Krit. d. r. V., Paralog.*, B 414–15 Anm.

[2] *Princ. I, 68.* Cf. *Med. III*, VII, 35. *Reg. XII*, X, 423.

[3] *Med. VI*, VII, 83.

[4] *Princ. I, 66–70. Med. VI*, VII, 83.

that the ideas involved in these different instances are in no way the same; at least Descartes applies to all of them the common name "sense perceptions." There must, then, be some additional factor whose combination with the two already indicated gives to the idea or perceptive act one or another of these qualifications. This third factor is revealed in Descartes's significant expression that the sensations are "viewed as" (*spectantur ut*). For the situation in which there enter clearness and distinctness involves not merely the passive apprehension of a directly perceived content, but also some interpretation with regard to that content. In each of the three instances given above of the perception of ideas of sensation, the same content was directly perceived; but in the first case the ideas (e.g. colours) were "viewed" or interpreted simply as sensations, in the second case as having some biologically symbolic function, and in the third as being "similar" or cognitively adequate to external material things. It would hence seem that it is in the relation of direct and interpretive contents or perceptions that the clearness and distinctness, or obscurity and confusion, of an idea are to be found.

The same conclusion emerges from consideration of other ideas which do not involve the sharp distinction between essential and non-essential representation found in Descartes's account of sense perception. Thus the ideas of the modes thought and extension, Descartes writes, "can be clearly and distinctly understood if they be *viewed not as* substances, or things separated from other things, but only as modes of things. . . . But if, on the other hand, we were to consider them without the substances in which they are, by that very fact we would *view them as* subsisting things, and so we would *confuse* the ideas of a mode and of a substance."[1] Here again the same content is directly perceived, and it is from the relation of that content to the way in which it is "viewed" or interpreted that clearness and distinctness, or confusion, result.

Descartes's doctrine admits, however, of greater generality than is envisaged in these two examples. For in each of these examples, the direct content (sense qualities, or "the modes thought and extension") is held constant, while the interpretive content varies. But Descartes also discusses clearness and distinctness in situations where the direct content varies while the interpretive content remains fixed. For example, not every idea which is interpreted to be representative of God is clear and distinct. The idea will have these qualities only if "we do not put anything fictitious into it, but note those things alone which are really contained in it, and which we evidently perceive to pertain to the nature of the most perfect being."[2] Among these "real" attributes Descartes lists "eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, source of all goodness and truth,

[1] *Princ. I, 64.* [2] *Ibid., 54.*

creator of all things, and in sum having in himself all those things in which we can clearly note some perfection which is infinite, or terminated by no imperfection."[1] On the other hand, the idolaters' "idea of God," which in its direct content representatively includes, together with perfection, such attributes as vindictiveness and corporeality, is obscure and confused.[2]

We can now see the sense in which Descartes's description of clear and distinct perception in the *Principles* is a normative characterization, and not one belonging to any idea whatsoever. For in every perceptual situation there is *some* content "which is present and open to the attending mind" (e.g. sense qualities, or "vindictive corporeal being") but this content "need not be an integral and complete perception of the thing,"[3] i.e. what is directly perceived may be other, or less, than what the mind interprets (or wishes to interpret)[4] itself to be perceiving (e.g. "matter," or "God"). Thus the direct content which, in Descartes's statement, is required to be "present and open to the attending mind" is not any content whatsoever (since every perceptual situation fulfills this condition), but rather that content which shall be "integral and complete" in relation to the mind's interpretation of it. When the interpretive content is taken as basic, then, an idea is clear if its direct content (e.g. "incorporeal," "good") includes all that which is included in the interpretation ("God"), and distinct if the direct content includes nothing other than this. And similarly, when the direct content is taken as the point of reference, an idea is clear if its interpretive content (e.g. "having biological utility") includes all that which is included in its direct content (sense qualities), and distinct if the interpretation includes nothing else.[5] In most general terms, then, the clearness and distinctness of an idea may be said to consist in the "equality"[6] of its direct and interpretive contents.

[1] *Princ. I, 22.*

[2] *IIae, IVae Resp.*, VII, 138–9, 233–4. [3] *Princ. I, 34.*

[4] Thus Descartes writes that "the ideas which I have of heat and cold are so little clear and distinct that I cannot learn from them whether cold is only a privation of heat, or heat a privation of cold, or each is a real quality, or neither" (*Med. III*, VII, 44). It is hence in relation to such contemplated interpretation of their direct content, in which one wishes to "learn from them" the nature of the qualities they represent, that these ideas are lacking in clearness and distinctness. On the other hand, an interpretation of them in terms of biological utility finds the same ideas, i.e. the same direct contents, clear and distinct.

[5] From this it can readily be seen that when the direct content is the basis of evaluation (as in Descartes's example of the clear but confused perception of pain in *Princ. I, 46*), ideas are usually clear, but their distinctness may come into question; on the other hand, when the interpretive content is made the basis, ideas may often be lacking in clearness, but if they are clear, they will usually be distinct as well. [6] Cf. *Reg. XIV*, X, 439–40.

This equality is, of course, a logical rather than a narrowly quantitative relation. In the context of science, where the concern is with the essences of things, the connection between the two contents must be necessary. The minimum requirement for an idea to be clear, then, is that whichever content be taken as basic, the other include what in the *Replies* is called the "formal nature" (*ratio formalis*)[1] of its object, and what in the *Principles* is called the object's "leading property, which constitutes its nature and essence."[2] Thus the equality between the square of the base and the square of the other two sides of a triangle "is not clearly understood unless in a right triangle";[3] i.e. the idea which is interpreted to be representative of that equality is not clear unless what is essential to such a proportion, its inherence in a right triangle, be included in the idea's direct content. Similarly, the minimum requirement for an idea to be distinct is that nothing contradictory to the essence of its object be included in it; it is in this sense that Descartes defines a distinct idea as one which "contains nothing *other* than what is clear." Thus a right triangle "cannot be distinctly understood if the proportion of equality between the squares of its sides and of its base be denied,"[4] for then the contradictory of that proportion, an essential property of the triangle, would be contained in the idea of the triangle. Similarly, "an atom can never be conceived distinctly, since the very signification of the word implies contradiction, viz. to be body and to be indivisible";[5] and "as for a true part of matter, the determinate quantity of space which it occupies is necessarily included in the distinct thought which one can have of it";[6] i.e. if the idea in which a direct content is interpreted to represent a part of matter is to be clear and distinct, that direct content must representatively include the occupancy of a determinate quantity of space.

4. But has not our discussion been confusing idea with judgment? It is perhaps a sign of the correctness of the above formulation that this same objection was made to Descartes himself by Arnauld.[7] For although Descartes insists that neither ideas nor perceptive acts, but only judgments, may incur error,[8] he holds that there is a "material falsity in ideas, when they *represent as* real what is not real."[9] It will be noted that just as perceptive acts "view as," so ideas "represent as": in each case the orientation is interpretive rather than consisting in simple apprehension. Now if ideas be

[1] *Iae, IIae, IIIae, Vae Resp.*, VII, 113, 147, 175, 368.
[2] *Princ. I, 53.*
[3] *IVae Resp.*, VII, 225.
[4] *Ibid.*
[5] *To Mersenne*, 30 Sept. 1640; III, 191. Cf. *IIae Resp.*, VII, 152. *Conversation*, V, 160.
[6] *Ibid., loc. cit.*
[7] *IVae Obj.*, VII, 206.
[8] *Med. III, IV*, VII, 37, 56–8.
[9] *Ibid., III*, VII, 43.

viewed normatively, from the standpoint solely of what they "really" represent, it is nonsense to speak of ideas not "representing" their objects "as" those objects are. Thus Descartes tells Gassendi that "the idea represents the essence of the thing, and if something be added to or subtracted from it, it forthwith becomes the idea of a different thing."[1] And from precisely the same standpoint Arnauld objects to Descartes: "that idea of cold, which you call materially false, what does it exhibit to your mind? A privation? Then it is a true idea. A positive being? Then it is not the idea of cold."[2] Descartes's reply stresses that the issue involves not merely a normative conception of ideas, but a mixture of direct content with interpretation: "I cannot *decide* whether what it exhibits to me is something positive outside my sense, or not."[3]

Such interpretation does not, of course, make the idea or perceptive act judgmental; for judgment involves an act of will in addition to perception. Hence, any object of the understanding, no matter how complex, is an idea so long as there enters no volitional act. Now a proposition or inference is not of itself volitional; it may, and in this context it indeed must, be an object of perception in the same sense as the simplest idea. For if it is simply by the act of willing an idea or perception that the judgment comes into being, must not the idea or perception have previously been a proposition or group of propositions? If the idea were logically equivalent only to a term, the addition thereto of the act of will could in no way result in a judgment. What one affirms or denies is not a term but a proposition which, having previously been simply a perceptual interpretation of a significant content, is transformed into a judgment by the volitional act of affirmation or denial.

That the interpretive perception is not a judgment is, indeed, indicated explicitly by Descartes in one of his letters:[4] "What men judge frequently disagrees with what they understand. . . . Thus, when they judge that space, which they call empty, is nothing, they none the less *understand it as* a positive thing. Thus, too, when they think that accidents are real, they *represent* them to themselves *as* substances, although they do not judge them to be substances." To "represent as" or to "understand as" is hence different from judging; and the idea which results from such an interpretive operation takes the logical form of a proposition or inference.[5]

[1] *Vae Resp.*, VII, 371.
[2] *IVae Obj.*, VII, 207.
[3] *IVae Resp.*, VII, 234.
[4] *To X****, Aug. 1641; III, 430.
[5] For a statement of indifference as to whether ideas are expressed as terms or as propositions, cf. *to Mersenne*, July 1641; III, 395: "Car, qu'elles (les idées) s'expriment par des noms ou par des propositions, ce n'est pas cela qui fait qu'elles appartiennent à l'esprit ou à l'imagination; *les unes et les autres se peuvent s'exprimer de ces deux manières*. . . ." In another letter to Mersenne (22 July 1641; III, 417), Descartes writes: "Je n'entends pas bien la question

The non-formal orientation of Descartes's method bears out these considerations. For even the "simple natures" are described as "propositions,"[1] and of course intuition, which is the elementary act of perception, is stated to have as its object now propositions, now the simple natures and their necessary connections, now consequences or series of propositions. Both the simple natures and the act of intuition are by Descartes opposed primarily to judgments, in virtue of the volitional character of the latter, which may result in "formal" falsity. But since ideas may be propositions, there is no absurdity in calling them "materially" false.

5. Once an idea has what we have seen to be the minimum of clearness and distinctness, it can become clearer if, while it is still interpreted to be representative of the same object, its direct content comes to include additional attributes necessarily connected with the interpretive content. "The more attributes we apprehend in the same thing or substance, the more clearly do we know it."[2] And by the same token, the idea will become more distinct, for the richer its content, the more is it distinguished from what is other than it: "A concept is not made more distinct by the fact that we comprehend fewer things in it, but only by the fact that those things which we do comprehend in it we accurately distinguish from all others."[3]

This variation in degree reveals another distinction, in addition to that between direct and interpretive contents, required to give clearness and distinctness a normative basis. This other distinction is between the explicit and implicit contents of an idea. We have seen that although a clear and distinct perception is "integral and complete," it nevertheless can become more clear, i.e. even more "complete." The limit of such increase is an "adequate" idea, in which are representatively "contained absolutely all the properties which are in the thing known."[4] Only God can have such adequate knowledge; the human mind is incapable of it, although it may have "complete" knowledge. Thus man may have a complete and hence a clear and distinct idea of God although this idea is by no means adequate to God's infinite perfection, just as "we do not doubt that one unlearned in geometry has the idea of a whole triangle, when he understands it to be a figure comprehended by three lines, although many other things can by geometers be known about that triangle, and be noted in the idea of it, of which he is ignorant."[5] For a direct

que vous me faites, savoir si nos idées s'expriment par un simple terme; car les paroles étant de l'invention des hommes, on peut toujours se servir d'une ou de plusieurs, pour expliquer une même chose. . . ."

[1] *Reg. V, VI, XI, XII,* X, 379, 383, 409, 410, 428.

[2] *Princ. I, 11.* Cf. *Med. II,* VII, 33.

[3] *Ibid., 63.*

[4] *IVae Resp.,* VII, 220. Cf. *IIae Resp.,* VII, 140, 152.

[5] *Vae Resp.,* VII, 368.

content not to "contain absolutely all the properties which are in the thing known" is possible only because of the logical orientation of Descartes's view of ideas. Metaphysically, of course, an idea refers beyond itself to a thing which the mind can never perceive directly; but in denying adequacy to human cognition Descartes is not relying exclusively, or even primarily, upon this basic fact; rather, he is referring to what can be ascertained in ideas themselves. Now for a strictly psychological position, an idea is precisely and exhaustively that content of which the mind is at any time aware, so that (putting Descartes's definition of adequate knowledge in terms of ideas and perceptive acts) to speak of a perception which is not aware of everything contained in an idea is a contradiction in terms. For Descartes, on the other hand, a distinction is possible between those ideas which are "fictitious," i.e. arbitrarily compounded by the mind itself, and those which the mind merely discovers without adding to their "objective reality." It still remains true that every idea not only depends upon the mind for its existence, but consists in that very content of which the mind is directly aware. But once thus constituted as a direct object of perception, an idea of the latter sort is, with regard to its further significance, an independent logical entity containing within itself a system of implications, of simple natures and their relations, which deduction may gradually reveal, and which indeed it is the task of science progressively to discover. Thus, to take again Descartes's favourite example of the idea of a triangle,

> when I imagine a triangle, although perhaps such a figure exists nowhere in the world outside my thought, and never has existed, yet it has forthwith a determinate nature, or essence, or form, immutable and eternal, which has not been made up (*efficta*) by me, and does not depend upon my mind; as is shown by the fact that various properties can be demonstrated of this triangle, viz. that its three angles are equal to two right angles, that its greatest side is subtended by the greatest angle, and the like, which willy-nilly I now clearly perceive, even if I have in no way thought of them previously when I imagined a triangle, so that they have not been made up by me.[1]

Hence, even though the properties revealed by such deductive development have not previously been suspected by the mind, these operations do not basically "augment" the idea, but merely "render it more distinct and explicit, because all these properties must have been contained in that idea which was had at first."[2]

It is important to note, however, that this variation in the degree of clearness and distinctness is possible only because an idea for Descartes involves an interpretive as well as a direct content. The "idea" which remains fixed and unchanged throughout the process

[1] *Med. V*, VII, 64. Cf. *Reg. XII*, X, 422. *Conversation*, V, 151–2.
[2] *Vae Resp.*, VII, 371. Cf. *ibid.*, 368.

in which properties previously unknown are discovered in "it" is not merely the initial direct content, since this undergoes obvious increase; it is rather the interpretive content which, equated at the outset with the direct content, is found to be necessarily connected with the "new" properties, since these are found to be necessarily connected with the initial direct content, so that the mind interprets each succeeding property to be representative of the same object. It can readily be seen how this interpretive perception is the initial methodological basis of Descartes's doctrine of substance and essence.[1]

6. Thus far we have been discussing the clearness and distinctness of ideas simply in terms of the characteristics which the ideas themselves must possess. But we must now turn to consider just how these characteristics of ideas are to be ascertained, i.e. what is that "method" of which Descartes spoke to Gassendi, whereby that which is really clear and distinct can be distinguished from that which is only thought to be so. In terms of the preceding discussion, this question has a special urgency. For on the one hand, Descartes has said that things can be known only through the ideas of them; on the other hand, in calling sense perceptions, or the idea of corporeality, obscure and confused when they are viewed as representing, respectively, the essence of material things, and God, he seems to have assumed that the mind has some independent insight, apart from ideas purporting to represent them, into the "real" essence of things. The question of how the clearness and distinctness of ideas are to be ascertained is thus basically the same as the question of how the mind, within the methodological context of ideas and perceptive acts, can ascertain that its definitions of objects, which it employs as a basis for evaluating the clearness and distinctness of the equating of direct and interpretive contents, are real and not merely nominal or arbitrary. This problem, it must be emphasized, is different from the ultimate metaphysical question of whether clear and distinct ideas are true. The divine guarantee enters only to give final sanction to the decisions already arrived at by methodological means.

These means are set forth in the *Rules* and in the second part of the *Discourse*. It will be recalled that in telling Gassendi of his "method," Descartes emphasized first the removal of "prejudices." Now a prejudice is a judgment made prior to clear and distinct perception of the content which is judged.[2] Does this mean that clearness and distinctness must be employed to attain these very qualities? The

[1] Cf. *IIae Resp., Def. II*, VII, 161, and especially *IVae Resp.*, VII, 222, where Descartes shows that substance is that which is interpreted to be the subject of directly perceived ideas.

[2] Cf. *Princ. I*, 47.

answer is given by the distinction between the perceptive act and the idea or content perceived. For it is possible that direct and interpretive contents be "equal" or necessarily connected, while the full perception of the grounds for this be lacking. This would be the case if the idea were not "open" to the mind, i.e. if its elements and the relations between them were not revealed to the extent required to justify, or to permit the deduction of, this necessary connection. In this perceptual, as against the preceding logical, sense, an idea is obscure and confused not because of an actual inequality between its direct and interpretive contents, but "only because there is contained in it something which is unknown."[1] Indeed, it is from this latter obscurity and confusion that ideas become contradictory, i.e. confused in the logical sense.[2] To make an idea "open" to the mind, to render known its elements and to see how the necessary connection of its direct and interpretive contents follows from them, is thus the purpose of Descartes's basic methodological precept whereby "we reduce involved and obscure propositions step by step to simpler ones," until we come to an "intuition of the simplest ones of all."[3]

The ultimate conceptual elements of ideas are called by Descartes "simple natures." They include, on the side of material things, such concepts as "figure," "extension," "motion," and on the side of mental phenomena, "cognition," "doubt," "ignorance," "volition." Unlike composite ideas, in which it is possible to discriminate from one another not only direct and interpretive contents, but also various parts of the direct content, the necessity of whose connection with one another in the idea is not self-evident, the simple natures cannot be misinterpreted, for it is impossible to discriminate in them a direct and an interpretive content. To think of these simples at all is to think of them completely, and hence clearly; similarly, their very simplicity makes it difficult for the mind to confuse them with, i.e. interpret them as, anything "other" than themselves, so that they are perceived distinctly as well.[4] Since all composite ideas involve these simples, it follows that to attain a clear and distinct perception of any composite idea requires the reduction of the idea to these self-evident elements and then the perception of the precise way in which they are combined in a necessary nexus to form the idea originally in question.

[1] *IIae Resp.*, VII, 147. [2] *Ibid.*, 152.

[3] *Reg. V*, X, 379. The *de omnibus dubitandum* of the *First Meditation* is just such a systematic reduction of ideas received "from the senses or through the senses," to the thoughts which are their elements.

[4] *Reg. XII*, X, 418–420, 422. The further refinements which Descartes makes on this doctrine of the simple or primitive "notions" (*Princ. I*, 47 ff., and *to Elizabeth*, 21 May 1643; III, 663), since they involve essentially the same principle as the discussion of the *Regulae*, although in a broader context, are here passed over.

This reduction does not, of course, result in an "adequate" idea. For in order to be clear and distinct, the idea must in its direct content represent only the "formal nature" of the object which it is interpreted as representing, but not the object or "matter" itself—the idea of infinity, for example, must not itself be infinite, just as the idea of obscurity need not be obscure[1]—so that the reduction will attain not the total system of implications in which an idea is involved, but those elements which are "sufficient"[2] to establish (or refute) the necessary connection of the idea's direct and interpretive contents. The various "relations or proportions" in which the proposition was initially involved will hence have been so "reduced" that the equality between its direct and interpretive contents will itself be "clearly seen."[3] The reduction attains this perceptual clearness and distinctness because it enables the mind, within the methodological context of ideas and perceptive acts, to "distinguish that which pertains to the true and immutable essence of a thing, from that which is attributed to it only through a fiction of the understanding."[4]

The contents of a fictitious idea, such as that of a winged horse or of a triangle inscribed in a square, can be clearly and distinctly conceived in separation from one another, i.e. even if one part be explicitly denied of the other, each can still be fully conceived without in any way contradicting the significance which it presents to the mind. An idea will be representative of a true and immutable nature, then, if the connection of its contents is necessary, not contingent, so that they cannot be sundered by way of a "real" distinction: "although one can think of the one without paying any attention to the other, one cannot, however, deny it of that other when one thinks of both."[5] "Those ideas which do not contain true and immutable natures, but only fictitious ones compounded by the understanding, can be divided by that same understanding not only by abstraction, but *by a clear and distinct operation*, so that those which the understanding cannot thus divide have undoubtedly not been compounded by itself."[6] If, then, the mind finds that it cannot deny the parts of ideas of one another and still be true to the meaning which each part directly presented to it, such ideas are representative of objects which are essential natures independent of the mind for their being what they are. The direct contents of these ideas are seen, as a result of this "method of difference," to represent the essence, or at least part of the essence, of the objects which they

[1] *Iae, IIae, Resp.*, VII, 113, 147–8.
[2] Cf. *IIae, IVae Resp.*, VII, 140, 152, 221.
[3] *Reg. XIV*, X, 440.
[4] *Iae Resp.*, VII, 116.
[5] *To Gibieuf*, 19 Jan. 1642; III, 474. Cf. *VIae Resp.* VII, 443.
[6] *Iae Resp.*, VII, 117.

are interpreted as representing, so that the direct and interpretive contents are equal to one another.

It will have been noted, however, that the criterion of "immutability" stated in the second quotation given above was the inability of ideas to be divided "by a clear and distinct operation," which Descartes goes on to specify as meaning "rightly understanding what I say." Here again, as previously in the discussion of the discarding of "prejudices," the logical sense of clearness and distinctness, as characteristics of ideas, is stated to be ascertained by clearness and distinctness as characteristics of the perceptive act which, resulting from the reductive process, finds necessity of connection within the ideas. An excellent example of this process is the famous operation upon the wax in the *Second Meditation.* It is required to ascertain the essential nature of matter. A direct content which is interpreted to be representative of matter is chosen, consisting in the various sense qualities which the wax initially presented. Then these qualities are put through a series of reductions to see whether they and the interpretive content "so depend upon one another, that one can in no way be changed while the other remains unchanged."[1] It is found that the sense qualities are changed, although the wax still "remains the same." Hence, those qualities are essentially "other" than the wax, and the interpretive perception of them as representing the essence of the wax was not distinct. This "identity" of the wax throughout the changing of the direct content, which is greatly emphasized by Descartes,[2] can be understood only through the interpretive aspect of his doctrine of ideas. It is because the interpretive perception is held constant that the reductive process can be viewed, in the methodological context, as going from accidental to essential attributes of the *same* object, and not from one set of ideas to another set wholly unrelated thereto. The process consists, then, in gradually divesting the direct content interpreted as representing a certain object of the "forms external" to that object, i.e. of those qualities with whose denial the object can still be conceived, so that there is no necessary connection between the object and those qualities. The end of the process comes when a direct content is attained which survives every reductive device, remaining so long as the object can be conceived, and without which the object can no longer be conceived. This direct content is hence necessarily connected with the interpretive content whereby the mind thinks of the object in question, and constitutes the

[1] *Reg. XII,* X, 429.

[2] "Remanet adhuc eadem cera? Remanere fatendum est; nemo negat, nemo aliter putat. Quid erat igitur in ea quod distincte comprehendebatur? Certe nihil eorum quae sensibus attingebam; nam. . . mutata jam sunt: remanet cera." *Med. II,* VII, 30. Cf. *Princ. II, 4.*

essential definition of that object. And only in virtue of such a reductive process is the resultant perceptive act clear (as attaining the essence of the object, in that the direct content which is actually representative of the essence of the object which it is interpreted as representing has been made "present and open to the attending mind") and distinct (as excluding everything "other than" what is essential). The wax is thus ascertained to consist essentially of extension and mobility, not of any peculiar colours, sounds, and tastes; hence, at the conclusion of the reductive process whereby the sense qualities are removed, Descartes writes that the perception of the wax "can be either imperfect and confused, as it was before, or clear and distinct, as it now is, in so far as I attend less or more to the things of which it consists."[1]

The physical manipulation which the procedure of the wax involves is the most graphic but not the only form which the reductive operation leading to this perceptual clearness and distinctness may take. The culmination of the process, Descartes points out, consists in an "inspection of the mind alone." The same operation in principle occurs when infinite perfection is found to be essential to God: ultimately it is the impossibility which the mind finds in conceiving the latter without the former that methodologically shows the idea equating them to be a real definition, representative of a "true and immutable nature."[2] These essential definitions consist, of course, not in genus and differentia but in various combinations of simple natures.[3] Once attained, they can then be used to test the clearness

[1] *Med. II*, VII.

[2] *Med. V*, VII, 67, ll. 21–4. It is because Descartes holds that he has shown in this way that the idea of God as an infinitely perfect being represents a true or real essence, and is not merely a nominal definition, that he maintains that his ontological argument, unlike that of St. Anselm as reported by Thomas Aquinas, is neither verbal nor fallacious. Cf. *Iae Resp.*, VII, 115–19. *To Mersenne*, 15 June 1641; III, 383.

[3] Definitions by genus and differentia, as viewed in the Aristotelian tradition, presuppose essentially different kinds of things, so that to define any given species requires showing the genus to which the species belongs, and then the form which differentiates it from other species of the genus and constitutes it what it is. Such definitions are hence basically additive: the differentia adds a characteristic which is essentially other than that of any other species. The Cartesian definition by simple natures, on the other hand, adds no "new" characteristic, but consists in a different arrangement or "mixture" of the same basic elements possessed by all other things; such definitions are hence "mechanistic" (cf. the example of a right triangle to exhibit what is meant by "species," *Princ. I, 59*). The only point at which the Aristotelian differentia would enter into the Cartesian scheme is in the initial separation of the "material" from the "intellectual" natures. There is, however, a certain analogy between the two methods; just as for Aristotle if the definition of a species states the genus alone it has not differentiated the species in question from other species, i.e. the definition is not "distinct," but if it states the

and distinctness of all other ideas which are interpreted to be representative of the objects defined. It is thus that the idolaters' "idea of God," where the direct content includes "vindictiveness" and "corporeality," is shown to be confused; for both these qualities imply imperfection, the former because it is a tendency away from goodness, and hence toward non-being, the latter because whatever is corporeal is divisible, and "it is a greater perfection not to be divided than to be divided," so that "if you mean (by 'God') only what is most perfect in the nature of body, this is not God."[1] The procedure is now deductive, and consists in "comparison" of the essential definition with other ideas, through as many intermediate steps as are necessary.[2] It is in this sense that Descartes mentioned to Gassendi, as the second part of his method of ascertaining what is really perceived clearly and distinctly, after the removal of prejudices by the process of reduction, that he "enumerated all the principal ideas and distinguished those which were clear from those which were obscure or confused"; i.e. he set forth which ideas constituted the real definitions of God, the mind, material objects, and which not, so that deductive comparison could then ascertain what further ideas interpreted as representative of these objects would be clear and distinct.

The discovery of what ideas represent the essences of things is thus effected by operations internal to ideas and perceptive acts. It is precisely because ideas are viewed by Descartes as being representative of things which are not themselves perceived directly, that clearness and distinctness, characteristics emerging within these operations, are not in their immediate nature the same as the transcendental relation of conformity between ideas and things which Descartes calls "truth,"[3] so that the methodological orientation must be supplemented by a metaphysical one culminating in the divine guarantee. This addition, which later rationalists, like Spinoza, were to find superfluous, indicates from the side of things the circumspection which similarly controls Descartes's internal approach to clearness and distinctness themselves. It is by subjecting the mind to the coerciveness exercised by the internal meanings of ideas, rather than by subjecting those ideas to the whims of a dogmatic mind, that these qualities are ascertained. That this is Descartes's real emphasis has been overlooked by the traditional interpretation

differentia it also includes the genus (cf. *Met.* VII 12, 1037b, 29 ff.); so for Descartes if a definitory idea contains that mixture of simple natures which represents the "formal nature" of its object, but other ingredients not necessarily connected therewith, the idea is clear but not distinct, but if it is distinct it is also clear (cf. *Princ. I, 46*).

[1] *IIae Resp.*, VII, 138. Cf. *Med. V*, VII, 67–8. *Conversation*, V, 161.

[2] Cf. *Reg. XIV*, X, 439.

[3] *To Mersenne*, 16 Oct. 1639; II, 597.

of his method because of the opposition, insisted upon in that interpretation, between the rationalistic and the experimental approaches to science. Yet both the formulae themselves of clearness and distinctness and Descartes's actual application of them show that these qualities pertain as much to the experimental methods of agreement and difference which he employed in his physical operations as to the operations dealing with the "intellectual" natures in which sense experience plays no part.

The purpose of physical science for Descartes is to explain the phenomena of material nature by a deductive system of ideas whose principles are the simple concepts of extension, figure, and motion, which represent the essence of all bodies. The clearness and distinctness of the ideas or propositions of physics will require necessity of connection, then, not only within the deductive system itself but also between each explanatory proposition and the class of phenomena which it is designed to explain: the phenomena, or effects, or direct contents, and the explanations, or causes, or interpretive contents, will similarly have to be "proved so to depend upon one another that the one can in no way be changed while the other remains unchanged." The ascertainment of this mutual dependence, in turn, involves recourse to "crucial" experiments whereby it is determined which of various possible explanations, each a certain "composition" or "mixture" of the material simple natures logically compatible with the prior propositions of the system, is in fact necessarily connected with the phenomenon in question: "in order to be able to ascertain which of these causes is the true one, it is necessary to consider experiments which cannot agree both with the one and with the other";[1] or, in another statement, "to seek out some experiments which will be such that their outcome will not be the same if it is in one of these ways that the effect is to be explained, as if it is in another."[2] A clear and distinct idea in physics, then, especially when detailed problems are being dealt with, must be an experimentally verified idea: a proposition purporting to be explanatory of a given phenomenon must be "equal" to that phenomenon and not "other" than it, but the ascertainment of this requires recourse to experiment, because science must be of the actually existing world, whose objects, as existing, the senses alone reveal determinately to the mind, whereas the pure understanding would be unable to differentiate which of its ideas represented actually existing material things and which only possible ones. Nor is this appeal to phenomena and experiment a departure from the intra-ideational orientation of Descartes's method. For the phenomena, as dealt with in the method, are themselves "ideas" directly perceived through the senses, and representative, although confusedly, of the

[1] *Description du Corps Humain, XVIII*, XI, 242. [2] *Disc. VI*, VI, 65.

existing material things which the scientific ideas represent clearly and distinctly. A scientific idea, then, finds its place as clear and distinct within the system of physics in virtue of a triple necessary connection: (1) with the basic principles of extension, motion, and figure which, as the example of the wax showed, represent the essence of material things; (2) with the ideas preceding it in the deductive system; and (3) with the particular phenomena physically caused by and hence representative of the particular material existents which are to be explained.[1]

The basic emphasis of the method of clearness and distinctness is thus upon the testing and confirmation of scientific ideas: the principle is that "for right philosophizing . . . the greatest care must be taken not to admit anything as true which we cannot prove to be true."[2] And the factor determining which ideas are representative of the essences of various objects, and hence clear and distinct, consists in that which the ideas themselves compel the mind to perceive after it has reduced them to their elements and tried to separate and combine them in various ways. There is, indeed, a psychological aspect of the method also, as is shown, for example, in Descartes's description of intuition as "a pure and attentive mind's conception, so facile and distinct that there remains no doubt concerning that which we understand."[3] But this facility and indubitableness are regarded by him as effects rather than as causes of clearness and distinctness in the logical and perceptual senses, as culminating the process whereby the mind recognizes the contents of ideas to be of such sort that it is unable to perceive them in any way other than the connection before it. It is in this sense, not in a narrowly psychological one, that Descartes can say, as Burman reports, that "whether or not perceptions are clear we shall know best from our own consciousness, and for this it is of the greatest help to know all those elucidations of things which the author set forth in the first book of the *Principles*."[4] The method of clearness and distinctness as Descartes develops it hence exhibits no merely psychological or subjective criteria, but rather logical and perceptual ones which the mind is to use in order to ascertain the conformity of its thought with a world external to it.

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[1] Cf. *IIae Resp.*, VII, 135.
[2] *Vae Resp.*, VII, 354.
[3] *Reg. III*, X, 368.
[4] *Conversation*, V, 160. Cf. *Princ. I*, 47 ff.

GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY

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THE aim of psychology is first of all to describe how we think, or the flow of our consciousness, and then to sum up the facts in terms of principles, generalizations, or "laws" which "govern"[1] our thinking. These laws must enable us to foretell what a man will think and how he will act when we know his environment and the state of his thought at any given moment, provided that no unforeseeable exercise of free will intervenes. Psychology has also to inquire whether interventions of "free will" ever do occur and, if they do, what is their nature and scope.

The "laws" sought by psychology should be as precise and clear, as free from ambiguity or vagueness, as those of physical science. Therefore they must avoid not only metaphors and analogies but also any terms which have not been defined with the utmost possible clarity. And where the subject-matter of psychology requires the introduction and definition of a concept—such as the Ego, self, soul, or spirit—that does not belong to the natural sciences, the role of that concept should be reduced to a minimum in the "laws" which psychology formulates for the purpose of summarizing up-to-date experience.

No psychologist to-day doubts that every psychical event is accompanied by a physical event in the neurones of the brain,[2] although the converse of this proposition—that every change in the physical condition of brain neurones is accompanied by a change in consciousness—is almost certainly untrue.

If we assume that (I) *to every psychical event* (to every thought in the mind) *there corresponds a physical event* (a flow of nervous impulses in the brain), two more hypotheses concerning the nature of the physical events will enable us to describe, in the familiar terms of physical science, how the physical events change and consequently how thinking proceeds. We shall then have formulated, or discovered, "laws" of thought. Their truth, and the validity of the hypotheses on which they rest, will depend upon how far they fit experience.

[1] See below, p. 44.

[2] Professor Köhler, for instance, writes: "I share the opinion of those who contend that all phenomena without any exception are the correlates of somatic processes in the nervous system" (1), p. 70. Cf. also Sir Charles Sherrington, O.M., F.R.S. "Between the individual human mind and the individual human forebrain considered in time and space there is a 100 per cent correlation" (2), p. 316.

The following hypotheses suffice for this purpose: (1) That the physical event which accompanies and corresponds to any particular thought is the conduction of nervous impulses in a particular group of brain neurones and across the synapses between them in the manner explored by direct experiment in other parts of the central nervous system.[1] (2) That the passage of impulses across a synapse in the brain leaves the resistance of that synapse permanently lowered in some degree.[2] (This is the neurological basis of habit and of memory.)

A train of argument starting from these two hypotheses and guided by experience of thought processes leads to the second and third laws of thought. They depend, however, for their validity not merely or chiefly upon the logic of the argument but upon the fact that their consequences fit experience. They are:

(II) *Excitement*—i.e. the conduction of nerve-impulses—*in any nervous arc tends to spread to every other arc that is connected to the first by synapses with thresholds low enough for that excitement to overcome.* This is the Law of Diffusion.

(III) *Of all connected neurograms*—groups of linked neurones—*the most excited tends to drain the excitement from the others.* This is the Law of Convergence.

If to those is added the Law of Action, that (V) *action is the natural end of every train of thought,* we have four generalizations (printed in

[1] Philip Bard has recently detected that even a fleeting touch, say on the foot, is followed a moment later by electrical disturbance, fleeting also, at a definite spot of the surface of the roof-brain. The position of the brain-spot varies within limits with the place of the touch on the foot (Harvey Lect., *Bull. New York Acad. Med.*, xiv, 585, quoted by Sherrington (2), p. 256).

Köhler assumes that cortical neurones are so intimately connected with one another through their synapses as to make "the tissue as such a macroscopically coherent entity" ((1), p. 208). Our hypothesis is not incompatible with, but does not imply, that of Köhler. On the other hand, Köhler's account of memory traces seems to involve our hypothesis, for he holds that the memory traces of any particular thought are "physical entities in the cortex" (p. 278) having their own particular place, or "pattern" (p. 236), in the brain tissue. "The trace," he says, "obviously 'does something' about" cortical occurrences "beyond itself" (p. 334). Köhler adds that "such traces of past events are left in just those locations in which corresponding processes have occurred. Thus the remnants [traces] of visual experience are . . . localized in the visual cortex, those of auditory perception in the temporal region of the brain, and so forth" (p. 245).

[2] This hypothesis goes beyond Köhler's corresponding assumption that "Neural events tend to modify slightly the state of the tissue in which they occur" (p. 236). Köhler supposes that memory traces are confined to chemical changes, but that they do not account for "association" or "habit." The lowering of a synaptic resistance so as to create or strengthen a new connexion in the cortex accords with Sherrington's picture of the "learning of new ways" ((2), p. 279) by enlarging the scope of motor behaviour.

italics) which between them sum up and account for the phenomena of involuntary thought in so far at least as these have been checked against the consequences of the four laws. That is to say, the four laws and the hypotheses on which they rest fit experience and are thus far true.

If now we assume the freedom of the will, we have to add another law to "govern" voluntary or willed thought and action. This law of Psycho-physical Interaction may be conveniently formulated thus: (IV) *Will can reinforce the excitement in any active neurogram*[1] the activity of which is already affecting consciousness. But it is unnecessary to suppose that the will intervenes in everyday life except only to resolve conflicts.

The purpose of our thinking is that we may better adapt our behaviour to our environment and even alter the outside world to our advantage. To this end our thought, which guides our action, must give us a sufficiently true picture of the "real" world.

A distinction must be drawn between the *things* of the real world and the *facts* of our experience. We thus avoid assuming the identity of physical reality, or things-in-themselves, with the facts that we know. The identity may exist, but we cannot take it for granted. So we use the word *fact* to describe a thing as it is generally assumed and defined to be, after verifying that the fact fits all available experience of the thing. We then define the fact as "true"; and so long as all our facts remain true, so long as they continue to fit all available experience, we find the world of things behaving as if it were identical with the realm of facts. Everything in our experience is as if our facts were indistinguishable from the real things they stand for, whether those things are what Köhler calls "segregated wholes" (*Gestalten*) or relations between them.[2] So soon as some new experience does not fit the facts, they are replaced by new ones that fit *all* available experience. For instance, the fact or law of gravitation formulated by Newton was replaced by a new and slightly different fact when astronomers verified that, as Einstein had pre-

[1] These five laws of thought are quoted from the present writer's *Education and World Citizenship* (3) as revised in his *Knowledge and Character* (4),

[2] Köhler believes that there is a "dualism in nature" ((1), pp. 364, 411), because, he says, "the physical world contains, on the one hand, facts as such and, on the other hand, dynamic factors which either oppose or facilitate the occurrence of these facts" (p. 364). But the dualism disappears when we realize that the realm of facts is being gradually constructed—both Koffka ((5), p. 35) and Köhler ((1), p. 142) use this world—to form an ordered whole (see (4), chapter x). Facts are not all born free and equal. They differ from one another in value ((4), particularly pp. 201, 210). Their mutual relations, Köhler's "dynamic factors," determine their places and values in the realm of facts, where these mutual relations are indistinguishable from "mere facts" ((1), p. 411) or at least from particular partial aspects of those facts.

dicted, the sun bends the path of a ray of light passing near it. The realm of facts is Köhler's "transphenomenal physical world" and Koffka's "geographical environment." Koffka observes that "physical reality is not a datum but a constructum" ((5), p. 35). He does not notice the distinction between the realm of facts which men construct and the "real" world, the world of things, which can be altered by human effort but may exist independently of human thought.

For the purpose of reasoning about the realm of facts, scientific thought breaks up concrete facts of direct experience into "essences," or particular partial aspects, so simple that each of them can only be thought of as a whole. The physical world as we experience it turns out to be such that scientific thought can arrange these elementary facts or essences in a certain order, Poincaré's "hierarchy of facts" ((6), p. 16). As scientific thought proceeds towards its goal—Whitehead's "neat trim tidy exact world" ((7), p. 110)—this order of the realm of facts approximates ever more closely to an ultimate order the properties of which have been studied. Since it is found to be dominated by its innermost essences, which are also the most valuable, this ultimate order has been called an "endarchy" ((3), p. 163; (4), p. 178). One of its features is that every one of its constituent essences is on the average linked to every other by a minimum number of intermediate essences, so that there is a minimum average path between any two essences. It is, indeed, an organization of knowledge such that thought about the world as known to science can proceed with a maximum of efficiency and a minimum of effort.[1]

Such a way of organizing thought is a mode of conceiving the real world as we experience it; a mode which fits that experience and enables future events to be foretold; and a mode which is therefore true. But we can be no more sure that the "goal of scientific thought"

[1] When this aspect of the endarchical organization of the realm of facts was first pointed out in 1921 ((3), p. 223) a footnote referred to Mach's statement, quoted by Henri Poincaré ((6), p. 28) that "the part of science is to effect economy of thought." Köhler ((1), p. 351) also cites Mach's principle and points out how it is "in accordance with Mach's principle" that our cortical correlates of the physical world "tend toward a more even shape." Without accepting the Gestalt psychologists' principle of *isomorphism* and so assuming that the "even shape" belongs to our neurograms, or cortical correlates, of the world as we think of it, we may agree that this world—Köhler's "phenomenal world" and Koffka's "behavioural environment"—tends towards an even shape. Two results follow, and both of them were noted in 1921 (3). First, the realm of facts—Köhler's physical or "transphenomenal" world and Koffka's "geographical environment"—tends to assume an even or symmetrical form (see the diagram in (3), p. 204 or (4), p, 208). Second, our neurographies tend to "short-circuit" ((3), p. 237) or round off the facts of experience, so that our neurograms tend to correspond to a simplified version of the realm of facts rather than to the realm of facts itself.

reached in this way is absolutely true—that the "endarchy of knowledge" ((4), p. 202) belongs to things-in-themselves as well as to the facts we find out about them—than we can be sure of absolute truth in any other connexion.

While, however, this organization of thought serves men's interrests, it is by no means the outcome of a human plan. On the contrary, the instinct of curiosity seems to move men to organize their thought in just this way.[1] This consideration raises a new issue: no longer the organization of thought in general, but that of your thought or my thought in particular. It is now a question of your knowledge or mine instead of what there is for us to know. In Koffka's terms, we move on from the geographical to the behavioural environment.

It is good for each of us, and for the society to which we all belong, that our thought, and therefore our neurograms, should be organized so as to correspond as nearly as may be to the realm of facts. And it is good for us and for our society that, although the organization of our neurograms—or, in a word, our "neurographies"—cannot correspond exactly with the realm of facts, our thought should still be organized and integrated as nearly as possible in the form of an endarchy. Towards this goal also we are helped by the instinct of curiosity. But we shall not come very near to the goal unless the involuntary drive towards it is assisted by voluntary effort, our own and that of our educators.

Much of this ground is covered by the Principles of Gestalt Psychology expounded in Professor Koffka's big book (5). But his principles are not always free from metaphor and analogy, nor is he as careful as he might be to define the precise significance which he attaches to some of the terms employed in his exposition. Thus he makes great play with psycho-physical energy, despite Professor A. V. Hill's objection ((8), pp. 6, 7) to the term energy being used to explain mental phenomena. Koffka has still more to say about (psycho-physical) force, or at least about force which is certainly not physical. But although his index gives more than eighty page references to this quasi-force, and an even larger number to a supposed psycho-physical field of such forces, Koffka never defines what such a force may be. He appears to use the word "force" as a synonym for "cause" or "causation." Köhler does almost the same, but not quite.[2]

[1] "Curiosity urges men to discover the realm of facts . . . and to build up their own neurographies so as to resemble it" ((4), p. 244; see also (3), p. 248).

[2] Köhler gives as his reason that he knows no other form of action at a distance save only "the class of 'forces' or 'fields' " ((1), pp. 334, 335). He goes on to say this "properly speaking this term"—force—"cannot be defined"

Koffka recognizes that every thought in the mind, every psychical event, is accompanied by a physical event, some kind of occurrence in the brain. But apart from the very disputable assumption of *isomorphism*—"that the 'motion of the atoms and molecules of the brain' are not 'fundamentally different from thoughts and feelings' but in their molar aspects, considered as processes in extension, identical" ((5), p. 62)—Koffka resolutely avoids any hypothesis about the nature of the physical event that accompanies a thought: a word used throughout this paper to include affects or feelings as well as cognitions. Despite the researches of such men as Hughlings Jackson, Sir Charles Sherrington, Sir Henry Head, and Sir Henry Dale, Koffka regards the molecular aspect of behaviour as "entirely beyond our ken" ((5), p. 375): "our knowledge of the central nervous system," he writes ((5), p. 52), "is almost a blank."

Koffka therefore ignores the microstructure of the brain and concentrates upon its macrostructure. In his own phrase, he treats the brain in a "molar" rather than in a "molecular" manner. He writes of it almost as if it were a homogeneous isotropic medium resembling the aether postulated by modern physics. Yet he believes that the brain retains, may be so long as life lasts, traces of some at least of the physical events that have occurred in it during the passage of thoughts through the mind, and that these traces are located in the "excited area" (p. 441) where the physical event took place. When, however, the same, or almost the same, thought reappears before the mind at a subsequent time, Koffka supposes that the new physical event takes place in a new place: a "slightly different area" (p. 442). Even when we hear the All-Clear, a constant tone sounded for a definite period of time, "the whole deposit consists of dead traces except for its 'tip' where it is just being *made* by an excitation" (p. 447). Surely it would be simpler, and therefore preferable, to suppose that, in such a case, the impulses corresponding to the *constant sound* continue to pass along the same neural paths while those corresponding to the *changing time* alter their location from one moment to the next.

In agreement with Köhler ((1), chapter vii), Koffka regards memory traces as wholly chemical in character: they are "chemical deposits" ((5), p. 441) or a "sediment" (p. 442). But they involve no change in structure. For Koffka, but not for Sherrington ((2), (p. 341). Yet "all facts which occur in a person's brain are causally determined; i.e., according to this reasoning they are due to forces" (p. 362). On the other hand, in Köhler's view "it is incorrect to say that 'causally determined facts in nature' and 'the operation of forces within contexts' are two expressions for the same thing" (p. 364). It is, however, abundantly plain that, whatever Köhler's "forces" may be, they are not physical forces measured, as such forces are, by the acceleration they would produce in a unit of mass in a unit of time.

p. 279), "structure is innate" ((5), p. 549), and Koffka is unalterably opposed to "a synapse theory of traces" (p. 457). Yet he recognizes that "potentially every new process may affect later processes through its trace, so that each process alters the organism" (p. 548); and "quite evidently a repetition of a run," or of any other action or thought, "even if it occurs a considerable time after the last, does not leave a trace independent of the preceding ones. Learning, rather, depends to a great extent upon the manner in which new deposits combine with old traces" (p. 456). How this may happen he leaves obscure, but he holds that it is due to "the dynamic intercourse between an excited area and the trace of a former excitation," and he suggests that "the interaction may be due to a leap of electrical potential between the two areas, when they are in contact, or between each of them and the field between them, if they are not adjoining" (p. 441).

If Koffka could only accept McDougall's "synapse theory of traces" his account of memory might be much simplified. He could then suppose that the physical event accompanying thought consists of the passage of impulses across brain synapses; that this passage, besides its temporary chemical effect, notably the liberation of acetylcholine discovered by Sir Henry Dale, may leave a permanent physical trace in the shape of lowered synaptic resistances so that future impulses tend to travel by the same path; and that, in this way, the physical traces, or neurograms, of successive and sufficiently intense thoughts become linked together. How much clearer is such an account of the physical counterpart of thought organized than to say, as Koffka does, that the organization of two taps into a pair depends upon "dynamical intercourse between chemical deposits" ((5), p. 441) and to leave it at that.

However, Koffka's or Köhler's "memory traces" do offer an equivalent to neurograms, or, at least, to *acquired* neurograms. But Koffka gets into great difficulties because he will have nothing to do with *innate* neurograms or inherited psycho-physical dispositions. He rejects—indeed, he repudiates—"the disputable term instinct" ((5), p. 356). When, therefore, he wishes to account for the fact that a newly hatched chick will peck at a grain of corn and leave untouched the gravel around it, Koffka is compelled to postulate "certain demand characters" in "behavioural objects" ((5), p. 356), i.e. in the chick's environment as it sees it. If my instinctive reaction to the lion in my path is wholly due to a "demand character" in the lion and not at all to anything in myself, it seems strange that this "demand character" should be lost upon the lioness.

We have summed up Koffka's alternative to our first law of thought and to our hypotheses concerning those physical events in the brain which correspond to thoughts in the mind. We have now

to present Koffka's version of the other four laws and of the organization of thought which depends upon three of them. It is according to these laws that the procession of physical events occurs in the brain. The corresponding psychical events mark the flow of consciousness. We remind ourselves that our "laws" are no more than statements of propositions or principles which comprehend an unlimited number of phenomena. The phenomena are "explained" as particular examples of the working of these general "laws." But, of course, a scientific law is not a part of nature. It is only a way of comprehending nature, a hypothesis (as we said) consistent with up-to-date experience. It can never be proved to be right. It can only be shown to be plausible. And it is not immutable, for it may have to be altered in the light of experience still to come.[1] No alteration seems, however, to be needed in order to account for any of the very large number of experimental results presented in Koffka's book.

According to our second law, the Law of Diffusion, excitement tends to spread from the excited area or neurogram to other linked neurograms, the extent of the diffusion depending on the strength of the links (the lowness of the thresholds of the connecting synapses) and the intensity of the excitement. Koffka presents this law in a less general form. He calls it "the law of reproduction: a part of a trace tends to establish the whole process that gave rise to the whole trace" ((5), p. 568). Or, as we should say, excitement in part of a system of neurograms tends to spread to the whole system. And the law holds in this more general form whether the system of neurograms is the trace of a single process—corresponding to a single train of thought which had previously occurred and is *reproduced* when the system is re-excited—or whether the system originated in several repetitions of an experience, or even if it was wholly or partly innate.

William James wrote of the stream of consciousness that "like a bird's life, it seems to be made of an alternation of flights and perchings" ((10), vol. i, p. 243). Our second law relates to the flights, our third to the perchings. The Law of Convergence describes how the excitement, which has been diffusing through linked neurograms, comes together again. The neurogram through which the impulses now flow is more intensely excited because of this convergence. Among the neurograms from which excitement is drained in this process will often, if not always, be the "self-system" of neurograms. My self-system is always excited in some degree while I am awake because thoughts of myself are never far removed from the focus of my consciousness. When my self-system thus links up with the neurogram excited during my current train of thought, the excitement of the latter is increased and maintained for some little time at

[1] Cf. Professor L. L. Thurstone ((9), pp. 44, 45).

a high level by means of a circular nervous process. That process has been studied and described ((4), pp. 109, 110). It would seem to consist essentially in the reinforcement of the cerebral excitement by impulses drawn from other parts of the brain and eventually perhaps from visceral arcs excited when the affective elements in the self-system make themselves felt as emotions and conations.

One result of this "boosting" is that the corresponding thought activity tends to remain before the mind, occupying the focus of consciousness for an appreciable time: the "perching" of thought. Another result is that it leaves behind it a more than usually vivid memory. The corresponding physical event is the formation of a more than usually deep neurographic record: a neurogram that is likely to be re-excited on subsequent occasions. Through such a trace as this, and perhaps only through such deeper traces, will the train of thought be afterwards recalled: as Koffka observes, "whatever has interested us, attracted our attention, is relatively easily recognized" ((5), p. 596).[1] Thus the train of thought, and the memory traces of it in the brain, is punctuated and subdivided into segregated wholes having much in common with the Gestalten that figure in Koffka's book.

According to our third law, it is the neurogram which is most excited at any given moment that tends to drain the excitement from other active arcs, including those of the self-system. Take, for instance, the fulfilment of a purpose. Some idea of myself enters into all my purposes; so the neurogram of my purpose will include elements from my self-system as well as others corresponding to my intended action and to the signal for it ((4), chapter viii, particularly p. 157). When therefore the signal occurs—when, to take Koffka's example, I am intending to post a letter during my walk but forget about it as I think of other things until suddenly a pillar-box reminds me of my purpose—nervous impulses arrive from my retinas in that part of my pillar-box neurogram which lies in my visual cortex. They find it already excited in some degree (although not enough to make me think of pillar-boxes) by the spread of excitement from the neurogram of my purpose to post the letter. The pillar-box neurogram is thus doubly excited. The third law says that this neurogram is then likely to drain the excitement from other active arcs, including the cortical correlate of my train of thought about other things. At the same time, a thought of the pillar-box, which, apart from my purpose to post a letter, I should never have noticed, comes into the focus of my consciousness. It is immediately followed by a thought of my letter to be posted. My purpose is thus fulfilled.

[1] See also (5), p. 621: "The goodness of a trace seems to be one of the factors that determine its availability . . . to produce recall."

Since Koffka will have nothing to do with the "synapse theory of traces," he has to find an alternative to our third law in order to "explain" the fulfilment of a purpose. His account of the matter is that "letter-boxes will influence my behaviour directly only under special conditions, viz. when I want to post a letter. Their dynamic function then is to effect the actual execution of a deferred action; they affect the Ego in such a way that a system—intention to post a letter—which up to that moment was under tension and did not control the executive, gains that control. The action itself, however, derives ultimately from the intention, i.e. from the tension within the particular Ego system" ((5), p. 354).

Action, according to our fifth law—we postpone consideration of the fourth law—is the natural end of every train of thought. "The whole neural organism," wrote William James, "is, physiologically considered, but a machine for converting stimuli into reactions; and the intellectual part of our life is knit up with but the middle or 'central' portion of the machine's operations" ((10), vol. ii, p. 372). "*Movement,*" he added, "*is the natural immediate effect of feeling irrespective of what the quality of the feeling may be. It is so in reflex action, it is so in emotional expression, it is so in the voluntary life*" ((10), vol. ii, p. 527, William James's italics). "I incline," writes Sherrington, "to endorse the challenging remark, that, 'the most fundamental function of mind is to guide bodily movement so as to change our relation to objects about us' " (§ 2), p. 324). Sherrington is quoting McDougall ((11), p. 235).

Now excitement is most likely to spread when it is most intense. Whenever, therefore, convergence occurs (according to our third law), excitement being concentrated while the train of thought seems to stop for a moment on the completion of a stage, then is the moment to expect some form of bodily activity due to the escape of the central excitement through outgoing nerves. Köhler, indeed, after describing the process of "organization and grouping" the flow of thought into segregated wholes, adds that "some of the best psychologists in America" claim that as each segregated whole is separated from the next, there is an overt movement or at least a tendency to movement ((12), p. 127). But Koffka's expression of our fifth law is that when the situation is as described in his account of posting a letter, "the next step is that our behaviour changes, the unrelieved stress gets command of the executive" ((5), p. 354). And Koffka's dynamic explanation of behaviour never gets beyond the phrase that the field obtains control of the executive. McDougall, reviewing the American edition of Koffka's book in 1936, made this comment: "One might expect at least some intelligible definition of the *executive.* At first one supposes the word to be equivalent to *motorium,* to be a new name for the whole of the efferent side of the

nervous system. But nothing so simple is meant. It does include all this, but much more also. 'The executive comprises all the ways in which action can relieve stresses or contribute to such relief.' . . . We have thus as the final outcome of Koffka's elaborate attempt at dynamic explanation of behaviour: the field determines behaviour by obtaining control of a process which leads to the attainment of the goal sought" ((13), pp. 331, 332).

Our fourth law, like the others, is a hypothesis consistent with up-to-date experience. It concerns the freedom of the will. It makes the plausible assumption that there is in man something more than the living cells which make up his body. It supposes that this society of cells is, in its molar or macroscopic aspect, essentially different from each of the individual cells of which it is composed. Just in the same way, each of these cells is, in its molar aspect, qualitatively different from its constituent atoms: it is alive and they are not. Precisely similar atoms constitute inanimate matter. But when they belong to living matter, the life which does not reside in them individually is yet a quality of them all collectively. Why should not another quality—we may call it spirit—which does not reside in the individual cells of the human body yet be found in them collectively? Certainly, no decisive experiment has ruled out this possibility. Nor is there any experimental evidence that the spirit of man, if it exists, may not interact with his body.[1]

Now there is much to lose and nothing to gain by deciding against the hypothesis of interaction unless and until we are forced to do so by the facts (see (4), p. 119). We therefore assume the interaction of spirit and body. But we said at the outset of this paper that the role of any concept which does not belong to the natural sciences should be reduced to a minimum in any formulation of laws of thought. Accordingly our fourth law does not go beyond postulating that the spirit can act upon the body in one simple way: by reinforcing the excitement in any active neurogram. As we have seen, this reinforcement would occur if the neurogram were linked by a low resistance path to the self-system, or if the corresponding thought were connected with the self. And this is precisely what Koffka

[1] The case for psycho-physical interaction has been presented by McDougall (14). It is summed up by the present writer in (4), p. 117, where, among modern British and American psychologists, William James, Bernard Hart, Charles Spearman, and Morton Prince are cited as interactionists. In his latest book Sherrington has declared himself on the same side: "The theoretically impossible does happen" ((2), p. 313). He adds that "when in the developing soma its integrated assembly of chemico-physical systems reaches a certain completeness and complexity mind [or, as we said above, spirit] appears, [it] does seem to prompt an inference that the latter is a result of the former. But . . . we have, it seems to me, to admit that energy and mind are phenomena of two categories" (p. 318).

believes to happen; although he would be deeply shocked by the suggestion that he has any truck with "vitalism," which he defines as "a dualism between blind mechanical and ordered mental forces" ((5), p. 560). Indeed, the Gestalt psychologists vehemently deny interaction. Koffka, however, approaches our fourth law when he writes, "Attention, like attitude"—Koffka's omnibus word for all affects, emotions or conations—"is a force which starts in the Ego," and adds "attention, adding energy to the particular field part, will increase its articulation, if it is not articulated as well as it might be" ((5), p. 206). (By increasing the articulation of a field part Koffka means what we should describe as deepening a neurogram or lowering its internal resistance.) Koffka returns to the same thought at the end of his book. "Concentration is effective only inasmuch as it supplies the problematical external situation," or the cortical correlate of the problem to be solved "with sufficient energy" (p. 636); and "the fact that 'we' concentrate on a problem shows that the Ego is needed to hold the problem in the actual behavioural environment" (p. 642).

We observed that the spirit acts upon the body only to resolve conflicts. These conflicts are apt to occur when thought is proceeding involuntarily according to the laws of dispersion, concentration, and action. Then the spirit intervenes by an exercise of will according to our fourth law. Koffka says, in effect, the same thing when he writes, "Controlled action . . . implies conflicting forces" ((5), p. 419).

And so we come to the organization of thought. Its purpose as we said is to adapt our behaviour to our environment and even to alter that environment to our advantage. Koffka devotes a large part of his book to this problem.

He begins by distinguishing between "behavioural" and "geographical" environment ((5), p. 27). My "behavioural environment" is the picture of the world formed in my mind and represented by the neurograms in my brain. The "geographical environment" is what we have called the realm of facts. It is Köhler's "transphenomenal world" ((1), pp. 104 *et seq.*). It is not necessarily identical with the real world, but is the "constructum"[1] of scientific thought about the world as we experience it. And Koffka's geographical environment, like our realm of facts, is an organized whole, a *multum* not a *multa* ((5), p. 5), a Gestalt. (We said that it tends towards the form of an endarchy.) Koffka would not, however, claim that "the universe and all events in it form one big Gestalt." But "Science will find Gestalten of different rank in different realms" and "every Gestalt has order and meaning" ((5), p. 22).

Moreover, Koffka's "behavioural environment," like a person's neurography in our account, also tends to become an organized

[1] See footnote 2 to p. 39 above.

system. "Instead of mere aggregates, in which the individual members more or less lose their identity and individuality articulated Gestalt systems may be built up" ((5), p. 526). Finally, just as our laws of thought lead to the conception of an ideal personality possessing a perfectly integrated and ordered mind, to which a single organized system of neurograms corresponds ((4), p. 236), so Koffka, at the end of his book, inclines to "the view that personality is a Gestalt" (p. 678).

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ETHICS AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS

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An Indian student, returning, after completing his course at a British university, to his own land, told his tutor that in India at least he would find once more that truth was one and indivisible. On being asked what he meant, his reply was that in England everyone separated scientific from religious truth, but that to Indian thought they were one. So familiar is this dualism of truth to us that we pass over its strangeness without question. In the Middle Ages Europe was of the same opinion as India is now. What then is the reason for the rent we have torn in the seamless vesture of truth? The answer is found by retracing our steps to the days when the old wineskins of theology were bursting under the pressure of the Revival of Learning, and, more important still, the layman was becoming the scholar. The Reformation issued no general licence to every man to think as he liked, but it at least allowed freedom of thought within certain bounds. Had Thomas Hobbes, for example, been born in 1488 instead of 1588, he would hardly have lived to die abed at the age of 91. Hobbes was not a great thinker, but he was a great iconoclast, and he created a critical temper of thought which showed itself in many who were in no sense Hobbists.

After the Restoration, science, now considerably safer territory than theology, became the fashion. The Royal Society received its charter of incorporation in the same year, 1662, which saw the passing of the Act of Uniformity. The coincidence of dates is not without significance. The same influences which sought to compose the differences of the religious bodies, worked towards a tacit compromise between science and religion. The sphere of reality was bisected. To science was allotted the earth, to theology heaven. Up to a certain point and period, the compromise worked well. Newton's first law of "philosophizing," that no more causes of natural phenomena are to be admitted than such as are true, and sufficient to explain such phenomena, was sufficiently ambiguous to escape being recognized as a challenge to supernatural explanations of natural events, but sufficiently plain to serve as a tactful warning. Newton, however, was a religiously minded man, and the secularity of his science did not disturb the sincerity of his faith.

Not until the nineteenth century did the compromise break down. The first gust of the storm came when the geologists assigned to the rocks an antiquity of creation which Genesis knew not. This made possible a new conception of the age and origin of life. The *Origin of*

Species appeared in 1859, the *Descent of Man* in 1871. The storm became a hurricane which threatened to sweep away every landmark in its track. The power that had made Galileo recant was not to be found in nineteenth-century Britain, but the controversy was far more bitter. The laity took sides, some for "science," some for "religion." The result was that the mind of the country, as a whole, became obsessed with the notion that science and religion were uncompromisingly opposed to each other. That idea remained when the dispute had worn itself away. The Church became wiser, the opposition more tolerant. But the aftermath of the controversy was that it became generally recognized as bad form—a thing the Englishman dreads more than he dreads the devil—to introduce any reference to religion into scientific discussion. The purity of scientific truth must be uncontaminated by incursions from the spiritual side. Hence, as the Indian student found, two types of truth exist, but must exist apart.

The bearing of this upon ethics is not remote. Ethics claims the status of a science, and few now dispute the claim. Yet it is evident that a science which deals with human nature and with what ought to be, cannot be modelled upon the sciences which deal with inanimate nature, and what is. None the less, as Viscount Haldane has put it, "Most of the confusion which has characterized the history of reflection has been due to the assumption that a particular set of universals would prove sufficient for the description of objects differently characterized in facts disclosed in nature." We all realize that the universals of seventeenth-century theology were inadequate to comprehend the discoveries of Galileo. But many still seem persuaded that the universals of the physical sciences can be applied to the humanistic sciences, that the properties of inanimate nature are reflected in human nature. Motives, for example, have been treated as if they were wind currents, and purpose disregarded because it finds no counterpart in the behaviour of solids, liquids, or gases. A corollary of this conviction is that ethics as a science must not be upon speaking terms with Christian ethics, which is a separate study belonging to the forbidden sphere of religion.

This bifurcation of truth affects both ethics and Christian ethics adversely. The isolation of Christian ethics forces it to find a home as a sub-department of theology, and under that tutelage it is not led to seek many affinities with other ethical systems, either those of the moralists or of the non-Christian religions. The limited value of such a truncated study is shown by the fact that some theological colleges omit it from their curriculum, and in divinity examinations it is seldom more than an optional subject, taken by only a few of the candidates. Yet, on the face of things, Christian ethics should be of far more practical importance to the average minister of religion

than the extensive knowledge of patristic controversies and Hebrew irregular verbs which is usually administered to him by his college tutors.

Ethics, however, has suffered no less, probably more, from the separation. European ethics have been built upon Christian ground, and the design of every ethical code and every ethical system current in modern Europe has been influenced enormously by Christianity, even those which are critical of, or claim independence from, Christianity. This is particularly so amongst democratic and Protestant peoples. Democracy is directly linked with Christian conceptions and the Christian scale of values, whilst Protestant communities, not having any standardized interpretation of Christian morality, have therefore been free to discuss the subject. It is a curious fact that whilst no one would seek to understand Hindu or Burmese ethics without close acquaintance with Hinduism or Buddhism, it seems quite possible to many writers to approach European ethics apart from the moral teachings of Christianity.

Some of these writers, with that fierceness which is so often a camouflage, perhaps unwitting, of their uncertainty, proclaim their entire ethical independence of Christian principles. If we, in the lawyers' phrase, accept that statement "without prejudice," it still remains that whether modern ethics be Christian or not, it cannot return to the ethical conceptions of the Greeks. It is interesting to imagine what would be the reception of Aristotle's "high-minded" man in modern society. Aristotle declares that he is worthy of great things, and knows it, deservedly thinking himself fit for honours. Yet he will be only moderately pleased with even noteworthy honours, knowing they are less rather than more than he merits. Since nothing better is possible, he will however accept such honours, but will despise the honours paid by ordinary folk on trivial grounds. High-mindedness is impossible without good breeding, and the high-minded man may even seem supercilious in his consciousness of his superiority. He is not ready to endanger himself in small affairs: indeed there are few things he values enough to allow them to bring him into danger. In the hour of great danger, however, he is reckless, as life is not worth living without honour. He is ashamed to receive benefits, since they yield a sense of inferiority. Rather will he return a benefit with interest and so turn the obligation upon the benefactor. Indeed he will even forget benefits received whilst remembering those rendered, since his aspiration to superiority is hurt by the remembrance of being indebted to any man. Nor will he bestir himself unless great honour or great results are to be won.

To Aristotle this "high-minded" man is the happy warrior whom every Greek in arms would seek to be, the man whose vocation is to be occupied with high things. To-day it is certain that he would

forfeit his deposit if he stood as a candidate for parliament in any constituency in the British Isles, and would be blackballed if he sought election to any club. To Aristotle the injunction "Set not your mind to high things but condescend to things that are lowly" would seem, as it seemed to Nietzsche, slave morality. The average Englishman probably does not know who said this, but he would agree with the sentiment far more readily than with the sentiments of the "high-minded" man. He approves the gentleman, not the high-minded man. Yet to Aristotle the term gentle prefaced to manhood, would have seemed as incongruous as to speak of shabby magnificence or distorted beauty.

Whether we like it or not, therefore, it remains that the ethics of modern Europe are to be understood only in the light of the profound influence which Christianity has had upon them. If they react against Christian standards, it does not alter the fact that the reaction must be measured with reference to those standards. Yet the unhappy division of secular and sacred has led to the methodological blunder of approaching modern ethics with no special reference to its background and the source of most of its principles. In this country for the last fifty years, the young student of ethics has usually started with the familiar textbooks of Muirhead or Mackenzie. Muirhead has three incidental references to Jesus in his book and none to St. Paul. Mackenzie makes one reference to Jesus, remarking that He was neither recluse nor ascetic, and quotes St. Paul twice. But Mill is referred to eighteen and Kant nineteen times, often at length. If we ask ourselves which has had the greater influence upon both the theory and practice of morals, the Sermon on the Mount, or what Carlyle called the "pig philosophy" of Hedonism, the epistles of St. Paul or the *Critique of Practical Reason*, the absurdity of such disproportion leaps to the eyes. The young student, however, naturally accepts his first textbook as a norm and takes his idea of the scope of the subject from it. Little wonder that ethics is often ridiculed as uncertain and profitless—an amazing travesty of a subject that should be the most proper part of the "proper study of mankind."

Let us concede, however, one exception, at least, to this ethical myopia. The most remarkable treatment of ethics that has appeared during the past dozen years, probably indeed during the present century, is that of Nicolai Hartmann. It has this merit, amongst many others, that it realizes in some part the contribution of Christianity to ethics, for example in giving the fundamental moral value of purity which the ancient world did not know. It finds place amongst the virtues for brotherly love and personal love, trust and faith, hope and humility. Hartmann makes no profession of Christianity and has no belief in a personal God. But his ethics should be

mentioned as meeting in some degree the criticism I am urging, that the foolish separation of religious from secular truth has crippled the teaching of ethics and yielded the spectacle of teachers seeking to explain ethics wrenched from its historical background to mystified and uninterested students. If it is impossible to understand the British Statute book apart from the Bible, it is no less incomprehensible when ethics is set forth without reference to Christian ethics.

If then we are to pay any respect to the historical aspect of facts, the study of Christian ethics should be the prerequisite of our approach to ethics in general. Indeed we might well go further and suggest that the prolegomena to the study of ethics is not, as Green thought, a stiff dose of metaphysics, but some acquaintance with the history and development of moral ideas from the earliest times, and in the great religious systems, particularly those like Buddhism and Zoroastrianism which have a strong ethical emphasis. European ethics does not owe much to the East, but that is no reason why it should not learn from it. The great religions do not suggest that there is a basis for moral law in humanism. Alike to Hinduism which swarms with gods and godlings, and to Buddhism which, in its original form, was uninterested in the divine, *karma* is a fundamental law of existence. It does not arise as a method of reward and punishment. It is just the expression of reality, of things as they are. *Karma* is: there is no interest shown in asking why it is. True, man's life creates his *karma*, but the oriental no more inquires why *karma* exists than we inquire why space and time exist. *Karma* is but one of the many conceptions of the East which show us that our ways of envisaging moral questions are not, as we seem to think, the only ones worth considering. Another gain we might obtain from the East is its added testimony to the conviction of Christian teaching that the moral law is an expression of the nature of ultimate reality. Some of our physicists have been telling us that the laws of nature are statistical rather than causal, that possibly the quantum laws are the only glimpse we have of a real law of nature, the rest being expressive of our ways of thinking about nature. The laws of nature are, we realize, in no sense authoritative in the sense in which the moral law has authority. They are expressions of what is, and the expression is always "under revision" if we find any better way of stating the facts. There is an absoluteness about the fundamental moral law which no law of nature knows. Most of us have had sufficient shocks from the amazing paradoxes of small-scale physics and the quantum theory to be prepared for any revision of our traditional scientific ideas. But it is impossible to imagine any conceivable justification, for shall we say, betraying the friend who trusts us, cruelty to the weak, or deliberately acting unjustly. It is concerning things like these that our strongest and most unshakable

convictions arise. The world's religions hold that in these things we meet a law which is more than a human law, that here we are at the very roots of our being.

Against that testimony arises the modern humanist re-echoing with the Sophists and Hobbes that moral law is simply the expression of man's own experience. If that is so, it is difficult to see what advantage morality has over a universal and strong system of laws which does arise from man's experience—that of etiquette. A society without manners is unthinkable, yet the saying "manners maketh man" is true only in the converse. Man makes manners, and what man makes he can unmake. If morality be based purely upon society, it can change with the changes of social life. In Bergson's words a state of war makes "murder, pillage and perfidy, cheating and lying, become not only lawful, they are actually praiseworthy. The warring nations can say with Macbeth's witches: 'Fair is foul and foul is fair.'" If we are to hold, in Levisky's words, that "spiritual values are human values, and there is no power but the power exercised by men who understand the laws of nature and the development of human society," what reply has Humanism when Nazi ethics of *Herrenvolk* domination are written in blood over Europe, the laws of nature and the development of human society as understood by Germany? The testimony of the world's religions that the moral law is not of man nor by man is the only final reply to Nazism, and the only basis for an enduring morality.

Many moralists are somewhat sensitive upon this point and insist that ethics needs no sanctions from religion. Possibly some of them are still thinking of the old notion of supernatural rewards and punishments as a means of enforcing right conduct. If so one may entirely agree, but this is not at all the point before us. It is rather that moral law must be regarded as based not on the experience of man but on the source from which man himself proceeds, whether that source is called God or not. Personally I would say God outright and be done with it, but if anyone prefers some such non-committal phrase as "the ground of our being" or "reality," it does not make any difference that is essential to the issue. It is, of course, true that up to a certain point ethics can be taken as sociology is taken, that is as a study of human nature and its expressions, without reference to the source of humanity. It is when we come to the sense of obligation which is the very root of morality that we are compelled to ask from whence it comes. What is, is, whatever be its origin. What ought to be must justify the existence of that "ought." Let it be granted that it is likely that religion and morals in their earliest history had separate origins, and that ethical theory can proceed comfortably without raising any question of religion. Moreover, many individuals either possess or profess no religious faith and

exhibit exemplary lives. None the less the psychological fact remains that ultimately it is what is thought which determines what is done. Morality at last resort depends upon the philosophy of life which underlies it. If that philosophy decay the morality is undermined. It may last in that condition for a long while and still function, but in the end it must collapse.

The psychological truth that action is determined by thought is obscured by another psychological factor—that we are primarily more interested in action than in thinking. Our press gives news in terms of what is being done, and we are apt to look on life from that angle. None the less every form, shall we say, of government has some political theory behind it, an underlying philosophy, even if it be as questionable philosophically as morally. *Mein Kampf* expresses the philosophy behind Nazism. Karl Marx afforded the philosophical raw material of modern Russia, even though his doctrines have been submitted, like wool to the processes of washing, combing, and dyeing before being made up into the garments of Soviet political economy. Democracy, particularly that of the British Empire and the United States, is based on the Biblical estimate of the value of human life and the relation of man and God. No non-Christian State is democratically governed. To Aristotle democracy was suspect as a form of mob rule, and even if we take the best types of such democracy as Greece knew, they were far removed from democracy as we understand it to-day.

Our confidence that democracy must triumph over Fascist ideals is due to the Christian atmosphere of our mental upbringing, to the sentiments due to Christian influences. If there is one thing definitely Christian about this country it is its sentiments, and sentiments are much more influential in building character and ideals than is reasoning. If anyone wished to defend Hitler's New Order from a moral point of view, it would not be at all impossible. Plato's *Republic* recognizes the doctrine of *Lebensraum*. For sheer need to extend the boundaries of the prosperous State, according to Plato, an army will be required to cut for one's self a slice of a neighbour's territory and to prevent him from doing the same. It would be possible to quote Aristotle's doctrine that slavery was in accord with the laws of nature, since the weaker are ever the prey of the stronger in nature's realm. It could be asserted that to make the State supreme and to sacrifice the individual to it, was in accord with the greater good of the greater number, an approved doctrine of Utilitarianism. It might be pleaded that it is also racially the best, setting the interests of the unborn generations above those of the present. If Christian values are to be set wholly aside, it would be easy to make quite a good case for either Fascism or Communism in their attitudes regarding the State and the individual.

Other writers have stated the case by saying that whilst morality needs no support from religion, it does require ethical principles, and some have admitted that it is in religious systems that these principles have been most frequently expressed. It is certainly true that such principles are needed if ethics is to be more than an expression of sentiment and prejudice. But what is to justify the principles? The Nazi, as I have suggested, can make out a case for his principles, the democrat for his. Who shall decide which principles are right if the grounds of decision are purely humanistic? But an ethical system which holds that its principles—not necessarily the particular expression of them—are neither made nor abrogated by man, but belong to the order of reality which is conceived as fundamentally a moral order, has a far stronger reason for its convictions. Philosophers are to be found who doubt this, but with all respect to their learning, it remains that the future of morality, and even of ethics, is much more closely connected with the convictions of the average man than with those of the philosopher, and to the average man what has just been said will seem self-evident.

It is likely that the recognition of the point at issue has been obscured by the fact that for many centuries the general outlook of Europe has been coloured by the Christian estimate of life's values, and these have been taken for granted, as if they were accepted facts. Nietzsche startled the nineteenth century by hurling his proto-evangel of Nazism into the midst of its complacent convictions. But a quick recovery from the shock followed. Nietzsche lapsed into insanity and was written down as a mere paranoiac. But now, in the twentieth century, new and avowedly anti-Christian systems have spread in Germany, Russia, and Turkey and even raised discord under the very shadow of the Vatican.

The challenge to the accepted scheme of values is now both sharp and severe. No compromise is possible. The new anti-Christian political systems have their basis in ethical principles, at least in principles claiming ethical status. How are we to vindicate our democratic faith against them, except by vindicating the philosophy which underlies it? The average Briton believes in democracy, but he is not likely to possess any philosophy of democracy. Still obsessed by the policy of isolating religion in its proper museum, a church, he probably imagines that there is no specific connection between democracy and Christianity. Let him look more closely and he will see that anything that can be called Christian civilization must depend on underlying Christian moral principles.

The present situation and world crisis is a further and urgent reason for the annulment of the decree of divorce so hastily and unwisely pronounced between ethics and Christian ethics. To answer the bastard philosophy of the Fascists we must be able to demon-

strate the sounder thought that underlies our own democratic principles which are founded on what is but the broad Christian conception of life. If anyone can lay other foundation than that which is laid, that is if new principles can be stated for democracy, it remains that historically it has been always true that the Christian ethic has been the basis of that form of government. We should still need acquaintance with Christian ethics for the understanding of the rise and rationale of democratic thought.

Moreover, what was said earlier of the loss to ethics and Christian ethics by separation can now be set off by reminding ourselves of the gain of their closer union. Christian ethics would be studied anew, not by theologians with dogmatic prepossessions, but by moralists who would see in it the revolutionary principles of a movement which turned the ancient world upside down, and in the end made a new world "safe for democracy." The uncompromising challenges of Jesus and the early disciples have been obscured by a system of ritual and doctrine far removed from the Galilean gospel, of later date and cast in alloyed metal. Christian ethics would gain greatly by the independent research of the undoctrinal type of mind.

Ethics in general would also gain. If it were set in its historical connection with Christian ethics, if the moral principles of the other great religions of mankind were also woven into our treatment of the subject, we should remove the reproach so often levelled at the study of ethics that it is abstract and indecisive. The student usually approaches ethics with some anticipation of interest, and leaves it with relief tinged with disappointment. That need not be. The future of humanity is at stake. If every generation is to produce some megalomaniac to set fire to civilization, the ever-increasing capacity of the engines of destruction will in time end the history of man on this planet. No armies, no fleets of warships and planes will abolish war. All they can do is to balance war and peace in unstable equilibrium. It is the might of the idea not the might of the sword which can create the new age. Ethics, revived by closer contacts with the world of facts and of ideas in which man lives and works would be of real service in the building up of the new order of thinking that precedes the new order of living.

I would plead, therefore, that Christian ethics as a separate subject should be abolished. It could, of course, be studied separately just as one may study the ethics of Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, or Kant separately, but it should be just as much and even more a part of general ethics as any of these. Christian ethics has far too long been treated as a clerical monopoly, The attempt of the Hegelians to base ethics upon metaphysics has broken down. The road they imagined they could discover, leading in a sweeping dialectical curve from what is to what should be, has led to an unbridgeable

gulf. Whether Lotze's suggestion that a road from what ought to be to what is may be discovered is yet to be seen, but if such a road exists it can be found only by those who start at the point Lotze suggested. The reverse way is impossible. It may yet be that the values men have seen darkly in the mirror of their faith will prove the true basis of ethics. Be that as it may, the splendid isolation of nineteenth-century ethics has had its day. Isolationism is a lost cause in the moral as in the political world. The reunion of ethics with the Christian ethics which, historically, did so much to enrich ethical thought will make for the lasting enrichment of both.

THE WORLD AFTER THE WAR

(The Foundation Oration delivered at Birkbeck College on June 24, 1942.)

THE RT. HON. VISCOUNT SAMUEL, G.C.B., G.B.E., D.C.L.

YOUR founders were men of vision. They built for the future. Dr. Birkbeck, Lord Brougham, Francis Place, and the rest—they must sometimes have wondered what this London would be—and England, Europe, the world—a hundred years or so after their time. When, on December 2, 1823, they opened the doors of the London Mechanics Institution, destined to grow, through many vicissitudes, to become the renowned College in which we meet to-day, they may well have let their imagination guess what might be the changes and developments in which this enterprise of theirs, according to its measure and scope, might play a part. That was a time when modern science was in its brilliant youth; when the movement for popular education was beginning to take hold, opening great prospects for the future; when, after twenty years of war, the British nation was gathering its forces for a sustained effort to remedy the great social evils that afflicted it, while in the political field, the powerful campaign was beginning that was destined to win victory in the Great Reform Bill of 1832. We may be sure that those men, of the sort—as a present-day poet writes:

> "Who watch the world with pity and pride
> And warm to all mankind,"

that those men would have had visions, hopes, expectations, an assurance even, that in later days a wiser and better instructed people, having established full political liberty, would have used their power to cure those social evils; with the help of a developed science, would have got rid of poverty; clasping hands with other free peoples, would have established securely the reign of peace, and so made possible an age of high material prosperity and brilliant intellectual splendour.

A century has passed, and nearly a quarter of another. If your founders were present in spirit to-day, at this assembly which commemorates their work and pays thanks for their service, what would they find? Some part indeed of their dreams fulfilled. Social conditions, changed beyond recognition. The squalor, the wretchedness, the drunkenness, the illiteracy, the widespread crime, the savage punishments, the terrible child mortality, the long hours and the hardships in the factories and the mines; the conditions

that Hogarth had painted, not long before, that Dickens described and Carlyle denounced—all these almost wholly gone. They would see a far higher general average of comfort; industrial work humanized; some education provided for all, a high education for many; the worst mischances of life countered by a widespread system of social services; environment, if far from perfect, at all events more healthy and more decent; and all this attained by means of a science developed far beyond the range of their imaginations, and under the influence of a political constitution in which power is broadly and firmly based upon the whole nation.

But they would see still much poverty and unnecessary suffering; social injustice still widespread. And they would find us at this moment tossed about in the greatest cataclysm in the modern history of mankind; at grips with enemies over half the globe; thousands of men and women being slaughtered by war, week by week, year after year; the great ideal with which France had inspired their generation and the century that followed, suddenly, in our time, discarded and derided—Liberty suppressed; Equality condemned; and Fraternity . . .? "Ah, yes," as someone has said, "we are all brothers now—all Cains and Abels!"

And yet they would see as well, in three great and powerful nations, and a score of lesser ones, no yielding under the shock of unlimited war. There they would see the higher spirit of man, calm and dauntless in the peril; overcoming disaster; gathering strength for victory; and, assured that the victory will come, with sword in one hand and trowel in the other already preparing a greater edifice for a civilization rescued and redeemed. I know of no example in history of higher steadfastness and courage and wisdom than the way in which the people of Britain are engaged in these days, not only in the most strenuous war effort, but also at the same time in laying the foundations for a finer society.

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Always three factors have decided the destinies of nations and moulded the shape of mankind—wars, material conditions, and ideas. Wars—for history is full of attacks, conquests, expulsions, and subjections; of the rise and fall of whole civilizations through warfare. Indeed, wars and their consequences used to be the chief topic of the historian. Because we recognize other elements of importance, that one has not been eliminated. The nineteenth-century hope that the predominance of war was becoming a thing of the past has proved vain. The belief that all the leading nations, drawing the plain lesson from the blood-stained annals of the human race, must have learnt that war was essentially an evil thing, to be

extirpated from among the accepted customs of mankind, has been shown by bitter experience to be false.

Economic materialism emphasizes another aspect of history. It finds the chief factor in changes in methods of production and distribution; in the clash between wealth and poverty; in the struggle of individuals for material well-being and the struggle between nations for outlets of trade. We may question the Marxist theory that this factor is so predominant that all others fade into insignificance; yet it cannot be disputed that it has played, is playing, and must continue to play a highly important rôle. We may deny that there can be what the Marxists term an "economic interpretation of history," while recognizing to the full that economic elements in history are vital.

Ideas are the third factor, and surely the most important. Both the other two are themselves dependent upon ideas. Wars of aggression, wars of liberation, wars of religion, Nazi and Fascist wars, are not the outcome of some strange transcendent "forces," which lift nations to glory or impel them to their doom. They are the outcome of ideas, held by rulers or by peoples in particular countries at particular times. Nor are there any mysterious "forces" of an economic kind, self-created and self-dependent, of which mankind are the slaves or the tools. That theory will not bear analysis; examine it and you will find that it is empty of all substance. The so-called "economic laws" are seen to be nothing else than the consequences of human feelings. The fact that individuals may desire comfort or wealth more than anything else, or may not so desire it; the fact that they will accept poverty as fated, or may not accept it; the fact that material things may be distributed in one manner or in another manner; that trade between nations may be conducted in accordance with one policy or another policy—these are the true causes of economic trends. And it is obvious that the course of history has been profoundly affected by the direct impact of ideas. The rise of the great religions one by one; the effects of the various schools of philosophy; the influence of scientific discoveries upon our views of life—all these have marked deeply the course of events.

I would ask you, therefore, when considering the prospects and possibilities of the period immediately before us, to do so under those three heads—War, Economics, Ideas.

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All men are agreed that the anarchy of Europe must be ended; there must be some kind of unification. History records that this has been several times attempted. The Romans established it for a time. The Catholic Church secured it in some degree. The Holy

Roman Empire had the same purpose—as Dante set forth in his *De Monarchia*. The so-called Holy Alliance, after the Napoleonic Wars, asserted the same aim. In our own day there is the League of Nations. Now comes Hitler's plan.

He offers a New European Order, which shall establish peace, and set trade free from all hindrances, under the control and direction of one predominant country—his own. This involves the surrender by all the other States of their national freedom. It means the subordination of their material interests to those of Germany. They are to be confined, it has been announced, to agriculture and to minor industries, while Germany will be supreme in those heavier industries which bring most wealth, and, through the manufacture of arms, ensure most power. As we already see to-day, the other nations would find the products and the profits of their enterprise and industry drained away, through price control and current manipulation, for the advantage of the Robber State. Such a system could only be maintained by force. Hitler suggests nothing else. That is the essence of his political philosophy. Discord, revolt, war, would be the inevitable outcome. It would lead to an epoch in human history such as Nietzsche, in *The Joyful Wisdom*, looked forward to with glee, in which for several centuries there would be a series of great wars: this, he thought, would raise the human race to the unprecedented heights of greatness.

The Atlantic Charter offers another alternative—the free collaboration of all nations, great and small, safeguarded by the disarmament of the aggressive Powers. What should be the political framework of this system has not yet been worked out. Agreements already made by the Governments of some important States may give us part of the pattern. Poland and Czechoslovakia have agreed upon the principles of a union between them, of the nature of a Confederation. Jugoslavia and Greece have done the same. Hopes are expressed that neighbouring States, when they are free to do so, may adhere to the one group or the other. Other such combinations may be formed in other parts of Europe. Perhaps an embryo may be found for one of them in the Oslo Agreement, dealing primarily with economic matters, entered into before the war by the smaller States of north-western Europe—Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. Such regional Unions might link themselves together by treaties of mutual advantage. Embracing them all, and what are now the enemy States as well, may arise, we can hope, a revived and reinvigorated League of Nations, its constitution and powers re-cast as experience indicates.

But all such organizations must prove futile if Europe is left under the shadow of ever-threatening war. And it is useless for some to seek disarmament while others are saturated through and through

with the spirit of aggression. "It is useless," as Dr. Inge has said, "for the sheep to pass resolutions in favour of vegetarianism while the wolf remains of a different opinion." To separate force and justice is disaster. The Nazis are an example of force without justice; the League of Nations of justice without force. The Atlantic Charter would unite the two by disarming the aggressors and not the others. Hitherto the States that believe in war have had the arms, for the very reason that they do believe in war; while the States that believe in peace have often left themselves comparatively unarmed, for the very reason that they do believe in peace. Now things will be turned the other way about. There will be disarmed warmongers and armed peace-lovers, and the world will become a much healthier place.

Such inequality, however, cannot endure indefinitely. When and how the future constitution of Europe will be shaped, together with its guarantees for peace, cannot now be predicted. It has been said that "no one can foresee the future, not even those who make it." There is no sign that any attempt will be made to settle all these great matters in a hurry and at one gulp. We are not likely at the end of this war to have the procedure repeated of the Conference of Paris and the Treaty of Versailles. With greater deliberation the new shape of Europe and of the world may be fashioned stage by stage, year by year.

It will surely be the same on the economic side, which may present even more formidable problems than the military and political. To provide against trade depressions and vast unemployment is essential if the world is to find tranquillity. You cannot patiently build up a system which will ensure "freedom from want" unless it can be done in "freedom from fear"; but neither can you ensure freedom from fear unless you also establish freedom from want. War produces misery and misery produces war, in the most vicious of all circles; while peace often brings plenty, and plenty usually brings peace.

The economic problem is not to be solved in the present-day world merely by applying the excellent principle that trade barriers between nations ought to be swept away. The fact is that a large part of the commerce of the world is now under political direction of another kind altogether; and that is not to be changed all in a moment. Combinations of producers and merchants control markets in many industries in many countries. These cartels and syndicates connect internationally. They enlist the diplomatic and financial support of their respective Governments. In Russia the Government itself conducts the whole of the national commerce. In Germany the Government closely directs it. There and elsewhere State-controlled corporations, using State money, buy up whole

agricultural crops and industrial outputs; not only in war-time but in peace-time also. The old controversy between protective tariffs and free trade is disappearing into the background. The problem now is how to raise the world's consumption of goods to match its vastly increased power of production; and, the international gold standard having collapsed, how to organize the exchanges.

Consider the immense increase in the total manufacturing power of Germany, Great Britain, the United States, and Russia, especially in all branches of the iron and steel industries, in the years preceding this war; and the feverish efforts to increase it further to supply arms and ships for the war itself. And consider the situation that will arise when the peace comes and all armament production everywhere stops overnight; and the situation after a few years, when war destruction will have been made good and stocks made up. Where will sufficient outlets be found to prevent a collapse of great industries, the disastrous effects of which will spread in widening circles everywhere?

Yet there are parts of the world where potential demand is almost unlimited. Half of mankind dwell in three countries—China, India, Russia; countries with low standards of life compared with Western Europe and the United States. We can strike out nowadays from our economic vocabularies the word "over-production" to replace it by "under-consumption." If the materially backward countries of the world—those three, our own colonial empire and the empires of other Powers, the States of Central and Southern America, and many more—were to be fully developed, with proper internal and oversea communications, with adequate capital resources, their peoples raised to a right standard of education and of comfort, there would be ample markets for all the industrial countries of the world—with a full share for Germany and Japan. Much thought is being given in these days to the manner in which the States that are financially strong, and especially the United States and ourselves, can help to bring this about. We shall be wise to concentrate upon this side of the economic problem; it may furnish the clue to all the rest.

War: Economics: let us turn now to Ideas, the greatest of the three. As it is there that we shall find the deep-seated sources of our present troubles, so it is there that we may seek to apply the remedy.

The advent of modern science has thrown thought into confusion. The great organized religions, East and West, find themselves terribly handicapped by their cosmogonies and their theologies. Dating back, some of them, to the dawn of history; others to barbarous times; others, in part, to obscurantist epochs like the

Byzantine Empire—all the faiths carry forward from the past dogmas and doctrines which are incompatible with present knowledge. Their lofty ethical creeds, their noble aspirations for mankind, are often overlaid by presentations of the cosmos and by particular beliefs that the mind of this age cannot accept. We have heard much of the conflict between religion and science. Yet there can be no conflict between religion in its widest sense and science working within its proper limits. For science is the interpreter of nature, and nature is the language of God. Between science and current theologies, however, there may indeed be conflict; and it is this which causes doubt and confusion, it is this which has created for multitudes of people an intellectual and moral void.

Into that void all kinds of strange ideas flow. I have heard it said that "Hitler is a vacuum phenomenon." A brilliant genius like Nietzsche bursts in with a wholly non-moral philosophy. Charlatan historians like Houston Stewart Chamberlain and Oswald Spengler provide the German people with a pseudo-scientific basis for the most hateful political creed that the world has known. A Croce infects the Italians with the doctrine—not, of course, a new one—that "Politics, like economics, has its own laws, independent of morals." No wonder that a man of Hitler's type soon learns to say, as he says in *Mein Kampf*, "Foreign policy is only a means to an end, and the sole end to be pursued is the welfare of our own people. . . . This is the sole preoccupation that must occupy our minds in dealing with a question. Religious considerations, humanitarian ideals—all such and all other preoccupations must absolutely give way to this." No wonder that a Mussolini may give to the Italian people as a maxim for their guidance, and have it stencilled on the walls in every town and village, "Credere, obbedire, combattere"—"Believe, obey, fight"—surely the most degrading rule of life ever offered to a nation.

The prime need of our age, we may plainly see, is to clarify our fundamental ideas—on religion, on morals, on politics, on economics. Then, and only then, we may hope to gather together all the vast forces of human goodwill in a concerted effort against the rampant forces of evil.

Obviously the Churches should be the pioneers. There are now welcome signs that, recognizing the gravity and urgency of the situation they are suspending the old controversies on their points of difference and organizing common action to defend and to promote their many points of agreement. We may see one of the most hopeful and significant events of the present day in the joint declaration, promulgated a month ago, under the auspices of the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, and the leaders of the Free Churches, by a Commission appointed by the

Churches "For International Friendship and Social Responsibility." The central purpose of that Commission was declared to be "to unite informed and convinced Christians all over the country in common action on broad lines of social and international policy." There is a movement also, the World Congress of Faiths, that has received in recent years a wide measure of support, although by no means wide enough; which seeks to inculcate a similar spirit of co-operation among all the creeds—Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucianism. In tendencies such as these may reside a chief hope for the future.

Yet when we probe down to the bottom of it all, let us remember that Churches, movements, policies, institutions, all aim at one thing, and one thing only—to influence the beliefs and the actions of individual men and women. We speak of States, nations, mankind; these are mere names; the realities are the persons who compose them. "Mankind," said Goethe, "is an abstraction. There are, always have been, and always will be, men and only men." The individual is the beginning, the means, and the end. It is he who sets all things in action. He creates, as his agencies, philosophies and sciences, churches and states, crafts and professions; but these have no existence apart from him. And his end is his own welfare—spiritual and intellectual, material and physical, personal and social. The perfection of the individual is the core of the whole matter.

This is why educational institutions are of the essence of civilization. Universities, colleges, schools in every part of the earth, will all help to teach and to guide the individual men and women who will fashion the world, for good or for ill, in the immediate post-war years and the times that will come after. If they can uproot war from among the accepted institutions of mankind; if they can establish a sound international economy; and if, above all, they can diffuse right ideas on the things that matter most—then it will be a better world, a better abiding place.

This is the 118th anniversary of the foundation of your College. I wonder whether, at the 218th anniversary, the speaker of the day might, in his turn, invoke the spirits of us who are present here this evening. If he does, I wonder what he will say. He will be amused, no doubt, at our quaint old-fashioned sentiments and our naïve way of putting things. But I trust he will approve in the main what we have been saying. I say "we," for I believe that you will concur in a great part, at all events, of this address. Perhaps he will have cause to lament that the century that separates us had disappointed some of our anticipations. But, maybe, that far-off spokesman of the coming age may also rejoice to record that many, perhaps most, of those expectations had been fulfilled by the event. I hope so. I see no reason why it should not be so.

APROPOS DE KIERKEGAARD

CLEMENT C. J. WEBB, M.A., D.Litt., F.B.A.

In an interesting article on Kierkegaard and the "Existential" Philosophy, contributed to the number of Philosophy for July 1941, Miss Dorothy Emmet counselled her readers to make themselves acquainted with the *Journals* of the famous Danish thinker, now rendered accessible to Englishmen ignorant of his language by the translation of Mr. Dru. I have taken her advice and am grateful to her for it. I am not indeed convinced that this self-revelation of a remarkable personality can be ranked among the great autobiographies of the world. It seems to me to fall, if only on account of its lack of unity as a work of literary art, below the standard which such an estimate of it would imply. But it is undoubtedly both impressive in itself and important in view of the influence which its author, little known in his lifetime beyond a circle of the parochial narrowness of which he was painfully conscious, has come, long after his death, to exert upon the spiritual and intellectual life of Europe to-day. The present article, however, will not be concerned with the exposition or criticism of this or other writings of Kierkegaard, but with thoughts, more or less suggested by my reading of him, respecting the notion of God and its significance for philosophy.

It was, if I understand him, Kierkegaard's complaint against Hegel and generally against the idealism which he found dominant in the schools of Germany that "science" was set above "the existential"; and that Christianity, which was allowed to be the highest, nay, the "absolute" religion, was resolved into a speculative knowledge of the divine nature, making no such demand upon the individual believer for an actual whole-hearted surrender of himself to God as in the thought of the New Testament writers was necessarily involved in the serious profession of it. I do not here propose to enquire how far he was just to Hegel or to the academic philosophy of religion of which in the reaction of disappointment—for he had once been an enthusiastic student of it—he often spoke so scathingly. My object is, apart from criticism of any particular school of thought, to discuss the importance in the philosophy of religion of "the existential."

Miss Emmet, in the article to which I have referred, speaks[1] of Kierkegaard's "elusive conception of *Existenz*, personal existence, as 'choice of oneself.'" I am, I confess, far from being sure that I have rightly grasped the meaning attached by the Danish philo-

[1] Philosophy, vol. xvi, p. 260.

sopher to this word, which is central in his thinking; but I hope that I shall not be far out in interpreting it somewhat as follows. Our knowledge of one another differs from our knowledge of things which are not persons in the fact that each of us is known to his neighbour, not only as an individual (not a "universal," like the objects of "science"), but as a "thou" rather than a "he," a partner in social intercourse rather than an object of contemplation from without.[1] But a partner in social intercourse makes on another a claim to which he must make—or refuse to make—a personal response. Thus *Existenz* involves a personal "decision."

To this conception I shall return later, and to its use by Kierkegaard in his account of religion. But, for the moment, I shall turn away from Kierkegaard and from what is peculiar in his notion of "existence."

In Professor Laird's recently published Gifford Lectures, which are distinguished not only by great ability but by a sincerity and candour which deserve the gratitude even of those who differ widely from his conclusions, yet, while in the end finding themselves "of the same opinion still," can recognize that their own convictions are all the stronger for exposure to such unsparing criticism as that which they have undergone at his hands, the author has argued for a "pantheism" which differs from a genuine "theism" precisely in this that, while for it God is unquestionably real, he is not "existential." He is immanent in all things, but that kind of existence which every one of us ascribes to himself and to his neighbours is not his. I might seem in saying this to be identifying "existence" with "personality" perhaps, indeed, it may be said that Kierkegaard actually does so; but the plain man, who is sure beyond a peradventure that he himself exists, is also certain that many things "exist" no less truly which are not "persons," but "things." Yet, even so, he always, I think, regards the kind of "existence" which he and his neighbours enjoy—which, in language more "philosophical" than he is probably at home with, may be called self-conscious and capable of social response—as intrinsically *superior* to that of mere "things," and as *different* from what is not properly the "existence" at all, though it may be called the "reality," of beauty, goodness, or love, which, while certainly in a sense "higher" than mere "existence," is nevertheless incomplete without the "existence" of things or persons which are good, beautiful, or loving. It has often seemed to me that philosophers who tend to disparage insistence on the peculiar value attributed by some to personality, while on the other hand emphasizing the transcendent value of beauty, goodness,

[1] Cp. my Hertz Lecture, *Our Knowledge of One Another* (Proc. of Brit. Acad., vol. xvi), p. 16; and my *Historical Element in Religion* (Allen & Unwin, 1935), p. 91.

love, and the like, are too apt to assume that those whom they criticize are champions of "mere particularity." For it is perfectly possible to recognize that it is the presence in them of such "universals" as beauty, goodness, and love that give worth to individual persons or things, while yet holding that only in beings enjoying that kind of existence of which persons are aware in themselves do these "universals" possess the full reality for lack of which, apart from such "existents," they have only a being not *lower* than, but *different* from theirs, such as may be most conveniently and with least begging of questions at issue be described as "ideal."

Now in the history of philosophy the notion of God stands (though this will not be a complete account of it) for the notion of a being in whom *essence* and *existence* are one. *We* are certainly not such beings, nor are the other persons and things which we encounter in our everyday life. In us and in all these there is a distinction of "that" from "what"; we may ask where is really any such being as X; or whether what is X (e.g. A) may not cease to be X and become Y, while still remaining A; or again, may cease to exist altogether and nothing, or only what is other than A, be X. But the human mind is constantly haunted by the thought or imagination of an existent being which is essentially and indefectibly X, and to this fact the familiar phenomenon of the personification of "abstractions" in myth and fairy tale bears perpetual witness. The growing experience of the race has again and again wakened men from these dreams. Sometimes we may regret, sometimes rejoice in such awakenings. One may wish to have been "a pagan suckled in a creed outworn" or may gladly dismiss as a nightmare the belief in a "personal devil." But while we acquiesce in, if we do not congratulate ourselves on, this sort of disillusionment, we have not exchanged our dream for mere vacancy, if we keep our faith that neither the "existential" nor the "essential" or "significant" is in the end, each for lack of unity with the other, impermanent and, in Old Testament phrase, "vanity"; that on the one hand our lives have a *meaning* and on the other our "ideals" are not in their very nature incapable of genuine "realization." It is this faith which lies at the heart of religion; for religion is the apprehension of God as that which is at once the ultimate reality and the intimate "existential" fact. When philosophers like Professor Laird decline to take account of "religious experience" because they themselves (they say) have none, are they not taking for granted that those among their critics who conceive a total lack of it to be a disqualification for the discussion of God as the object of religion mean by "religious experience" only something exceptional, such as "mystics" and prophets claim to enjoy, and not also any sense, however vague and intermittent, of a Presence which we are (as the slang phrase

goes) "up against," and in which our lives from day to day are passed; a sense by which few who think at all have never been disturbed,[1] and no purely "naturalistic" account of which will, I believe, be found to be satisfactory.

Astronomers, when they use the traditional names of planets or constellations, are not in any danger of exposing themselves to a secret influence exerted upon their calculations by the ancient myths and fancies the memory of which is embalmed in these designations. But it was otherwise with the philosophers who used the word "God" in the seventeenth or eighteenth century for a unifying principle of experience or an inferred "first cause" of motion or of other phenomena. Not only might the word recall to a historian of ideas the religious context in which speculative and scientific problems first engaged the attention of human beings, but the religious associations which it still possessed and which it possesses to-day for the majority of those who employ it, profoundly affected the minds even of such men as Descartes and Spinoza, Leibnitz and Voltaire. The avoidance of the word by later writers and their preference for expressions such as "the Absolute" or "the Universe" is a legitimate device to escape, so far as may be, from the spell of those associations. But whereas for most of us the beliefs of those who saw in the movements of the stars the counterparts of earthly adventures or connected the several planets with human dispositions and destinies are dead beyond recall, the quest for a *meaning* intelligible to the human mind in the course of events of which our lives form a part is very much alive; and is maintained in being by the fact that few, if any, who think at all are altogether destitute of a mode of consciousness which, for want of a better name, I call "religious experience," although this phrase may suggest a more highly developed form of it than some, even among professional students of the human mind (like Professor Laird), are willing to admit that they themselves have ever in their own persons enjoyed.

I have been accustomed to think that the characteristic marks of all instances of religion are *ultimacy* and *intimacy* in combination.[2] That such a "pantheism" as Professor Laird and many others prefer to "theism" properly so called may exhibit these I should not dream of denying; I do not for a moment doubt that the sense that one has within oneself that which is also the moving principle of the universe—*Anima Mundi*, the soul of the world—may be a genuinely religious emotion. I would even allow that the capacity to experience a religious emotion of this description indicates a disposition more truly religious than does an unhesitating identifi-

[1] "A Presence that disturbs me" (Wordsworth, *Lines written above Tintern Abbey*).

[2] See my *Religion and Theism* (Allen & Unwin, 1934), p. 15.

cation of religion with the acknowledgment of a supernatural being external to oneself. Yet I am myself convinced that no "religion" adequately expresses the true notion of religion which lacks the consciousness of what may be called an "existential" relation to a Higher than oneself—a relation, I mean, which, however different in important respects from the relation of one finite person to another, resembles that relation in this—that it is a relation to a Being which is taken to "exist" in the sense in which oneself indubitably "exists," but in which the "universals" which constitute the object of "science" do not.[1]

Thus while I do not identify "religion" with "theism," I see in "theism," thus understood, the form of religion capable of fulfilling the religious aspirations natural to man as none can be which fails to include an "existential" relation of man to God of the kind which I have endeavoured in the foregoing paragraph to describe. It is remarkable that the philosopher in reaction from whose teaching Kierkegaard's "existential" manner of thinking about religion took shape in his mind has given expression to this view in a passage[2] where, speaking of magic, which he has just declared to be the "first form of religion," he says[3] that it "cannot indeed as yet be properly called religion. "To religion," he goes on, "essentially pertains the moment of objectivity, and this means that the spiritual power shows itself as a mode of the Universal relatively to self-consciousness, for the individual, for the particular empirical consciousness. This objectivity is an essential characteristic, upon which all depends. Not until it is present does religion begin, does a God exist, and even in the lowest condition there is at least a beginning of it." From the other side, as it were, the doctrine of St. Thomas[4] that God is, what no creature can be, his own essence, points in the same direction. For this means that God, the object of religion, is distinguished from what is not God in that he must be conceived not merely as an instance—even as the sole instance—of the perfection which is the divine nature, but as that nature fully actualized or existent. Not only Kierkegaard but Hegel is, as we have seen, in accord with this affirmation. The difference which, notwithstanding, no doubt obtains between the two philosophers comes out, however, in the contrast between Hegel's remark[5] that "it would be strange if the notion, . . . the concrete totality we call God, were not rich enough to embrace so poor a

[1] See Kierkegaard's *Journals*, § 1054 (tr. Dru, p. 373).

[2] Hegel, *Philosophie der Religion*, Ph. 2, Abschn. 1, *Werke*, xi, p. 290.

[3] Eng. tr. Spiers and Burdon Sanderson, i, pp. 297–8.

[4] *Summa Theol.*, I, qu. 3, art. 3, and elsewhere.

[5] *Encyklop. der phil. Wiss*, § 51, *Werke*, vi. p. 113, Wallace's *Logic of Hegel*, p. 92.

category as Being, the poorest and most abstract of all," and Kierkegaard's[1]: "The moment I speak of being in the ideal sense" (he has been examining Spinoza's declaration that in God *essentia involvit existentiam*) "I no longer speak of being but of essence." "For the difficulty," he goes on, "is to lay hold of God's factual existence, and to introduce God's ideal essence dialectically into the sphere of factual existence." It is meaningless, in Kierkegaard's view, to speak, in the case of "factual existence," of *more* or *less* being. "A fly, when it exists, has as much being as God;" but "ideally," in respect of "essence," "the case is quite different."

It is, I think, true to say[2] that less attention has been devoted by philosophers to the problem of our knowledge of one another than either to the problem of our knowledge of ourselves or to that of our knowledge of the external world; and it is a consequence of this comparative neglect of the first of these three kinds of knowledge that it has too often been approached, not (as it should be) from the side of the reciprocal intercourse expressed by the mutual use of the second personal pronoun, but from that of such a mere contemplation of one person by another as is expressed by the use of the third. It is, I believe, also true to say that (as, in attempting to interpret Kierkegaard's conception of "the existential" and of its importance to religion, I have already suggested) our primary attitude to the object of religious experience is expressed rather by the second personal pronoun than by the third. In religion we are, so to say, confronted by God in a fashion analogous to that in which we are confronted by our neighbours (though it is not necessarily posterior to it, still less inferred from it by way of analogy).[3] Had we not begun by invoking God in times of danger or distress[4] we should not have started on that process of reflexion whereof the so-called "proofs" of God's existence are the eventually formulated outcome; and, when it is cut off from its roots in the sense of a Presence "disturbing" us, to which we respond by invocation, propitiation, prayer and worship, the quest of God is apt to end in the disheartening doubt whether we are not chasing a will-of-the-wisp.[5] Our fundamental experience of one another in social intercourse is supported by sense perception, but that is lacking in our experience of God. In the latter we always "walk by faith, not by sight"; but its source is in the depth of the human spirit and is native to it even as is our awareness of one another.

[1] In a footnote to the *Philosophical Fragments*, written under the pseudonym of Johannes Climacus, Swenson's Eng. tr., p. 33.

[2] Cp. *Our Knowledge of One Another*, p. 1.

[3] Cp. F. Heiler, *Das Gebet*, pp. 41 ff.

[4] See *Our Knowledge of One Another*, pp. 14, 15.

[5] Cp. Job xxiii. 8, 9.

I have called this article *"apropos de Kierkegaard"* because, though its theme was suggested by my reading of his *Journals*, it is not intended to be a discussion of a thinker my knowledge of whom is too slight and superficial to qualify me for expounding, still less for criticizing, his teaching. I am, as I have said, by no means certain that I have rightly understood his use of the expression "existential" which is the keyword of his philosophy. If I interpret him correctly, he thinks of the claim made upon us by God as differing from that made upon us by our neighbours in being—at least eventually, in the most highly developed form of religion (which for him is always Christianity)—as a demand for unreserved self-committal or self-surrender on our part, not for such a contemplation as may be exercised by the intellect alone, the other activities of our personality being left comparatively unaffected. Whether or no, however, I am right in thus interpreting Kierkegaard's emphasis on the act of "decision," the requirement of which distinguishes for him an "existential" from a merely notional or "ontological" fashion of philosophizing, I have, I think, sufficiently indicated a line of thought which is worth pursuing—the thought, namely, that no satisfactory philosophy of religion is possible which does not take as its starting-point the normal human consciousness of an "existential" relation to God. Nor do I doubt that a passionate realization of this truth is the principal contribution to the philosophy of religion made by a great man the grounds and significance of whose influence on contemporary thought well deserve investigation.

NEW BOOKS

The New Leviathan: or Man, Society, Civilization, and Barbarism. By R. G. Collingwood. (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1942. Pp. viii+387. Price 21s.)

This is a work of distinction both in matter and manner, as was only to be expected from its author. If (as I think) it solves less than it undertakes to solve or claims to have solved, it has gone a long way towards emphasizing certain structural relationships indispensable in any political theory worth the name. In other words it succeeds in its primary intention, that is to say, in restating and also to some extent in advancing the "classical politics." According to Dr. Collingwood the "classical politics" was founded by Hobbes and Locke, much as "classical physics" was due to Newton; and these classical theories, though not untouchable, remain substantially indispensable. "Classical politics," to speak briefly, is the "social contract" theory derived from the Roman conception of *societas* and adapted to modern nation-states. According to its supporters it may be the better for modification but could be abandoned only at the price of futility.

For the purposes of this enterprise it was natural for Dr. Collingwood (and in his case it was not absurdly ambitious) to take Hobbes's *Leviathan* for his model and to plan his book with that grand image in his mind. Hobbes's *Leviathan* had four Parts: Of Man, Of Commonwealth. Of a Christian Commonwealth, Of the Kingdom of Darkness. This *New Leviathan* has also four Parts. They are enumerated in its sub-title and correspond, pretty closely, to Hobbes's divisions, as they were meant to do. Naturally the two books differ vastly in style, but Dr. Collingwood is a twentieth-century rhetorician of distinction while Hobbes was a seventeenth-century rhetorician of genius.

One of Dr. Collingwood's innovations is to write his entire book in numbered sections *à la* Wittgenstein, seldom as long as half a page and usually very much shorter. The method favours aphorisms, and Hobbes might have revelled in it. It is our gain, however, that Hobbes preferred periods. Dr. Collingwood's choice seems to be due to his passion for being scientific. He wants to speak to the point, "to divide our subject into parts, to arrange the parts in such an order that what is said about each prepares the way for what is said about the next, and to say about each, not all we know, but only what need by said for the sake of that preparation" (1.19—the device makes reference easy). That is an austerity programme of truly formidable virtue; but Dr. Collingwood himself is not so very austere. He is full of jokes and gibes and provocative sallies. The reader is pleased, but in spite of the form, I think, rather than because of it.

The point is rather trivial, but certain other features of the author's austerity programme may be of greater moment. If the aim of Part I "Man" is only to be a preparation for political theory, it seems to me to be overlong for its purpose. The same objection, it is true, could be brought against Part I of Hobbes's *Leviathan*, for which reason I have always thought Hobbes's *De Cive* a more effective political document than either his *Leviathan* or his *Elements of Law*. However that may be, I think that Part I of this *New Leviathan*, while abounding with psychological and epistemological interest, and of high merit in that kind, offends against the maxim quoted above, viz. "to say only what need be said for the sake of preparation for the rest." It

is so elaborate, and so many-sided, indeed, as to resist analysis here, and I shall content myself with a few desultory comments.

Dr. Collingwood's view about mind and body is in effect that if you want to know about body you should consult a text-book of physiology and that if you want to know about mind *Nosce teipsum* is your sole and sufficient standby. If the latter statement implies that since civilization is a mental thing, *Nosce teipsum* will tell you all about it, the statement itself would seem to be an exaggeration. Self-observation, could not, for instance, tell you nearly enough about controlling or exploiting the environment; and that is part of what Dr. Collingwood means by "civilization." But there is more than that. Dr. Collingwood is prepared to argue e.g. that in his own case selective attention, e.g. in focusing his eyes, is the same thing as naming and/or conceptual thinking, and so that it is the same even in babies and in dogs (in whatever way these beings "name" and "conceive"). Personally, I find it so difficult to believe that selective attention need be any sort of naming that I doubt the accuracy of Dr. Collingwood's self-observation in this matter. But if he were right in his own case, I don't see what title he has to legislate for babies and dogs in consequence.

Dr. Collingwood warns us repeatedly that the cardinal sin in this matter is to swap horses, that is, to mix up "bodily" with "mental." Oddly enough, however, it appears (2.43) that there is only one horse.

There is a long discussion upon the question whether there are "objects of feeling" (where feeling for the most part, means sensing). As stated, the question is whether (*a*) I am conscious of sensing blue or (*b*) am conscious of sensing bluely; and we are informed that, methodologically at least, the adverbial analysis is the simpler. Why it is simpler is not explained. The idea seems to be that Occam's razor cuts accusatives to pieces but is too blunt to deal with adverbs. If so, why shouldn't Dr. Collingwood have made a still more resolute effort to go all simple and say "I am sensuously conscious and in detail bluely." For no apparent reason he insists that "conscious" implies a "simple" and "proper" accusative which is its "object."

Utilitarianism is condemned because it contains an element of "caprice." The foolish utilitarian doesn't see that the means-end relationship doesn't yield an *individuum omnimodo determinatum*. He doesn't care which tin of tobacco of a given size and brand he gets, and the tobacconist doesn't care whether he is paid with two half-crowns or with two florins and a shilling. If neither cares, why worry? And why shouldn't the means-end relationship be unique? Take the steps to marriage. Surely you might want to marry not any woman, but one particular woman, and on her own thoroughly individual terms.

"Right" is found wanting on rather similar grounds and is said to mean simply "regularian," i.e. agreeing with a rule. If so, it is certainly correct to say that in a "conflict" each alternative may be "right," i.e. in accordance with some rule. But the remark would not seem to be impressive. The rule "When there is trouble, arrest the nearest bystander" is certainly a rule. Some people, however, might play with the idea that such a rule itself was wrong.

In contrast with each of the above, "duty" is said to be *omnimodo determinatum* "There is only one of it; there is nothing that will do as well." This is encouraging.

With a view to the sequel the most important statements of Part I would seem to be those that have to do with free choice. The main point, I think, is (13.23) that we should always have the negative "freedom from what" and the positive "freedom to do what?" "up our sleeves if they are wanted."

More precisely (13.25) "The freedom of the will is, positively, *freedom to choose*, freedom to exercise a will, and negatively freedom *from desire*; not the condition of having no desires, but the condition of not being at their mercy." It doesn't seem to me that Dr. Collingwood has told us nearly enough about this matter. But that is to anticipate.

The critical importance of questions about freedom is at once apparent when we come to Part II, that is, to "Society." Here the central theme is that the clue to "classical" and therefore to all sound political thinking is the Roman conception of *societas*, that is, a joint activity of free agents. No political community, we are told, can ever be a *societas* in the full sense. It must always contain a nursery whose members enter the community without their own consent and for a time at least, are incapable of the feeblest sort of free choice required for a *societas*. But the rulers should form a *societas*.

It may very well be true that the solution of the principal political problems should be sought somewhere along these lines, but Dr. Collingwood's answer seems to me to leave far too many pertinent questions in the air, and often to proceed *per saltum* when he would have been wiser to advance step by step. Materials towards an answer may indeed be supplied rather freely, e.g. in some of the things that are said about "authority," and certain arguments are developed step by step. But there do seem to me to be defects of this order.

What do we mean, for instance, by a self-governing community? Such a community, it is plain, must not be other-governed, that is, must not be politically subject to a foreign power. Again it must *be* governed, that is, must not be in a state of anarchy. These conditions, however, would be fulfilled if there were *any* government, *de facto*, within the community, tyranny, plutocracy, or what you will. If, then, you say that self-government implies more than this you must, I should say, be making some assumptions about *each* of the members of the community, or at any rate about each who is out of the nursery, and I would understand most of Dr. Collingwood's statements in that sense. But surely it isn't enough to go on asserting that the rulers, whoever they may be, should form a *societas* and that whether they are few or many (aristocracy or democracy) is just a matter for amicable discussion. Not every *societas* would do. The Royal Society is a perfectly good society whose members, if invited, enter it freely. It need not, however, be a suitable body for governing England, and it need not become so if its members voluntarily decided, without invitation, to add this to its other activities. The functional aptitude required is not merely the capacity to combine voluntarily. What is wanted is capacity to rule the entire community effectively in matters of foreign policy, domestic national organization and so forth. Two men agreeing to go for a walk may be a good enough instance of *societas*. So might a nursery arrangement of the same kind. But such instances of *societas* have very little bearing upon political government, the governing of a people in the business of living together. When we speak about "democracy" nowadays we frequently mean the doctrine that the common man, although incapable of being a statesman or a successful civil servant, should nevertheless have an effective if minute say upon the direction of national policy. An analysis of *societas* together with the insistence that what is at the top should be some sort of *societas* tells us little or nothing about such a principle.

A connected, although (of course) a distinct objection seems to me to arise from the frequency with which Dr. Collingwood is content to assert that there is "freedom," and to leave the matter there. As we saw, he holds that there is no freedom (and therefore no *societas*) if passion "takes charge." Apart from that he seems to say that you are "free" if you just choose in

whatever condition you as a unique historical individual happen to be. The matter is of immense importance since, in Dr. Collingwood's hands it is, *inter alia*, another way of discussing "force" versus "will." You are "forced" if passion "takes charge."

As it seems to me much more is needed of an efficient ruler than simply that he should be "free" in this sense. I don't think Dr. Collingwood has addressed himself at all adequately to the question, and some of his statements appear to me to be quite inconsistent. He frequently tells us, for instance, that freedom is a matter of degree. If, however, unfreedom means "passion taking charge" (the phrase is nautical and borrowed from a ship getting out of control through a shift of ballast or the like) it isn't a matter of degree at all. If you begin to say that difficulty of control is a matter of degree you will land yourself in a hopeless mess and be driven in the end to say that a man is free only when passion has no influence at all. If you say that although freedom in this sense isn't a matter of degree the intelligent use of it is, your theory requires just the sort of supplement that I do not find at all extensive in Dr. Collingwood's exciting pages. It is all very well to say, and even to say with gusto, that force must be used in the nursery. If the "nursery" means juveniles and defectives we know where we are. If it means all who are not Members of Parliament we also know where we are and, I should say, know also that we have slipped up somewhere. And if the nursery includes, as one parable of Dr. Collingwood's might seem to suggest, the whole "Yahoo herd" we don't know where we are.

Having said so much about these matters, I have left myself too little space for many other things I should like to mention. I can say something, however, about Dr. Collingwood's "Three Laws of Politics." The first is (25.7) that a body politic is divided into a ruling class and a ruled class, the second that the barrier between the classes must be permeable in an upward sense, and the third that there is or tends to be a correspondence between rulers and ruled.

I deny the first law altogether. There must be rulers but there needn't be a ruling class. In a certain sense, no doubt, the rulers do form a class since they resemble one another in being rulers. So do army officers; but it doesn't follow in any ordinary sense that there must be an officer *class*. And Dr. Collingwood is employing a *very* ordinary sense for he tells us that the "ruling class" may carry "passengers." A "passenger" in this sense must mean one unfit for rule who is nevertheless in the ruling class, which is absurd if the ruling class is defined functionally by its regal efficiency. "Promotion" to the ruling class (except in emerging from the nursery) implies the same mistake about classes, and the third law seems to be tarred with the same idea unless it means that some children imitate their parents and that certain parents are rejuvenated in spirit by playing with their children.

Towards the close of Part II we hear a good deal about the distinction between "eristic" and "dialectic," so much indeed that Chapter XXX, "War as the Breakdown of Policy" begins as follows: "Why do wars happen in the modern world? Because the modern world handles its external politics in an eristic spirit." This I should call the pedant's fallacy, although I know very well that Dr. Collingwood is less of a pedant than almost any other philosopher I have ever met.

"Eristic," to speak roughly, is arguing for victory, "dialectic" is arguing with the hope of reaching agreement. From various statements and especially from a later footnote on p. 362, I gather that there are occasions for eristic, indeed, not merely for arguing a man down but also for shouting him down and for thrusting him down by force. We are told, however, that the proper

process (40.24) is to soften disagreements into non-agreements "not without the use of force" and then to attempt dialectically to convert non-agreement into agreement. It seems to follow from this (a) that people who do differ are in a hopeless plight. They have to fight it out. (*b*) that toleration has no place in Dr. Collingwood's scheme of things, (*c*) that a "soft" condition of non-agreement is a hopeful sign. I should not like to assent to any of these statements.

In Part III (Civilization) it is maintained that civilization is a process approximating asymptotically to an ideal of civility. Specifically this implies obeying rules of civil intercourse, intelligently using or scientifically exploiting the environment, and refraining from the use of force (which is always uncivil outside the nursery). A certain connection between civil behaviour to other men and the exploitation of the environment is traced to the transmission of skill from unknown inventors, e.g. the genius who invented the bowline. Barbarity is the opposite of civility, barbarization the opposing process to civilization. In Dr. Collingwood's chapter on education as a civilizing process there is a vehement outburst against professional educators, and a remarkable estimate of the capacities of (all?) parents in this matter. Even the irresponsibility of the parents is praised (37.88) and so is their "versatility as non-specialists" (37.36). We are not told why specialists should not be *more* resourceful than others in their special business or less resourceful when like the others they are off their special beat and therefore are non-specialists in such particulars.

Part IV, on Barbarism, explains that barbarism is conscious or unconscious hostility to civilization, and therefore distinct from savagery (which is simply the negative condition of not being civilized). The barbarist is said to be something of a parasite upon civilization and also to be pretty sure to lose in the (very) long run since human communities have multitudinous tendencies towards civility (with the consequence that, as soon as the barbarist has scotched one of these, some other pops up to torment and confound him).

The book ends with an account of four barbarisms: those of the Saracens, the Albigenses, the Turks, and the Germans. From explanations given at the beginning of Chapter XLIV it would seem that the list should not be taken too seriously; and that, I think, is just as well. The first three seem to have been chosen principally because they were specifically anti-Christian, though the first and the third are also condemned because of the permanence of the desolation they brought about. The Saracens, in short, were too unintelligent to appreciate the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. So they were barbarists. (The sting of this is removed in 44.8 when we are told that there is room now for Islam and for Christianity in the world, but here, perhaps the meaning is that the late Kemal Atatürk had a better version of —agnostic? —trinitarianism than Mohammed). The Albigenses, or Bogomils, were Manichaeans. So they were barbarists, not perceiving how right it is to say that the devil, although he is granted a long innings for no obvious reason, must be bowled in the end, and how wrong to say that the devil is a genuine antagonist who might conceivably carry his bat. As for the Turks, we hear a good deal about their campaigns and about their habit of liquidating Quislings when it suited them. Similar faithlessness obviously characterizes the Germans.

In these remarks and for the greater part of this review I seem to have been rather free with my criticisms, too "eristical" I suppose and insufficiently "dialectical." I should be much more perturbed had I been unfair; but in all probability I have been. Let me say, then, in conclusion, that this book of Dr. Collingwood's is by far the most stimulating and the most important contemporary work on general political theory that I have read for many

a long day, and that I have as good as no doubts about its fascination for those who are seriously busied about such inquiries. JOHN LAIRD

FOOTNOTE.—This review was written before Dr. Collingwood's death. The reviewer prefers to leave it unaltered, believing this course to be more respectful to Dr. Collingwood's memory and to his prowess as a controversialist than any other.

The Theory of Motion in Plato's Later Dialogues. J. B. SKEMP. (Cambridge University Press. 1942. Pp. xv and 123. Price 8s. 6d. net.)

Before I say anything of the main contentions of this very valuable and suggestive essay, I would enter a friendly *caveat* against a certain preconceived bias. It is natural that a Cambridge scholar should tend to take the view that whenever there is a divergence between Burnet and myself and Cornford, Cornford is right and we are wrong. No doubt this is sometimes so, and it ought to be so for the simple reason that Mr. Cornford published last, but I think Mr. Skemp carries his determination that the Oxford dogs shall not have the better of it a little too far; for example, in the remarks he makes on p. 82 about a non-existent difference between Professor Cornford's version of *Timaeus* 42*c* and my own. The metaphor, to which he takes exception, of the burden which the returning sinner has to trail after him, was not imported by me from the *Pilgrim's Progress*; it is there in Plato's own word *ἐπισπώμενος*, and the note in my translation of the dialogue was meant merely to defend the authentic text against the *falsa lectio ἐπισπόμενος*. And the metaphor is not strictly Bunyan's; his pilgrim is made free of his burden at the outset of his journey, as Bunyan's theology required that he should be. This is a small matter, but does, I think, suggest that Mr. Skemp's representations of "Burnet and Taylor" are not always to be implicitly trusted.

One other more important remark of a general kind. I may be mistaken, but I suspect that the laudable brevity of the essay has been achieved by severe compression and excision. Too often, I should say, where a choice has to be made between divergent interpretations of crucial Platonic texts, it is made without sufficient discussion of the arguments on either side, and there is often a similar light-heartedness in Mr. Skemp's treatment of debatable points in the scanty tradition of pre-Platonic thought. I feel that he is a little too ready to foreclose discussion by the mere assertion that something is "surely" so. Mr. Skemp may feel that in all these cases he has sufficient reasons to allege for his decisions, but the reader is often left insufficiently informed of those reasons. It is always, I should say, a good rule when one is tempted to settle a question with a "surely," to ask oneself, "Doesn't that mean that I am *not* sure?"

But to get down to brass tacks: I take it that the careful way in which Mr. Skemp has framed the title of his essay so as to avoid the implication of any radical revolution in the thought of the ageing Plato means that he has weighed and considered the conception of the "unity" of Plato's thought so ably championed by Professor Shorey. If so, I am glad to find him holding what I take it Professor Cornford and myself are at one in believing, that whether there is or is not any change of *doctrine* in what are now known to be the latest group of Platonic dialogues, there is, at least, a change of tonality, a shift of the centre of interest. These dialogues are pervaded, as the *Phaedo* and *Republic* are not, by a special and dominant interest in the nature of "process" (*κίνησις*) and its ultimate source which was absent from

their precursors, and this, I should say, is the real answer to Shorey's valiant attempt to prove that there is nothing in the "later" dialogues which is not to be found already somewhere or other in the *Republic*. Still it is legitimate to look in earlier dialogues for some anticipations of thoughts which will only become predominant in the *Sophistes—Laws* group. I am not convinced, however, that so much can be found in the *Cratylus* in particular as Mr. Skemp wants to find there. I suspect that he may have been a little too ready to accept Max Warburg's very uncertain speculations about the date of the dialogue and its supposed connection with Heraclides of Pontus. And when we remember that *δίκη* was in the fifth century an accepted name for "the course of *nature*" (cf. Euripides, *Medea* 402), I think it impossible to argue that the pretended etymological connection of *δίκη* with *διέναι* (*Crat.* 411*a*) conveys any suggestion that the source of motion "must be the soul." On the other hand I think that most of what is said about the growing interest in *κίνησις* and its source shown in the *Phaedrus*, *Parmenides*, *Theaetetus* is excellently put, and I would commend it to the consideration of any one who has been too much influenced by Shorey's exaggerated estimate of the kind of unity to be expected in the thought of a great philosopher continuously philosophizing for half a century. In particular I believe that Mr. Skemp is probably right in defending the MSS *ἀεικίνητον* at *Phaedr.* 245 *c* 5 against M. Robin, though he does not mention one consideration which weighs with me, that the *αὐτοκίνητον* of an Oxyrhyncus papyrus is likely to have been influenced by Xenocrates' definition of the soul, and by recollections of *Laws* X.

In the main what is said of the *Theaetetus*, *Sophistes*, and *Politicus* also seems to me admirable, especially the entirely correct exposition of the important passage in the *Sophistes* (259 *d*–264 *d*) about true and false thinking. It is true that the point of the whole passage is that the individual person about whom both the true and the false proposition are made is neither of the Forms in which he is said to "participate," and, in fact, is not a Form at all, and yet is no less real than the Forms themselves. Only I would add that the view that such passages involve a "direct and drastic modification" of the thought of the *Phaedo* can hardly be said to be "wrecked by the reappearance of the Form in the *Timaeus*" (51 *c*–*d*), when we remember that Timaeus is there made so carefully to be uttering a "personal opinion" (*ὧδε οὖν τήν γ' ἐμὴν αὐτὸς τίθεμαι ψῆφον*). I am the more bound to say this that my own *ψῆφος* on the question is given on the same side as Mr. Skemp's.

In connection with the remarks about the curious myth of the *Politicus*, is it not missing the main point of the story to comment (p. 21) that "Plato still clings to the figure of the philosopher-king who can dispense with rules and regulations." Is not the moral of the tale precisely that the infallible ruler who needs no laws is not an historical figure, but belongs to the fairyland where the beasts can talk? (The notion that the "kings" of the *Republic* are supposed to dispense with law has no foundation in the text—what the *Republic* says is only that they will be capable of making the law for themselves). With the treatment of the *Philebus* again I find myself in substantial agreement, only that I should not like to assume, as I think Mr. Skemp does, that the *Timaeus* is a later work than that dialogue. And I think it doubtful whether (p. 29) the Zeus of *Philebus* 30 *d* means "the *οὐρανός*." It may mean just "God," and in that case the dialogue will be all the more closely in accord with the conclusion to which Mr. Skemp rightly comes at the end of his essay about the real distinction between "the Good" and the "Father and Fashioner" of the world.

The main substance of the essay is contained in Chapters III–VII, which

deal with the *Timaeus* and the various Pre-Socratics who have contributed material to the great cosmological synthesis of the dialogue. As to the Pre-Socratics I will merely mention a few points where the writer's assertions are, as I think, at least open to question. I find it hard to believe that when Anaximander spoke of an ἄπειρον he meant something which is "finite, though not bounded," or had some anticipation of a "curvature of space." And, *à propos* of p. 41, it was not Burnet who "found a rotation of the earth" in Anaximander; it was Eudemus (see Theo Smyrn, 198, 18), and it is from him that Burnet takes it. Here, as in the more important case of Plutarch's statement that Theophrastus reported Plato's final rejection of the geocentric astronomy, I think Mr. Skemp allows himself to play a little fast and loose with weighty evidence which does not square with a preconceived opinion of his own. So the assumption (p. 38 *n.* 1) that in politics Pythagoreanism was an "aristocratic" movement is in direct conflict with what we are told by our (no doubt) late authorities. And again I find myself at p. 52 asking for reasons which are never given for the assertions that Orphicism ("qualified" or not) is to be found behind the verses of Xenophanes, and that the Orphic "world-egg" is the source of the "central fire" astronomy.

For reasons of space alone I must not enter into the exegesis of the *Timaeus* in any detail. My main general criticism would be that I think there should have been a more careful distinction between the primary question what the dialogue teaches us about the nature and source of κίνησις and certain important but secondary questions about the particular movements it ascribes to the heavenly bodies. As to the main question I believe there is no real divergence between Mr. Skemp, Prof. Cornford, and "Burnet and Taylor." We should all agree (1) that the *Timaeus* finds the ultimate source of all "motions" in a "soul" or "souls," (2) that a "soul" here means "a movement which can set itself moving, (3) that it is just in this conception of ψυχή as self-moving (not *unmoving*) that the fundamental difference between Plato and Aristotle comes in, (4) that the movements of the "heavenly bodies" are circular rotations, (5) that such rotation, wherever found, is to Plato's mind, due to the conscious superintendence of an agent with intelligent purpose. There is no disagreement about the "metaphysics" of motion; divergence only comes in with the interpretation of the highly ambiguous language of Plato about the particular motions assigned to the earth and the planets.

Even so, there are still several questions which need to be properly discriminated. If we can satisfy ourselves about the exact meaning of the language of the *Timaeus* and *Laws* VII about these movements, there is still the further question whether there is any change of view when we pass from one of these dialogues to the other. Mr. Skemp is anxious to sustain the highly ingenious answer given to these questions by Professor Cornford, viz. that both dialogues teach one and the same doctrine, and that both assume the geocentric astronomy. This leads him to devote a really disproportionate part of his discussion of the *Timaeus* to polemic against the views maintained by Burnet and myself, that the motion ascribed to the earth in the *Timaeus* is oscillatory, and that the geocentric scheme is incompatible with the *Laws*.

I do not deny that there are difficulties about the type of interpretation given by Burnet and myself. There are difficulties of which Professor Cornford has legitimately made the most. But I submit that his own most ingenious interpretation has also its real difficulties. I find it hard to believe that the word used at 40*b* about the earth (ἰλλομένην) means an orbital revolution, and though the very ingenious theory of "planetary") motions expounded

in *Plato's Cosmology* is perhaps strictly *compatible* with the actual words of Plato. I imagine Cornford himself would admit that it requires us to make an important assumption of which the text says nothing. (I mean the assumption that, over and above the ψυχή of the οὐρανός, there is a ψυχή of each "planet" which is a further "source of motion." This is expressly asserted about the true "stars," and it may seem natural that it should be understood also of the "planets," but it is odd that it should never be *said*). There is a further difficulty, acknowledged by Mr. Skemp, in supposing as his adherence to Cornford's main thesis compels him to do, that the emphatic language of *Laws* VII, 822 *e*, means only that the "proper motion" of a planet is regular and uniform. This much is taken for granted in the Myth of *Er*. How then can the speaker in the *Laws* call it a truth which he has only learned recently at an advanced age? Mr. Skemp tries to lessen the difficulty by a comparison with *Laws* 819 *d*, where, as commonly understood, the same speaker calls the existence of "incommensurables" a recent discovery. But can he really mean that? May not the "recent" surprising discovery be the discovery of the extent and grossness of the prevalent ignorance about incommensurables? Finally, there is the express testimony of Theophrastus already referred to, which ought not to be lightly disregarded or explained away. I do not say, then, that Mr. Skemp is doing wrong in following Professor Cornford's account of Plato's astronomy. But on his own showing he has difficulties to face which call for more discussion than can be given to them in an essay in which the precise details of astronomy are only a secondary issue. And I doubt whether Mr. Skemp himself is quite happy about the matter, since (pp. 80–82) he seems inclined to submit that after all *Tim.* 40 *b* does ascribe a "motion in latitude" to the earth.

Is there not some confusion of thought in the passage which attempts to explain why Plato did not accept the astronomical scheme of Eudoxus? Plato, we are told, shows his "anxiety to maintain the double-motion astronomy" by his very demand for an explanation of the *planetary* anomalies. But does he? In the movements of the true stars, as known to Plato, there *were* no anomalies to account for. And as to the reason why Plato could not accept the particular version of the "double-motion" astronomy devised by Eudoxus—"He could not allow that the soul moving the Ouranos was a host of movements at cross-purposes." If that is all, would it not follow that Plato must equally repudiate the astronomy accepted by Mr. Skemp for the *Timaeus*, where there are seven planets all, more or less, "at cross-purposes?" Is it not more likely that Plato saw that there are "appearances" of which the scheme of Eudoxus takes no account (e.g. the inequality of the seasons and the fact that we do not see an eclipse of the moon whenever sun and moon are in opposition)?

Chap. VII, which is concerned with the "ten kinds" of motion described at *Laws*, X, 893 *b* ff., is of very great interest. Mr. Skemp's own thesis, very ably developed, is that the classification depends on the cosmology and astronomy of the *Timaeus*, of which it is a summary with a certain touch of moralizing "unction." Now it seems to me that though Mr. Skemp has ably shown that most of the "ten motions" can be *illustrated* from the *Timaeus*, he has not really proved that the *Laws* actually presupposes the theories of that dialogue, and I consequently still think that the tenfold classification is not dependent on any particular physical or astronomical theory. This is, I think, proved by the fact that *gliding* and *rolling* are two of the "ten kinds," the planets of the *Timaeus* do not roll, nor yet, *pace* Mr. Skemp, do they glide. There is no "surface" for them to glide over. Has not Mr. Skemp been a little led away by an excess of zeal against what he calls

Burnet's "disparagement" of the *Timaeus*? And was it any disparagement at all to say, what is said by Burnet in the passage referred to, that the reply of *Laws* X to the "atheists," unlike the cosmogony of the *Timaeus*, is given as scientific "proof of the being of God" without any admixture of myth?

Of the brief concluding chapter on the "ultimate *ἀρχὴ κινήσεως* in Plato," I would only say that it is a particularly well-stated exposition of a truth of cardinal importance for the interpreter of Plato. "We are left with an *ἀγαθὸς δημιουργός and* (italics mine) *τὸ ἀγαθόν* as ultimates. He believed in an ultimate *ἀρχὴ κινήσεως* distinct from the Form of the Good" (p. 111). Exactly; and on that issue at any rate "Burnet and Taylor" are wholly at one with Mr. Skemp.

A. E. TAYLOR.

Plato's Earlier Dialectic. By RICHARD ROBINSON, Associate Professor of Philosophy in Cornell University. (Cornell University Press. 1941. Pp. viii + 239. Price 18s. 6d.)

Professor Robinson says at the outset that the book does not treat of the logical methods developed in the later dialogues, including the *Parmenides*. As the work deals with method, perhaps it is not unfair to say a word of Professor Robinson's own technique in planning the book, He divides it into two parts, Elenchus and Dialectic; only the first chapter of the second part, however, deals directly with dialectic in general, the rest of it being taken up with an exhaustive study of hypothesis and some allied problems. In effect then we have a series of studies of Plato's logical method, studies of great interest and depth.

The chapter on dialectic does not exhibit elenchus and hypothesis as related functions of the dialectic, which is discussed in quite general terms on the ground that it was something of which the content was always changing; they are, however, brought together for a special purpose in the chapter on hypothesis as treated in the *Republic*.

In dealing with elenchus Professor Robinson finds some difficulty in detaching it as a variety of logical method from its historical character as Socrates' technique for making men think for themselves. This difficulty arises from a marked feature of the author's technique, i.e. a desire to bring Plato's pioneer essays in logical method to the test of Aristotle's formal logic. Thus he proceeds by way of applying to the elenchus Aristotle's test of a dialectical argument, i.e. that it is either a syllogism or an epagoge, concentrating mainly on the former. He further distinguishes between the use of direct and indirect argument in the elenchus, the latter taking the form of a destructive hypothetical syllogism. A careful test shows that in nine of the earlier dialogues, including the *Republic*, three-fourths of the arguments appear to be indirect. As this is the main result, it will be seen that the author's study of elenchus is of a highly technical character.

Professor Robinson suggests indeed that Plato was not aware of these refinements and did not recognize anything so definite as a premise. At the same time Plato does make comments on the way that the elenchus works, otherwise the critic could not detect his misconceptions. While it might be urged that the author has read too much of the schematism of formal logic into the numerous examples of the elenchus, on the whole, however, he seems to have made out his case.

The author prefaces his chapter on dialectic by some general remarks on method, of which, of course, it is one kind. At this point one has a feeling

that perhaps there is a little too much scaffolding in the book, and that if some of it had been taken down the book as a whole would have been easier to read, for the close discussions do not admit of relaxed attention. Another instance of this occurs later in the examination of the use of hypothesis in the *Meno*, where the author seems to take up a disproportionately large space in arriving at what is the actual hypothesis upheld in the dialogue.

As regards dialectic the author finds it rather hard to say what it is exactly. For Plato it tended to be the "ideal method, whatever that may be." At times it is generally "resort to discussion;" in the *Republic* and middle dialogues he uses mainly hypothesis, while in the later ones division emerges. There were, however, certain permanent features. Professor Robinson perhaps disarms criticism by saying that his book "attempts to develop first those elements that always belonged to dialectic, and then the notion of hypothesis."

It proceeds by question and answer, the grounds for which procedure the author finds to be historical rather than logical; Plato, he suggests, took over the Socratic elenchus and tried to use it for constructive purposes. As he points out, dialectic is not easy to define because it is identified as much with the ends it serves as the means that it uses. It is claimed for it that it can attain certainty; but there is a hiatus between Plato's epistemology and his nascent logic. In the former, whether we sample it in the divided line of the *Republic* (which the author submits to a searching dialectic) or in the late analysis of the *Timaeus* leading to the identification of space, there is a strict correlation between faculty and object with a strict severance between the correlated pairs—in fact there is as hard and fast a distinction between rational knowledge and sensible opinion as between Kant's Vernunft and Verstand. In logic (or dialectic), however, there is inevitably a passing from one mental state to another. If in spite of this discrepancy certitude is claimed for dialectic, Professor Robinson is baffled by the thought that one cannot say much more about it than that it is a method of question and answer. Perhaps he might have made more of the fact that the questions are leading questions, that the questioner always plans the course of the discussion, and raises the new point at the right moment; he has the technique in his mind and brings it to the surface, as when he professedly uses such a device as hypothesis.

Dialectic is more than a method, it is a process or progress. Perhaps one might be allowed, by way of supplement, to quote part of a definition of dialectic, given by a later Platonist, Plotinus. "Dialectic is a mental habit or practice, which can tell of any given thing what it is, wherein it differs from other things, and what it has in common with them, of what class it is, etc. It discourses about the good and the not good . . . what is and what is not eternal—all by science and not by sensation. It checks our roaming over the area of the sensible, and establishes us in the ideal. There it carries on its activity. It rejects falsehood and nourishes the soul on the "plane of truth." It uses the Platonic division to distinguish the forms for definition, and to reach the first kinds. By thought it makes a synthesis of these till it has gone through all the ideal realm, and there again analysing them gets back to the first principle." This account is pieced together out of Book VI of the *Republic* and some of the later dialogues, which takes it further on than Professor Robinson's survey. One might suggest that his careful analysis of the technique of dialectic might have been supplemented a little by the "notes" of its more serious purpose. Thus it is curious that the insistence in Book VI that the *mark* of the Dialectician is that he is "synopticos" is not developed by the author, since he quotes from the same passage the remark that dialectic is the coping stone.

The author then takes us to the use of hypothesis of which he says guardedly that it is a method of deduction, provisional and approximate. A more positive indication is given in the statement that it is "positing in order to infer." This result is reached after a discussion as to whether alternatively a hypothesis is something to be proved (as in the modern sense of the word). Sometimes apparently it is so used. The thoroughness with which Professor Robinson examines every branch of the subject and his noteworthy circumspection do not allow any unqualified statements, a limitation perhaps salutary when we are dealing with the gradual growth of logical method in the mind of Plato. In the course of a careful study of the application of the method of hypothesis in the *Meno*, *Phaedo*, and *Republic* the author throws further light on the subject. Thus in respect of the *Meno* he remarks "with the introduction of the method he (Plato) is passing from destructive to constructive thinking, from elenchus and the refutation of other men's views to the elaboration of positive views of his own." In handling the *Phaedo* he gives some space to the suggested regress from the original hypothesis to a "higher" one, which he is careful to distinguish from the unhypothesized beginning of the *Republic* (511), the latter being epistemological. He thinks, however, that Plato only regarded such a procedure as a concession to an objector. The *Phaedo*, however, in general yields a good instance of the use of hypothesis—for what the method is worth.

The question of its validity arises in the *Republic*. Professor Robinson labels it as an inferior method, if contrasted with the claim to absolute knowledge made in the *Republic* and expounded at some length in the divided line. Plato's methodology in the *Meno* and *Phaedo*—he says—is at variance with his epistemology as stated in the *Republic* and other works. There is a good deal about hypothesis in the exposition of the divided line, where the two are sought to be brought together, and in his treatment of the question raised one may see the most valuable part of the whole book. Professor Robinson fastens on Plato's criticism of the mathematicians for treating their premisses as certainties when they should have regarded them as hypotheses (in the Platonic sense). This is how he understands the criticism, and he suggests that Plato meant that the mathematicians felt that their hypotheses were given in sensible intuition. "In geometry the appeal to spatial intuition and the claim that one's postulates are certainties go together. Plato's contemporaries accepted both. Plato and the twentieth century reject both." Otherwise presumably there would not be non-Euclidean space.

At the same time there is some interest in asking how the method of hypothesis should be used in mathematics, for here perhaps for the first time it would be applied to a science. So far it had been used in ethical, social, and philosophic enquiries, wherein the exclusion of sense perception from any share in the method would make little difference; this, however, could hardly be said of geometry. In our view no natural science can dispense with sense experience, and if Plato thought that hypothesis could be applied to geometry on such terms, then it is ideal numbers and figures that he had in mind.

Professor Robinson then turns to the further statement in the passage on the divided line that dialectic (unlike mathematics) treats its hypotheses strictly as hypotheses, but uses them as "steps and sallies" (to adopt the author's translation of an obscure phrase) to reach the anhypotheton by "the upward path." The text of the *Republic* gives the barest hints as to what is meant, which leaves the field open to speculation. The author goes patiently through the theories of his predecessors and then puts forward his own view, which is that the hypothesis must be submitted to an elenchus and that it becomes an anhypotheton, if it survives this test. Incidentally

this implies that the hypothesis is no longer treated as a means of getting to prove something else, but as itself something to be proved. At the end of it all, as Professor Robinson reminds us, the anhypotheton is not mentioned again, and apart from the *Parmenides* hypothesis does not come into the later dialogues. Does not it come to this that in the Socratic elenchus and in the method of hypothesis Plato is trying to reach a test of the validity of logical judgments, the beginnings of the deductive logic, which Aristotle put into the syllogism, or if you will perhaps something like the modern theory of consilience. Has this in fact much to do with the "nous" or "noesis" which intuits realities? In following the author's penetrating analyses one has the impression of Plato trying various technical devices, turning them over, and then quietly going on to some fresh method.

In reviewing this work it is possible that one has not conveyed an impression of its great merits. If anyone ever followed the argument, whithersoever it leads, Professor Robinson has done so. There is no passage in any of the Platonic dialogues with any bearing on the matter in hand, which he cannot quote. Even after finishing the main discussions on hypothesis, he takes up the further question whether mathematics can be dialectical and then deals with analogy. It is a wide field that he covers, and in every area his treatment is exhaustive. The book indeed is a fine specimen of that type of research for which American Universities are now famous.

H. M. Conacher.

Rome and China: A Study of Correlations in Historical Events. By Frederick J. Teggart. (University of California Press and Cambridge University Press. Price 18s. net.)

The author of this book, who is Professor of Social Institutions in the University of California, has set out to give a general explanation of barbarian invasions and "disturbances" on the European frontiers of the Roman empire between 58 B.C. and A.D. 107. He is clearly very interested in his subject and has made a most important contribution to the study of it. He goes further, however, and uses his work to illustrate a general theory of history; indeed, he indicates in his preface that he selected his subject simply as a suitable problem for an experiment in historical method. According to the publisher's jacket, Professor Teggart's aim is to provide an answer to the question: "Can scientific method be applied in the field of history for results useful to the intelligent conduct of human affairs?" He himself declares that thirty years ago he had found himself "confronted with the difficulty that, whereas in the opinion of scholars history was a science, the results achieved by historical inquiry were wholly unlike those characteristic either of physical or biological research," and had come to the conclusion that "since historical data constituted the record of human experience in its broader aspects, it was a matter of the highest importance to discover whether this experience might not be used for the purpose of gaining verifiable knowledge concerning 'the way things work' in the world of human relations."

Professor Teggart's work on tribal movements about the beginning of the Christian era is so admirable that it seems a pity he should have been thus preoccupied in his undertaking with large philosophical speculation, interesting as are his views on the proper purposes and methods of history. The book as a whole gives the impression of a good sea-going ship which has been so heavily overloaded that it is in danger of sinking. The author would have

been far more successful if he had not tried to prove quite so much. Haunted, apparently, by the desire to obtain results similar to those of physical or biological research, he strives to produce neat equations which will be more "scientific" than the generalizations of normal historical writing. Though he admits that "simple enumeration can never be accepted as a substitute for historical detail," he goes on to claim that during the period which he treats there were 31 occasions on which conflicts took place in the Roman East, and that 28 of these were followed by uprisings on the lower Danube, and 26 of them by outbreaks on the Rhine. These figures become less impressive than they may appear at first sight, if it is taken into consideration that 31 "conflicts" in 165 years means an average of roughly one in five, and further that the conflicts in question vary enormously in scope and intensity. Nor is Professor Teggart's argument free from *petitio principii*, for he maintains that "in the light of the close correspondence between events in the Roman East and Central Europe from 60 B.C. to A.D. 70, the disturbances in Armenia and Syria from 72 to 76–77 may be taken as confirmatory of the scanty evidence provided by inscriptions and coins that serious uprisings of German tribes took place between 74 and 77–78, and that on one occasion at least Moesia was invaded by Sarmatians."

It is noteworthy that Professor Teggart achieves his best results when he is using what may be described as normal methods of historical investigation rather than when he is constructing his schemes of chronological correlation. A most rigorous and wholly convincing piece of argument is his identification of the Yen-ts'ai or Ho-su of Chinese sources with the Abzoae mentioned by Pliny as living to the east of the lower Volga. Hitherto the identification with the Aorsi, first advanced in 1885 by Gutschmid and Hirth, seems to have gone unchallenged, but Teggart gives good reasons for believing it to be incorrect. On this and on many other points his account throws new light on the obscure early history of Central Asia. But in so far as he convincingly sustains his main thesis, it is because he uses "historical detail" to show definite connections and does not rely merely on coincidences of date.

The view that events occurring near the borders of China may have had important effects on the Roman world is not, of course, new; it has existed ever since it was first suspected that the Huns of European history derived their name from the Hsiung-nu of Chinese records. To-day, as a result of the labours of Tomaschek, Marquart, and other scholars, our knowledge of Central Asian history has increased to a point at which it should have become impossible any longer to regard Roman history as a self-contained field of study with no significant geographical connections beyond the immediate borderlands of the empire. Professor Teggart does well to emphasize this. But nothing is to be gained by overstraining evidence in order to explain phenomena of great variety and complexity by a simple formula.

In his preface Professor Teggart states his conclusion that the correspondence of wars in the East and invasions in the West, which he finds so striking, was due to interruptions of trade. The pages of the book itself, however, do not bear out this extreme simplification. As regards Parthia the author makes out a very strong case, for Parthia depended largely for revenue on tolls on the transit trade along the "silk route" from China to Syria, and these would fail whenever wars and blockades held up the caravans. But the explanation does not work so well as applied to the movements of tribes on the northern steppes, because it is clear from the evidence adduced by the author that displacement of tribes as a direct result of war is a very important factor in migration and this is not reducible to interruption of trade routes. Thus there is a high degree of probability that the west-

ward withdrawals of Northern Hsiung-nu tribes after recorded heavy defeats in A.D. 49 and 73 had repercussions which are manifest in the movement of the Alan tribes from about 50 and their large-scale invasion of Armenia and Media some time between 72 and 75. Further, the struggles of the Hsiung-nu to gain control over the trade routes of the Tarim basin and levy tolls on the silk traffic were not an effect of interruption of trade (though they were at times a cause of it), but arose from their determination to exploit a commerce which they did not carry on, and this implies a greater capacity for 'policy,' as distinct from an automatic response to external factors, than Professor Teggart appears willing to allow to 'barbarian' tribes.

Professor Teggart has written a valuable book, but his material seems to have proved to a great extent intractable to his design. It is difficult to avoid the impression that Professor Teggart, in the hope of making history more 'scientific,' has tended to ignore the necessary limiting conditions of historical study. These limitations are not peculiar to human history—as Professor Teggart suggests—but are to be reckoned with also in the 'historical' branches of the physical and biological sciences, e.g. in the study of the Ice Age or the evolution of animal species. The special characteristic of 'history,' which distinguishes it from anthropology and sociology, is that it reconstructs the past from evidence remaining in the present and thereby provides a knowledge of development in time wider than that which is afforded by purely contemporary observation and experiment. The more the results of specialized historical research are integrated and made available for use by the social sciences, the better for man's knowledge of his world and society, but history must obtain these results by the methods it finds most appropriate for its field of investigation. G. F. HUDSON.

Reflections by a Journeyman in Philosophy on the Movements of Thought and Practice in his Time. By JOHN HENRY MUIRHEAD. Edited by JOHN W. HARVEY. (London: Allen & Unwin. 1942. Pp. 215. Price 15s.)

Trained in philosophical idealism at Glasgow by Edward Caird and at Oxford by T. H. Green, Muirhead's chief interest lay thereafter in the application of his philosophy to practical questions, especially to those of social reform. With remarkable selflessness he devoted his gifts to the welfare of his fellow-men; the dissemination of ethical culture, the fulfilment of the civic responsibilities of the University of Birmingham—these and other causes filled the range of his vision to the exclusion of himself. His gifts of sympathy enabled him to feel at home with younger men when he had outlived his contemporaries, and when philosophical trends and interests had changed; his eagerness and his ability to help his juniors endeared him to one generation of them after another, and when he died at the age of eighty-five the passing of the Grand Old Man of philosophy was an occasion of universal regret.

The title of this book of memories is very characteristic of the author. It describes him as a "journeyman," and this is not self-depreciation but genuine humility; and it implies that what he thought it worth while to write in response to the requests of his friends was not an account of himself so much as an account of other men, whom he regarded as more gifted than himself, and of movements in which he participated. Indeed, few autobiographies contain so little material directly about their subject; apart from a charming narrative of his childhood, Muirhead tells comparatively little about himself

beyond a few facts and dates. But to wish that he had done otherwise would be to wish him other than he was, and to depreciate the value and the grace of what he actually wrote. Moreover, almost despite itself, a singularly lovable and unselfish personality glints through this record of his contacts with others, and impresses with its dignity and attractiveness even readers who did not know him in the flesh.

Muirhead was but fifteen when he entered the University of Glasgow in 1870, and there he passed through the old compulsory seven-subject curriculum in Latin, Greek, Logic, Moral Philosophy, Natural Philosophy, Mathematics, and English Literature. He rightly doubts whether "for breadth of training or for business life, for the professions or for specialized study" any better curriculum has ever been devised; and he had the good fortune to study it under an unusually distinguished group of professors. The chief of these was Edward Caird, whose class in moral philosophy was a new revelation to the youth of Scotland, and whose impact on Muirhead was all the greater in that the young student postponed that class until late in his course. It is clear from this book that it was from Caird that Muirhead learnt the fundamental moral ideas which guided the rest of his life.

A Snell Exhibition took Muirhead to Balliol in 1875, but he was at that time not much at home in Oxford, although the influence of T. H. Green led him to devote himself to social reform. His account of Oxford, as of Glasgow, consists in the main of short and graphic sketches of his teachers and other leading figures in the university at the time. On leaving Oxford, he returned to Glasgow as assistant to the Professor of Humanity, but although he held this post for six years he was increasingly convinced that classical study was not his vocation. He thought of entering the Church of Scotland, but he was deterred partly by his own scruples in signing the confession of faith, partly by the unenlightened character of the theological lectures at Glasgow which his professor allowed him to attend.

In 1885, determined to seek a vocation elsewhere before it was too late, he left Glasgow for London to enter Manchester New College, where he hoped to breathe a freer theological atmosphere. Although he writes appreciatively of Martineau, Upton, and Estlin Carpenter, and although he almost became a Unitarian minister in Croydon, he came to think that Unitarianism was not for him; with its too attenuated theology and its lack of a social philosophy, it seemed to him to suffer from "motor ataxia." He had become interested in the London Ethical Society, and when it began to hold meetings in Essex Hall he was glad to become secretary of the university extension work, of which his Unitarian friends made that hall the centre. At about the same time he was appointed to philosophy lectureships at Holloway and Bedford Colleges in the University of London. He was beginning to find his feet, and was living an interesting and varied life in contact with the members of the Fabian Society, to whom he was introduced by his friend Graham Wallas. At this time, too, he began to edit the Library of Philosophy, a remarkable series of volumes which may remain his greatest philosophical monument.

In 1897 he at last found his life work on his appointment to the chair of philosophy at Mason College, soon to become the University of Birmingham. The Birmingham chapters, one of which readers of *Philosophy* have already been able to peruse in the issue for November 1942, are perhaps the most fascinating in the book. There are brilliant character sketches of Joseph Chamberlain, Sir Oliver Lodge, and Bishop Gore; and the account of the making of a university is defective only in so far as some readers may fail to read between the lines and observe how large a factor in the success of

the institution and its activities was Muirhead himself. In a great industrial city he was able to devote himself wholeheartedly to social problems, both to the philosophical principles on which reform should be based, and also to their actualisation in practice. His essays on the Poor Law are an example of his work in this connection, and he also writes of the University Settlement, of the Workers' Educational Association, and of the Warwickshire Education Committee, although as usual his own contribution to the success of these is ignored and all the credit is given to others. He was concerned that the University should address itself to the needs of the poor, by whom it was surrounded, and also to the requirements of Birmingham industry; this led him to support the foundation of the Faculty of Commerce, and to advocate what are now called "social studies." He makes no mention of the Muirhead Lectureship in Social Philosophy which was founded and endowed by friends as a fit memorial to his work in Birmingham.

With his retirement in 1921, Muirhead's manuscript ends. We are left asking many questions. First, we want more information about the man Muirhead who is so quick to praise others and so reluctant to bring himself on the stage. Our curiosity here is gratified by the brief but charming sketch of her uncle which Miss Helen M. Wodehouse has contributed to the book. Secondly, we want to know about Muirhead's own teaching; he has told us what Caird did; but what did he lecture on himself, when he had the impossible task of taking all philosophy for his province? Thirdly, what editorial principles and what amount of editorial work lay behind the success of the Library of Philosophy? Fourthly, members of the British Institute of Philosophy would like to know much more than Muirhead's short paragraph tells of his work for the Institute.

On these last three points, enlightenment might have been expected from Mr. Harvey, who has edited the volume which Muirhead did not live to complete or to revise for the press. But he has confined himself to adding a few footnotes and to writing a concluding chapter, based on Muirhead's unfinished draft, about the last twenty years of Muirhead's life, especially about the years spent as a visiting professor in California. Interesting though the chapter is, the reader must regret that the editor has not gone a little further, not only in the way just suggested, but also in correcting the numerous mis-spellings of proper names in the earlier part, in adding to the bibliography (here contributed by Mr. T. E. Jessop) Muirhead's two earliest publications (an essay on Cicero and a selection of Cicero's letters), and in emending the anecdote on p. 58, where Caird and Nichol are said to have been Professors when Story was Principal of the University of Glasgow. This is impossible; when Story became Principal in 1898, Caird was already Master of Balliol, and Nichol was dead.

T. M. Knox.

Conditions of Peace. By E. H. Carr. (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1942. Pp. xxiv + 279. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

The war, Professor Carr foresees, will be the prelude either to the fairly rapid decay, or violent overthrow, of our civilization, or else to a decisive turning-point and the birth of a new world based on a new social philosophy. The most unsatisfactory feature of British foreign policy between the wars was its failure to establish any proper co-ordination between ends and means. Much will thus depend on Britain having a government ready to give that "clear and decided lead" which will make the active co-operation of the

U.S.A. more, not less, certain in the future. This will presuppose careful preparation during the war. In 1919 British, and French, statesmen, complacently failing to understand the intractable material of history, forfeited the initiative to the rival group of powers. This war should be recognized as an episode in a revolution—against three nineteenth-century ideas: liberal democracy, national self-determination, and *laissez faire* economics.

If Britain is to play a predominant post-war role, her people must maintain in peace that same sense of common purpose and obligation which has been born of a common enmity and a common fear. For the moral crisis of to-day is the breakdown of the system of ethics which fostered those aforesaid nineteenth-century notions. The most fundamental factor jeopardizing social cohesion is the cessation of the apparently automatic expansion which made possible the recognition of the profit motive as a moral force. We realize now that progress can be achieved only by deliberate planning. Yet we continue to ignore the problem of the moral purpose which must reanimate our political and economic system. Mr. Carr outlines, very tentatively, some of what may become "the basic assumptions of the coming age."

Unlike the "four freedoms," the new faith must speak in positive terms. It must make democracy a reality by restoring to the "little man" his sense of being a constituent member of the community. It must address itself to the mitigation of inequality and unemployment. And it must lay more stress on services to, than on benefits from, the community—and on authority (used by the State on behalf of the masses) than on the enlargement of popular liberties. It is in this spirit that, in his final chapter, Mr. Carr calls, in the cause of European reconstruction, for vigour, on the part of "those who have the power," in enforcement of "the decisions which they think right."

"The most encouraging feature of the present situation is the prevalence, especially among the younger generation, of a deep-seated conviction that the world of the past decade has been a bad and mad world and that almost everything in it needs to be uprooted and replanted." This is not the only remark suggesting that Mr. Carr's simple formula might be to do, on every point, the opposite of what happened in 1919. The view then accepted was that an international society should be constructed "by the piecing together of national units." Next time the best hope lies in a reversal of that process. "Legalistic discussions" must not again serve as a "red herring" to divert public opinion from those practical issues of co-operation and interdependence on which the future depends. No attempt must again be made to combine in a single operation the two distinct processes of ending the war and of building the durable framework of an international society. It will be wise to recognize that peace-making is not an event, but a continuous process, likely to take six years or more.

Readers who recall *The Twenty Years' Crisis* should not be surprised to find Mr. Carr abounding in the provocative mood. It may indeed be regretted that, in stating his often excellent ideas, he should now and then have been tempted to prove too much. That governments cannot always strictly adhere to economic textbook maxims was well worth recalling, and it may be that some economists have too readily assumed the increase of wealth as a necessary objective. But when one of them writes of factories being sited in the "wrong" places, it seems a little severe to tax him with having looked, in breach of his own principle, at ends, as opposed to means. (The constable who puts you on your "right" road, may care nothing for destinations as such.) Allied diplomacy may indeed have been overmuch preoccupied with peace and security; but, when Mr. Carr denies that these can properly be the

objects of policy, it is the "immediate" objects that he must surely mean, for he himself goes on to say how after this war those very ends may best be pursued. In insisting that economic nationalism injures the interests of the common man, and that the independence of nations should be recognized only subject to economic policies being regionally co-ordinated, he takes a helpful line; but, when "strategic factors" are described by him as demanding a similar treatment of military affairs, his reasoning is such as to condone the Nazi assault on Holland. He incidentally adds colour to the legend that neutrality, for League members, was supposed to be out of the question. Nor is he better inspired on the "confusion" into which the Paris peace-makers fell on "the baffling problem of self-determination." Impossible of uniform use as their principle may often have proved, there is really no reason to charge them with not having well understood it. When it is proposed to "re-interpret" the right, as inhering not in nations but individuals, what seems to suffer re-interpretation is the word "re-interpretation" itself. Men and women should, says Mr. Carr, be "induced" to determine themselves into different units for different purposes. On what happens if they be unwilling, he is ominously reticent. What peoples are to surrender is not "a mythical attribute called sovereignty," but merely the habit of framing their military and economic policies without regard for other nations' interests. But does one really dispose of a constitutional crux by calling it a "red herring"? (p. 165)

Does one really dispose of the boundary line between economics and the other social sciences by calling it "unreal," or "dear to the academic mind"? (p. 75). The most ambitious, and, were it valid, the most timely, of Mr. Carr's passages is that introducing his opinion that "there is no practical difficulty about the solution of the economic problem." We must be clear, he says, about the "social function" of war in our time. To inequality and unemployment it forms "an effective, if short-term, antidote." We cannot therefore escape from war until we have found some other moral purpose powerful enough to generate self-sacrifice on the scale requisite to let civilization survive. Given such a purpose, the vicious circle of the economic crisis will, as in war, be "triumphantly broken." Has Mr. Carr forgotten his own adjective, "short-term"? And those now in the armed forces: are they, technically, employed or unemployed? What precisely will, in peace-time, be involved in treating them "in exactly the same serious and methodical way" as in time of war? Nor will every reader easily see how a reduced consumption of non-essentials will of itself contribute to full employment.

It is, however, in his attack upon the profit motive that Mr. Carr becomes most perplexing to a layman. The metaphors "driving force" and "regulating force" both occur; but no distinction appears between the grounds on which an entrepreneur proceeds and the possibly independent grounds on which the State may have wished him to do so. Was there ever a time when at least a possibility of *regulative* action by the State did not condition the working of the profit motive, as the *driving* force of the economic machine? The case for more intervention, whether or not we call it "economic planning," does not, even in Germany, presuppose the entire "supersession" of the profit motive. Though no longer trusted, of itself, to make for maximum welfare, the incentive with which the worker goes "to it," includes, even in Russia, some element of interest in a material reward. There may after all be nothing incompatible between the continued vitality, under suitable controls, of men's will to economic self-help, and the re-emphasizing, among to-morrow's basic assumptions, of "scoial values of a different kind."

It would be ungracious, however, and inept, to end these rather captious

comments without a word of tribute to Mr. Carr's general approach. Of the special pleading by which so much ostensibly academic writing on similar subjects is commonly marred, his book is distinctively free. To such as reject its readings of the past and recommendations for the future it is open to offer some equally sincere contribution of their own. That there shall never be wanting others of like ability ready to wrestle, in Mr. Carr's disinterested truth-seeking spirit, with the tough problems of world order, is itself a condition of peace. C. A. W. MANNING.

Physics and Philosophy. By Sir JAMES JEANS. (Cambridge: at the University Press. 1942. Pp. viii + 222. Price 8s. 6d.)

The author discusses the philosophical implications of physical theory in an easy, popular, interesting, but not always satisfactory, way. His grasp of philosophical problems is uncertain, and his exposition of the views of earlier thinkers is inaccurate. It is to be hoped that he is more reliable as an exponent of modern physical theory. So much for the debit side. On the credit side must be placed the general conclusions that arise from the discussion. Causality and indeterminacy, like probability, measure human knowledge and ignorance, nothing else. On issues such as Idealism *versus* Materialism physics has nothing to say. Anyone who asserts or denies that the human will is free speaks as a metaphysician and not as a man of science. These things are all worth saying, but could have been said at any time, for they depend on the character of scientific method, not on the subtleties of the Quantum Theory. The philosophical value of the Quantum and other new scientific theories is that by developing new ideas they open up new philosophical possibilities. If Sir James Jeans can help to prevent men of science from talking metaphysics without knowing they are doing so, and metaphysicians from claiming that science justifies their theories, much may be forgiven him. A. D. RITCHIE.

Art: A Bryn Mawr Symposium. R. BERNHEIMER, RHYS CARPENTER, K. KOFFKA, MILTON C. NAHM. (Lancaster, Pa.: Lancaster Press Inc. 1940. Pp. xii + 350.)

Thls collection of essays is an interesting attempt to shed light on aesthetic experience from several different angles. The art historian, the archaeologist, the psychologist, and the philosopher, are asked what contribution they can make from their specialities to the elucidation of aesthetic problems. From the standpoint of heuristic method, it is true that aesthetics impinges on these and other branches of knowledge. The varietv of its methods should correspond to the variety of its problems, and no error is more frequent than the conversion of aesthetics into psychology, philosophy, or the history of art. But it is no use applying the right method to the wrong problem. And, sound as much of this material is, it is disconcerting to find an art historian dealing with symbolism, an archaeologist discussing the development of modern painting, and a psychologist concerning himself with tertiary values. One cannot help feeling that there would have been less trespassing and overlapping if the writers had taken the precaution of agreeing beforehand about the different fields they would severally traverse. LISTOWEL.

Books also received:—

A. M. Carr-Saunders. *The Biological Basis of Human Nature.* (L. T. Hobhouse Memorial Trust Lectures, No. 12). Oxford University Press. London: Humphrey Milford. 1942. Pp. 24. 2s. net.

W. G. de Burgh. *George Dawes Hicks, 1862–1941.* From the *Proceedings of the British Academy*, Vol. XXVII. London: Humphrey Milford. 1942. Pp. 29. 3s. net.

Kewal Motwani, A.M., Ph.D. *Science and National Reconstruction in India.* (Address delivered before the Indian Science Congress, 29th Session, at Baroda, January 6th, 1942.) Calcutta: The Indian Science Congress Association. 1942. Pp. ii + 34.

Armand Lowinger. *The Methodology of Pierre Duhem.* New York: Columbia University Press. London: Oxford University Press. (Humphrey Milford.) 1941. Pp. 184. English price, 15s. 6d. net.

Alfred Tarski. *Introduction to Logic and to the Methodology of Deductive Sciences.* Translated by Olaf Helmer. New York: Oxford University Press. 1941. Pp. xviii + 239. English price, 14s. net.

C. H. Waddington, Sc.D., and others. *Science and Ethics.* London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1942. Pp. 144. 7s. 6d. net.

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Schelling. *The Ages of the World.* Translated with Introduction and Notes by Frederick de Wolfe Bolman, Jr. New York: Morningside Heights: Columbia University Press. 1942. Pp. xi + 251. 20s. net.

INSTITUTE NOTES

PROFESSOR DINGLE's lecture on "Space and Time in Modern Physics," which was postponed owing to the sudden illness of the lecturer, will be delivered at the Institute on Friday, March 19th, at 5 p.m.

On Friday, February 19th, Professor H. H. Price (Wykeham Professor of Logic in the University of Oxford) lectured on "Belief."

Request from ASLIB.—The Association of Special Libraries and Information Bureaux have reminded us that the losses of libraries owing to war conditions have been very extensive, not only in this country but throughout Europe. Readers of PHILOSOPHY, who can spare back numbers of the Journal, are asked to retain them in good condition until after the war, when they may be of value in contributing to the replacement of stocks of periodicals lost by national and institutional libraries.

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Appeal for New Members and Donations

It will be readily understood by members that it was inevitable that the war with its world-wide dislocation should cause a considerable loss of income to the Institute. This loss has now been accumulating for nearly four years. The Institute has no endowments, and its work, which includes lecture courses and meetings for discussion in the various Centres, as well as the conduct of the Journal, cannot be carried on from revenue derived solely from subscriptions of £1 1s. per annum.

The Council therefore appeals to members to do all in their power to introduce new members in order to extend the benefits of the Institute and to increase its revenue. It also appeals for donations, small or large, from sympathizers with the Institute's aims.

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